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2Personal Study Plan
Name: Kee-on NG 
Date of Registration: 2nd October 1996 
Overall Objective
■ To produce a portfolio, which demonstrates clinical, academic and research 
competence.
Clinical Dossier
Aims:
■ To demonstrate professional competence
■ To enhance professional competence by critical reflection on practice 
Proposed Content:
A documentation of my professional development since 1981. This will include my work 
and experience as a clinical psychologist in a number of health care settings:
■ As a psychologist in the mental handicap and mental health services in U.K.
3■ My professional experience of working in the psychiatric settings in Hong Kong
■ My professional experience of working in an acute teaching hospital in Hong Kong
The content will also include accounts of my professional development and my 
involvement at different level of service development: at the clinical, management, 
planning and research level.
Academic Dossier
Aims:
■ To enhance my knowledge in two specialist areas of clinical psychology
■ To critically evaluate the theory and practice in the two areas of clinical psychology
Proposed Content:
Two 4500 worded reviews will be submitted on the following topics:
■ The Role of Placebos in Psychotherapy Research
Conceptually and methodologically, placebo as a construct in psychotherapy research is 
largely borrowed from chemotherapy, which viewed all psychological variables as 
“nuisance” factors that have to be controlled. Recent controversies have questioned the 
adequacy of the placebo as a construct in psychotherapy research. These controversies 
actually raise fundamental concern about the viability of extending the chemotherapy
4paradigm to guide psychotherapy research. The aim of this review is to examine the 
conceptual and methodological bases of placebo in psychotherapy.
■ A Cognitive analysis of Obsessions
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) is a common psychiatric disorder, which usually 
has a very distressing, disabling and destructive consequence. This review will focus on 
some of the recent researches in the cognitive processes of the disorder. Recently it has 
been proposed that obsessions are caused by the way meanings are attributed to the 
significance of one’s thoughts (Rachman, 1993; Salkovskis, 1985). The aim of this 
review is to examine the evidence in support of the theory.
Research Dossier
Aims:
■ To demonstrate research competence 
Research Title:
■ Distinctive Characteristics of Neurasthenia: A comparative study with anxiety 
and depressive disorders
5Research Supervisors/Advisors:
Dr. Eithne Buchanan-Barrow / Dr. Emma Dunmore (University of Surrey)
Dr. Calais Chan & Dr. Wing (Dept, of Psychiatry, Prince of Wales Hospital, Hong Kong) 
Mr. Tony Leung (Advisor on Statistics, c/o Dept, of Psychiatry, Prince of Wales 
Hospital, Hong Kong)
Background:
The subject of the proposed study is Neurasthenia, which was initially coined by an 
American neurologist George Beard (1869). It has been described as a 'disease o f  the 
nervous system, without organic lesion, which may attack any or all part o f  the system, 
aW  c/zanzcferz.s'gf/ o f f/ze fzervozzj force, w/zzc/z may /zove o/Z degree o f
jeverzzy, from j/zg/zf Zoojezzzzzg o f f/zejc forces ofowzz to ^ rp/bzzW oW  gczzcro/ j^rojtrotzozz ' 
(Bourveret, cited by Deale and Adams 1894). At the core of the condition is ‘nervous 
exhaustion’ whereby sufferers invariably complain of undue fatigue on slightest exertion, 
both mental and physical. The concomitant symptoms, however, tend to vary, ranging 
from sleep disturbance, emotional symptoms such as irritability, worry, mood 
disturbance (e.g. anxiety and melancholy) , nervous pain such as tension headaches and 
myalgia, to cognitive symptoms such as memory loss and poor concentration (Lee, 1994). 
Embracing such a broad spectrum of vague and non-specific symptoms, controversies 
inevitably arise over its usefulness as a psychiatric entity. Questions have been raised 
about its nosological status and its place in modern psychiatry. It has been suggested
6because of its overlapping symptomatology with depression and anxiety (e.g. Kleinman, 
1982), neurasthenia is primarily a variant of the affective disorder of anxiety and 
depression. Consequently, neurasthenia as a concept is dismissed in the West and 
subsumed under the concept of depression and anxiety.
Despite the rejection in the west, neurasthenia as an illness has flourished in the East, 
particularly in Chinese society (Lee, 1994). In Chinese societies, neurasthenia is seen a 
unique illness, distinctive from depression and anxiety. In view of these controversies 
and confusion, the aim of this is elucidate the nature and characteristics of neurasthenia. 
Emphasis will be placed on investigating any possible psychological characteristics of 
neurasthenia which are distinctive from anxiety and depression.
Method
Subjects:
3 groups of clinical subjects will be selected and employed in this study: namely those 
diagnosed to be suffering from neurasthenia, depression and anxiety. It is anticipated to 
recruit at least 50 subjects in each clinical group. All of the subjects will be recruited 
from our local hospitals and clinics where a formal diagnosis will be made by a 
psychiatrist using the DSM-IV and ICD10, which are internationally recognised 
classification and diagnostic procedures.
7Instruments/ Measures
This consists of a set of self-report scales, as follows:
1. The revised Beck Depression Inventory
2. The Beck Anxiety Inventory
3. The Depression Anxiety Stress Scale
4. Neurasthenia Scale (developed by a local psychologist in Hong Kong)
5. Penn State Worry Questionnaire
The psychometric properties of all these scales have been tested and validated.
(A discussion about the properties of these clinical scales, and a copy of which, including 
the translated version, will be forwarded at a later date)
Procedure
1. Since most of the self-report scales were originally developed in the West, they will 
be translated into the Chinese language, and back-translated to evaluate semantic 
consistency and reliability.
2. All subjects selected for the study will be recruited from the outpatient clinics in 
Hong Kong and be given the questionnaires.
Statistical Design/ Data Analysis
1. Factor Analysis: To evaluate the extent to which the factor structure of the Western 
scales employed in this study fit with a Chinese clinical population.
2. Analysis of Variance: To investigate the characteristic of neurasthenia distinctive 
from anxiety and depression, scores obtained from Neurasthenia, Depression and 
Anxiety groups on various psychometric scales will be compared. A one way 
analysis of variance will be performed on a list of planned orthogonal contrast 
(neurasthenia versus depression and anxiety; depression versus anxiety). It is 
predicted the neurasthenic group will have a higher score on the Neurasthenia Scale 
than the anxiety and depression controls, while the latter will have higher scores on 
scales measuring their corresponding affect.
3. Correlation analysis, multiple regression analysis and discriminant function analysis 
will also be performed to investigate the relationship between the construct of 
neurasthenia, anxiety and depression. Should the assumption of neurasthenia being a 
construct overlapping with anxiety and depression be true, then it is anticipated that 
there will be a positive measured association between neurasthenia and the construct 
of anxiety and depression.
Resources/ Support for the project
Since I am working at a teaching hospital, which is part of the medical faculty of the 
Chinese University of Hong Kong, facilities such as library and computerised statistical 
packages are readily available. A number of colleagues have also kindly agreed to 
provide advice and assistance in data collection and analysis.
9Time-scale
The instrument (questionnaires) for the research project has already been printed and the 
data collection shall commence around end of April, 1997. This should take 
approximately 3 to 6 months. That is to say, it is hope that the data collection will 
complete in October 1997 which shall provide sufficient time for data analysis and the 
writing up of the thesis.
References:
Kleinman, A. (1982). Neurasthenia and depression: A study of somatisation and culture 
in China. Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, 6(2), 117 190.
Lee, S. (1994). The vicissitude of neurasthenia in China: Where will it go from the ICD- 
10? Transcultural Psychiatric Review, 31, 157 471.
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Section 2.1: Curriculum Vitae and Publications
Professional Appointments
The United K ingdom  (1979 ~ 1990)
1979-1981 Probationer Clinical Psychologist 
Mersey Regional Health Authority, 
Liverpool.
1981-1983 Clinical Psychologist 
Warrington Health Authority, 
c/o New Church Hospital, 
Warrington.
1983 Honorary Clinical Supervisor
Post-graduate Training Programme in Clinical Psychology, 
University of Liverpool.
1983 -  1985 Senior Clinical Psychologist 
North Staffordshire Health Authority, 
c/o Stallington Hospital, 
Stoke-on-Trent.
1985 -  1987 Senior Clinical Psychologist 
Mid-Staffordshire Health Authority, 
c/o St. George’s Hospital,
Stafford.
1983 -  1987 Honorary Clinical Supervisor
Post-graduate Training Programme in Clinical Psychology, 
University of Birmingham.
1 9 8 7 - 1990 Principal Clinical Psychologist 
Trafford Health Authority,
Nr. Manchester.
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1 9 8 7 - 1990 Honorary Clinical Supervisor
Post-graduate Programme in Clinical Psychology,
Manchester University.
H ong K ong (1990  ~  1999)
1 9 9 0 - 1994 Clinical Psychologist 
Hospital Service Department,
Hong Kong Government.
(Castle Peak Hospital, Hong Kong)
1994 -  Present Clinical Psychologist 
Department of Psychiatry,
Prince of Wales Hospital, Hong Kong.
1990 -  Present Honorary Lecturer and Clinical Supervisor 
Post-graduate Training Programme in Clinical Psychology, 
University of Hong Kong.
1991 -  Present Honorary Lecturer and Clinical Supervisor 
Post-graduate Training Programme in Clinical Psychology, 
Chinese University of Hong Kong.
1994 -  Present Honorary Clinical Lecturer 
Department of Psychiatry,
Faculty of Medicine,
Chinese University of Hong Kong.
1994-1996 Part-time Lecturer and course co-ordinator 
Department of Applied Social Science, 
City University,
Hong Kong.
1995 - 1998 Honorary Consultant Psychologist 
Positive United Living Services, 
Hong Kong.
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Teaching Experience
1 9 8 0 - 1981 Lectures on Medical Psychology to 1SI Year medical students, 
New Medical School, University of Liverpool, U.K.
1981 -  1983 Lectures on Behaviour Modification to nurses, Warrington 
General Hospital, U.K.
1981 -  1983 Lectures on Early Intervention and Precision Teaching 
Techniques to social workers and health visitors, Warrington 
Health Authority, U.K.
1983 -  1985 Lectures on “Psychological Intervention for people with 
Developmental Handicap or Learning Difficulties” to post­
graduate students at Keele University, Staffordshire, U.K.
1985 -  1987 Lectures/ seminars on “Behaviour Modification” to nurses, 
Community Mental Handicap Unit, Stafford, U.K.
1 9 9 0 - 1994 Teaching Introduction to Psychology to psychiatric student 
nurses, school of nursing, Castle Peak Hospital, Hong Kong.
1 9 9 0 - 1992 Lectures on Psychotherapies to social work students, 
Department of Social Science, Hong Kong Polytechnic, Hong 
Kong.
1991 - 1992 Workshop on Sex Education Programme for social workers, 
Family Planning Association, Hong Kong.
1991 -  1992 Lectures on Behavioural Therapy to trainee clinical 
psychologist, Department of Psychology, Chinese University of 
Hong Kong.
1991 -  1994 Seminars / workshops for parents of children with a mental 
handicap at Tuen Mun Psychiatric Clinic, Hong Kong.
1993 Advance workshop on Sex Education Programme for social 
workers, Family Planning Association, Hong Kong.
1993 -  1996 Teaching Introduction to Psychology course at the Open 
Learning Institute, Hong Kong.
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1994 -1996 Lectures on “Community Psychology” to social work students, 
City University, Hong Kong.
1994- 1996 Lectures on “Psychological management of the terminal ill” to
4th year medical students, School of Medicine, Chinese 
University of Hong Kong.
1995 -  Present Lectures on “Behavioural Science” to 1st Year medical students, 
School of Medicine, Chinese University of Hong Kong.
1995 - 1996 Workshops on “Basic counselling skills” for voluntary workers 
at the Prince of Wales Hospital, Hong Kong.
1994 - Present Lectures on “Cognitive Behavioural Therapy” to 4th Year 
medical students, School of Medicine, Chinese University of 
Hong Kong.
1994 -  Present Lectures/ Seminars on “Introduction to Psychotherapies” to
trainee psychiatrists, Department of Psychiatry, Prince of Wales 
Hospital, Hong Kong.
1995 Stress Management Workshops for post-registered nurses, 
School of Nursing, Prince of Wales Hospital
1996 -  Present Lectures / Seminars on “Management of Post-traumatic Stress 
Disorder” and “Cognitive Rehabilitation” to trainee 
psychiatrists in Hong Kong.
1996 -  Present Basic Counselling Skills Workshops for midwives, School of 
Nursing, Prince of Wales Hospital
1997 Lectures on “Psychological management of the chronically ill”
to doctors and nurses at the medical department, Prince of Wales 
Hospital and Nathersole Hospital, Hong Kong.
1998 Lecture on “psychiatric rehabilitation” for mental health workers 
in Macau (a Portuguese colony near Hong Kong).
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Professional Memberships
1979 Member of the British Psychological Society.
1981 Associate of the British Psychological Society.
1981 Member, Division of Clinical Psychology, British 
Psychological Society.
1981 Member, Occupational Psychology Section, British 
Psychological Society.
1981 Member, Mathematical and Statistical Section, British 
Psychological Society.
1989 Chartered Psychologist (Clinical Psychology), British 
Psychological Society.
1990 Associate Fellow, Hong Kong Psychological Society.
1990 Member, Division of Clinical Psychology, Hong Kong 
Psychological Society.
1992 Affiliate Member, Hong Kong College of Psychiatrists.
1993 Member of Management Committee, Richmond Fellowship, 
Hong Kong.
1995 Registered Psychologist, Hong Kong Psychological Society.
1996 Member, Hong Kong Research Institute of Ageing.
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Pro fessional Activities in the Past 10 Years
1991 -1994 Treasurer, Hong Kong Psychological Society.
1991 -  1993 Newsletter Editor, Division of Clinical Psychology, Hong Kong 
Psychological Society.
1993 -1995 Member of the Advisory Committee, Richmond Fellowship, 
Hong Kong.
1993 -  1995 Member of the Psychiatric Rehabilitation Committee, Castle 
Peak Hospital, Hong Kong.
1993 -  1995 Committee Member, Tuen Mun Yuk Chi Resource Centre (for 
Handicapped Children), Hong Kong.
1995 - 1996 Member, Working group on “management of violent patients”, 
Department of Psychiatry, Prince of Wales Hospital, Hong 
Kong.
1995 -  Present Panel Member, Board of Graduate Studies in Clinical 
Psychology, Chinese University of Hong Kong.
1995 -  Present Curriculum Planning Committee, Department of Psychiatry, 
School of Medicine, Chinese University of Hong Kong.
1995 -  1996 Member, Occupational Health Committee, Prince of Wales 
Hospital.
1996 -  Present Treasurer, Hong Kong Research Institute of Ageing.
1 9 9 4 - 1998 Member, Executive Committee, Department of Psychiatry, 
Prince of Wales Hospital, Hong Kong.
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Publications
Wright, G.N., Phillips, L.D., Ng, K.O., et al. (1978). Cultural Differences in 
Probabilistic Thinking. Journal o f  Cross Cultural Psychology, 9, 285 -  299.
Wright, G.N., & Ng, K.O. (1982). Three Methods for Improving Clinical Decision 
Making, in C.J. Main & Lindsay, W.R. (edsj Clinical Psychology: A behavioural 
perspective. Plenum Press: New York
Caudrey, D.J., Kirk, K., Thomas, P.C. & Ng, K.O. (1981). Perceptual Deficit in 
Schizophrenia: A redundancy, utilisation, filtering or scanning? British Journal o f  
Psychiatry. Oct., Vol. 137, 352 -360
Lee, D.T.S., Ahuja, A.T., Ng, K.O. et al. (1996). Cerebral Atrophy in Heroin Abuse. 
Hong Kong Medical Journal, 2, 9 6 -9 8 .
Lam, L.C. W., Chiu, H.F.K., Li, S.W., Chan, W.F., Chan, C.K.Y., Wong, M., Ng, K.O.
(1997). Screening for dementia: A preliminary study on the validity of the Chinese 
Version of the Blessed-Roth Dementia Scale, International Psychogeriatric, 9(1), 39 -  
46.
Chiu, H.F.K., Chan, C.K.Y., Lam, L.C.W., Li, S.W., Chan, W.F., Wong, M., Ng, K.O. 
(in press). The modified verbal fluency test: A validation study in Hong Kong.
Journal o f  Gerontology. Psychological Sciences.
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Section 2.2 Professional Experience in Clinical Psychology
Outline
The following is an account of my professional experience and practice in clinical 
psychology, which is presented in chronological order:
2.2.1 Post-graduate Training in Clinical Psychology, University o f  L iverpool 
(1979  ~  1981)
2.2.2 Work in Warrington Health Authority, U.K.
(1981  ~  1983)
2.2.3 Work in N orthstaffordshire Health Authority, U.K.
(1983  ~  1985)
2.2.4 Work in M id-Staffordshire Health A uthority, U.K.
(1 9 8 5 -1 9 8 7 )
2.2.5 Work in Trafford Health Authority, U.K.
(1 9 8 7 -1 9 9 0 )
2.2.6 Work in Castle Peak H ospital, H ong Kong  
(1990 -1 9 9 4 )
2.2.7 Work in Prince o f  Wales Hospital, H ong Kong  
(1994 -  Present)
2.2.8 Summary
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2.2.1: Post-graduate Studies in Clinical Psychology, University o f  L iverpool
(1979  ~  1981)
My career in clinical psychology began in 1979, after successfully gaining a post­
graduate studentship at the University of Liverpool. The studentship was funded by 
the Mersey Regional Health Authority, which sponsored nine students for training in 
clinical psychology every year. My research supervisor was Dr. Glynn Owens, while 
Dr. Peter Slade was the course director. My clinical placements during the two-year 
training are as follows:
Specialty P lacem ent Supervisor
Adult Psychiatry West Cheshire Hospital, 
Merseyside
Dr. R. Hoy
Forensic / Special Hospital Moss-side Hospital, 
Liverpool
Dr. B. Ashcroft
Child Psychiatry Alder Hey Children 
Hospital, Liverpool
Ms. J. Sambrook
Adult Psychiatry Winwick Hospital, 
Warrington
Mr. A. Addington
Mental Handicap Dr. Barnados, Liverpool/ 
Liverpool Community 
Mental Handicap Service
Ms. A. Walters/ 
Mr. A. Crisp
Primary Health Care Halton Hospital, Runcorn, 
Liverpool
Mr. B. Gealdeard
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2.2.2: Work in Warrington Health Authority, U.K. (1981  ~  1983)
My duties at Warrington Health Authority comprised the following aspects:
a. Provision o f psychological services for people with a mental handicap at New 
Church Hospital, which is a long-stay institution for people with mental handicap. 
At that time, services for people with a mental handicap remained primarily 
custodial. Having said this, a number of innovative works and health care policies 
were emerging, such as the introduction of community care. For this reason, 
psychologists played a crucial role in the drive to move people out o f hospital and 
to help them to integrate into the local community. My work at the hospital 
included:
• Assessment of individuals for training and rehabilitation
• Devise training programmes
• Staff training (e.g. on behaviour modification)
• Regular reviews to monitor progress of training programmes
• Liaison with appropriate services in the community (community mental 
handicap team, resettlement services)
b. As project leader of the “Portage Service” in Warrington. Briefly, the Portage 
service is a home based educational programme which involves teaching parents 
how to teach their pre-school children with a developmental handicap. The 
programme in Warrington involved regular visit by a ‘home teacher’ (a nurse or 
social worker) who helped parents to identify training goals as well as the
21
appropriate strategies of training their handicapped infants. My role in the project 
involved:
• Train the “trainers” (i.e. the home teachers) in behavioural techniques
• Undertaking developmental assessment for individual infants
• Supervising and advising the home teachers in curriculum planning and 
training strategies
• Conducting regular review meeting to monitor progress
• Conducting an evaluation study on the value of the service
2.2.3: Work in N orth-Staffordshire Health Authority, U.K. (1983  ~  1985)
I left Warrington in 1983 to take up a senior post at North-Staffordshire Health 
Authority, working mainly with people who are mentally handicapped. Again, the job 
there was divided into two major components i.e. hospital based work as well as 
working in the community settings. Details of my work there are outlined as follows:
a. Hospital based work: Part of my duties was to develop a psychological service at 
Stallington Hospital near Stoke-on-Trent, which until my appointment had no full­
time psychologist in post. Clinically, my work in Stallington Hospital was very 
similar to that at New Church Hospital, which involved primarily training and 
rehabilitation of people with a mental handicap. As a senior clinical psychologist, 
however, I was also required to participate in management, which included policy 
making and planning of services for people who are mentally handicapped. One of 
the more notable works I was involved in was the setting up of ethical guidelines
22
for behavioural modification, which was often misused or abused by direct care 
staff.
b. Community mental handicap service
As the concept of “community care” for the mentally handicapped was taking root in 
the early 1980s, there was a need to examine how best to deliver a “community 
service” for people with a mental handicap. At that time, the concept of “community 
care” was often misconstrued by many health care staff as simply the process of 
“relocating” patients from long-stay hospitals to be cared for in homes and hostels 
within the community. Consequently, many homes and hostels for the mentally 
handicapped were operating in the manner of a “mini-hospitals” with similar 
institutional rules and practices, which restricted the growth and development of 
individuals with a mental handicap. Individuals with a mental handicap were still 
being seen as “eternal children”, incapable of learning and self-determination. In light 
of this, as a clinical psychologist as well a member of the community mental handicap 
team, I was involved in a number of projects or activities, which aimed to change these 
attitude and beliefs. These included:
• Education to staff in various community settings such as group homes, training 
centres and school -  e.g. promoting the principle of normalisation, which aimed to 
“raise consciousness” of the stereotyped view about individuals with a mental 
handicap.
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• Incorporate the principle o f normalisation in the planning and design of local 
services e.g., purchasing private motor vehicles, or using public transports instead 
of “ambulances” to transport individuals with a mental handicap; setting up 
accommodations in an “up-market” neighbourhood, in order to combat the 
“devalued” image of individuals with mental handicap.
2.2.4: Work in M id-Staffordshire Health Authority, U.K. (1985  ~  1987)
I moved to Mid-Staffordshire Health Authority in 1985, this time to take up a new 
challenge as my new post required my working 50% of the time with psychiatric 
patients at St. George’s Hospital in Stafford, a large psychiatric institution which 
housed over a thousand patients. For the rest of the time, I continued to work in the 
mental handicap service but now mainly in the community settings as the concept of 
community care was gathering momentum. I also found myself increasingly involved 
in more managerial tasks and activities. Details of my works at Mid-Staffordshire 
Health Authority can be summarised as follows:
a. At St. George’s Hospital, Stafford
• Individual work with adult psychiatric patients, this included assessment and 
treatment of the long stay psychiatric patients as well as those attending the 
outpatient department of the hospital.
• Group work with young psychiatric patients, this included running a weekly 
social skills training programme
24
• Undertaking service development, such as establishing a psychiatric 
rehabilitation service in the hospital
• Supervision of junior staff in the psychology department, which included 
trainee clinical psychologist (from Birmingham University) and psychology 
assistants.
b. Community Mental Handicap Service
• Setting up a Mental Handicap Register
• Staff training (Behaviour Modification)]
• Individual work with mentally handicapped clients and their family
• Providing consultation to local special schools, local training centres and 
group homes
• Consultation to the community mental handicap teams, providing advice and 
supervision to social workers and nurses
• As a key member of the management team for service development and 
planning
2.2.5: Work in Trafford Health Authority, Nr. M anchester, U.K. (1987  ~  1990)
I was appointed as Principal Clinical Psychologist in m id-1987 at Trafford Health 
Authority. Again, my main responsibility in Trafford was to provide psychological 
input to the community mental handicap service. In addition to this, I was also 
required to provide services to the Home-based Early Intervention Service, as well as 
the Mental Health Service in Trafford. Details of my work are summarised as follows:
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a. Home-based Early Intervention Service
• As co-ordinator of the Home-based Early intervention service for children with 
a developmental handicap, heading a team of multidisciplinary clinical staff, 
which included a school medical officer, four health visitors, two 
physiotherapists and an occupational therapist,
c. Mental Handicap Service
The North West Regional Health Authority was renowned for having a good and 
coherent service policy for the mentally handicapped. Being one o f its district health 
authorities in the 1980s, Trafford had also a well-developed mental handicap service 
and the staff there were, in general, forward-looking and receptive to suggestions. 
This enabled me to experiment new ideas in developing service more responsive to 
clients’ needs. One of my more notable achievements in Trafford was to persuade the 
management of a local training centre to involve parents in the decision-making 
process in the day-to-day running of the unit, this included their participation in the 
selection and appointment of direct-care staff. Another innovative idea I initiated was 
to involve the handicapped individuals in the regular case conference review. Instead 
of their being a passive recipient of service, they were in fact encouraged to take an 
active part in the discussion of their needs. A few of the individuals were in fact 
invited to chair the meeting of the case review, after some training on this skill. 
During this time, I had also the opportunity to develop a procedure for teaching 
individuals with a mental handicap to make choices rationally. This, I felt, was an 
important area worthy of attention as choice-making was often assumed to be an
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intuitive and implicit process, and as such not open to teaching. Details of this work 
will be presented in Section 2.4.
c. Mental Health Service (1 session per week)
• Provision of consultation to a local geriatric unit (Wilson House)
• Undertaking referrals from local GP clinics, mainly for clients with anxiety or 
depression
2.2.6: Work in Castle Peak H ospital, H ong Kong (1990  ~  1994)
I returned to Hong Kong in 1990, after living more than 20 years in the U.K. I 
started working at Castle Peak Hospital, which was a large psychiatric hospital 
accommodating over 2000 patients. The hospital was built in the early 1960s initially 
only intended to house 1200 patients. Inevitably it was overcrowded with many of the 
usual problem associated with large psychiatric institution. My previous experience in 
mental handicap service and in psychiatric rehabilitation was therefore invaluable. 
Soon after my taking the appointment at the hospital, I was invited to participate in the 
psychiatric rehabilitation service. One of my roles in the service was to advice and 
assist the consultant psychiatrist in designing a coherent service policy. In addition to 
my role to the rehabilitation, I was also required to undertake individual case works 
with patients in the hospital as well as those from a nearby outpatient clinic. Most of 
the referrals were problems pertaining to depression and anxiety.
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In the clinic, I also held a regular coffee morning meeting with parents of children who 
have problem of Autism. Through these meetings, parents were given the opportunity 
to share information and ways of dealing with the behavioural problems and learning 
difficulties of their children. Parenting workshop was also organised at the clinic from 
time to time.
2.2.7: Work at the Prince o f  Wales Hospital, H ong Kong (1994  ~  Present)
I took up the appointment at the Department of Psychiatry at the Prince of Wales 
Hospital in 1994, in search of something more challenging. The Prince of Wales 
Hospital is a local teaching hospital, which is part of the Faculty of Medicine of the 
Chinese University of Hong Kong. Inevitably, the environment is more academically 
oriented and hence there are invaluable opportunities to work with interesting clinical 
cases, which one may not encounter in the usual psychiatric settings e.g. conversion 
hysteria. In addition, being a general hospital, I have also the opportunity to learn to 
work with psychological problems associated with physically illness. This includes, 
among other things, dealings with those with physical disability, burns and 
disfigurement, complaints of pain and so on.
Further details of my work at the hospital comprises the following elements 
which can be summarised as follows:
a. Clinical Work
• Individual work with patients from the University Psychiatric Unit, both adult 
and children
• Participation in the weekly academic case conference at the Department of 
Psychiatry
• Consultation service for the Neurosurgery Unit, undertaking 
neuropsychological assessment for the brain injured
• Consultation service for the other medical and surgical specialties, including 
Paediatric Department, Burns and Traumatic Unit, Cancer Unit
Teaching
• Medical students as well as trainee psychiatrists on psychological theories and 
practices pertaining to a number of psychological disorders such as anxiety and 
depression
• Other medical and health care staff in the hospital
• Supervision of trainee psychologists from both the University o f Hong Kong 
and Chinese University of Hong Kong
• Regular contribution to the departmental seminars attended by medical 
students, trainee medical officers, nurses and social workers
Research
• Research projects on ageing (in collaboration with a number of psychiatrists, 
we are currently investigating on the utility of certain dementia assessment 
tools e.g. the clock drawing test)
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• Psychological Sequalae of mild head injury (in collaboration with a 
neurosurgeon)
• Therapy evaluation (currently evaluating the group and manualised format of 
Cognitive Behavioural Procedure for panic disorder)
2.2.8: Summary
Its’ 20 years since I started my career as a clinical psychologist. There is little 
doubt that the experience that I have acquired over the years has enabled me to 
function confidently as a clinician. However, it is also evident that clinical psychology 
is changing at a rapid pace, both as a science and as a practice. No doubt, even more 
innovation and new ideas will develop as we move towards the new millennium. From 
a professional perspective, it is obvious that one needs to keep abreast of development. 
Undoubtedly, enrolment with the PsychD conversion course will provide me the 
opportunity to acquire more knowledge, and better myself as a professional 
psychologist. Personally, however, I am hoping it will be more than just learning yet 
another new skill and technology in research design and methodology. To me, learning 
how to reflect and think critically on my learning over the years, is probably a far more 
important goal and accomplishment, which I hope to attain from this course.
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2.3 Continuous Education: 1988  ~  1998
The list below provides a summary of continuing educational courses or workshops I 
have attended between the years 1988 and 1998.
1988 “Leadership Skills”, a three-day workshop run by North West Regional 
Health Authority, U.K.
1989 “Programme Assessment of Service System” a five-day workshop run by 
the British Institute of Mental Handicap (BIMH)
1990 “Psychotherapies in Chinese Societies” run by the Hong Kong 
Psychological Society
1991 “Law for Clinical Psychologist” run by the Correction Service 
Department, Hong Kong Government, and the Department of Extra Mural 
Studies, University of Hong Kong.
1992 Two day’s visit and professional exchange to learn about the Psychiatric 
Services in Guangzhou, People’s Republic of China, organised by the 
Division of Clinical Psychology, Hong Kong Psychological Society.
1993 “Strategic Planning of Health Services” run by the Hospital Authority, 
Hong Kong.
1994 “Cognitive Behaviour Therapy”, a three-day workshop given by Dr. Paul 
Salkovskis and Dr. Melanie Bryan; commissioned by the Hospital 
Authority, Hong Kong.
“Psychotherapy for the Chinese”, a three-day conference organised by the
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Department of Psychiatry, Chinese University of Hong Kong.
1995 “Psychological management of Child abuse”, a three-day workshop 
jointly commissioned by the Hospital Authority and the Social Work 
Department, Hong Kong.
1996 Enrolment to the PsychD (Clinical Psychology) Course, University of 
Surrey, U.K.
“Neuropsychological Rehabilitation” a three-day workshop by Dr. Barbara 
Wilson, commissioned by the Hospital Authority, Hong Kong.
1997 “Cognitive therapy for personality disorder and substance abuse”, a
three-day workshop by Dr. Judith Beck, commissioned by the Hospital 
Authority, Hong Kong.
In addition to the attendance of the above courses, I also attend regularly the monthly 
academic seminar run by the Department of Psychiatry, which, from time to time, 
invites distinguished speakers and scholars from overseas.
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Section 2.4: Teaching a person with Learning Difficulties to
M ake Choices: The Decision A nalytic Approach  
Introduction
One of the ultimate aims of working with people who have learning difficulties is 
to enable them to live, as far as possible, a valued and independent life 
(Wolfensberger, 1972, 1983). Implicitly and explicitly, this means that people with 
learning difficulties should be encouraged to make meaningful choices in their lives. 
The essence of choice making is that it is an expression of self, an exercise of will. To 
people with learning difficulties, experiences of being “done for” and “seen to” are 
commonplace. Depriving the opportunity for self-determination and developing 
preferences will only lead an individual to assume that this is the way of the world and 
that there are always others who will make the decisions. It has been suggested that 
the “passivity” and “resistance to learning” shown by some individuals with learning 
difficulties may, in fact, be a consequence of this “learned helplessness”(Brinkler & 
Lewis, 1982). Yet, these are only a few of the many “limiting factors” which impose 
constraint and restriction on the individuals to exercise choice and preference.
From the preceding analysis, it is evident that there are a number of possible 
interventions, which could contribute towards enabling individuals to exercise choice 
making. These include amelioration of the individuals’ primary disabilities (Wright, 
1995), provision of opportunity for self-determination (O’Brien, 1987), and helping 
them to acquire the necessary skills to make choices. It is against this background that
a behavioural procedure for teaching choice-making skills was developed. While 
acknowledging that progress has been made in many areas of services for people with 
learning difficulties, little has developed in ways of teaching choice making skills. 
The following section presents a teaching method, which I developed in 1987.
D ecision A nalysis: The state o f  the art
The method of intervention to be presented is called Decision Analysis. It is a 
practical approach based on the normative models o f behavioural decision theory. It is 
already widely used in business and management (e.g. Meiheson, 1980), industry 
(Pessemier, 1966), military (Brown et ah, 1974) and clinical settings (e.g. Emerson et 
ah, 1974).
In Decision Analysis, the decision-maker is assumed to have a number of choice 
alternatives or options, from which an optimal choice can be made. What the 
decision-maker has to do is to evaluate systematically the consequences associated 
with the perceived choice alternatives. The basis for deciding an optimal choice is 
determined by the axiomatic principles of Subjective Expected Utility Theory. The 
axioms of the theory are relatively straightforward and uncontroversial. For example, 
one axiom, transitivity, states that if  you prefer outcome A to B and also prefer 
outcome B to C, then you should prefer outcome A to C. (For a more detailed review 
of the axiom system underlying the Subjective Expected Utility Theory, see Edwards, 
Tinman & Phillips, 1966).
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The procedure of the decision analytic technique usually involves a number of 
logical steps, which can be described as follows:
a. Drawing a decision tree
The first step is to decompose the complexity of the decision problem into a 
number of manageable components. This involves drawing a decision tree in 
which the perceived choice options and their alternatives are represented. The 
essence of the decomposition procedure is to “force” the decision-maker to 
define the problem clearly, by specifying all the feasible choice alternatives 
and consequences.
b. Evaluating R isk and Payoffs
The next task the decision-maker has to do is to evaluate the relative risks and 
payoffs of the consequences associated with each perceived choice. The 
payoffs or risks are often expressed in terms of subjective utility values, 
although in some instances (e.g. in business), they can be represented in 
concrete figures.
c. A ssessing Uncertainty
At this stage, the decision-maker has to evaluate his or her degree o f belief 
that the outcome event will occur. In Decision Analysis, it is assumed that 
uncertainty can be quantified in measurable probabilistic terms o f either 
objective frequency or subjective probability.
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d. D eterm ining the O ptim al Choice
Having quantified an opinion regarding the risks and uncertainties, the 
decision-maker is required to calculate the expected utility value o f each 
choice alternative by combining (multiplying) the estimated probability and 
payoffs of each outcome event. By “trading o f f ’ the relative value of each 
perceived choice, all the alternatives will be eliminated leaving the option 
with the maximum expected utility value.
An E xam ple o f  A  R eal L ife D ecision Problem
The application of Decision Analysis to a real life decision problem can be 
illustrated by the following situation. Imagine one Saturday morning, an individual 
has to decide whether to spend the day going picnicking or staying at home to do the 
house works. The weather, however, looks uncertain even though the sun is out at the 
time. If the weather were sunny, the individual would rather go picnicking with a 
friend. But if  it rains, staying at home would be the preferred choice.
Figure 1 is the decision analytic representation of the decision problem. The 
decision tree shows that there are two possible courses of actions: go picnicking or 
staying at home. For each course of action, there are three possible outcomes: the 
weather may stay sunny, or it may rain, or it may be overcast but no rain.
The first task the individual has to do is to estimate the probabilities of these 
outcomes (Pi, P2 and P3 for sunny, overcast and rainy respectively). Given these
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probability estimates, the individual is required to assign appropriate subjective 
payoffs in numerical terms for each outcome (A1 to A 6 ). With the probability 
estimates and the individual’s subjective payoffs, it is possible to calculate the 
expected utility value for each course of action. The course with the highest expected 
utility should, therefore, be the logical choice for the individual.
The example above is a very simple application of Decision Analysis using the 
principle of Subjective Expected Utility Maximisation as a choice criterion.
Figure 1: The Decision Problem of A Simple Life Event
Course of 
Action
Events
(probability)
Utility of 
Possible Outcome
Go Picnic
Stays at Home O
Sunny
(PI)
Overcast
(P2)
Sunny
(PI)
Overcast
(P2)
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
Rain
(P3)
A 6
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Towards Developing a Behavioural Decision Procedure fo r  People with 
Learning Difficulties
Clearly, Decision Analysis is potentially a useful tool for people with learning 
difficulties on how to make choices rationally. However, in its present form, the 
procedure can be rather complicated even for the “sophisticated” decision-maker 
(Phillip, 1983). Yet, so far, there is frustratingly little information in decision research 
on how the technology can be translated to aid the “unsophisticated” or “untrained” 
individuals (Beach, 1976). In terms of people with learning difficulties, there is hardly 
any research in this area.
For individuals with a mental handicap, having the ability and opportunity to 
make choices is obviously an important and valued skill. The difficult task is how to 
develop a behavioural procedure, which could be appropriate for work with individuals 
who have learning difficulties. There are several considerations in designing a 
procedure for use with individuals with learning difficulties:
a. It would have to capture the essence of the decision analytic approach, i.e. 
structuring the decision problem into discrete components of perceived 
options and consequence -  the wisdom of which is clear from the literature 
(Winkler & Murphy, 1973).
b. It would have to be flexible enough to accommodate a varying degree of 
abilities and disabilities. Visual or pictorial cues may have to be used to 
increase the saliency of the decision tree.
c. It would have to be relevant to the individual’s knowledge and values.
d. It would have to be non-threatening, and if possible, fun to do, in order to 
reduce escape or avoidance behaviour.
e. Complicated procedures, such as quantifying uncertainty and risk, would have 
to be simplified and “iron out” where possible.
A Feasibility Study
In order to evaluate the evolved method, the procedure is described and illustrated 
with a case study.
The subject of the case study, M, was a 27 year old man with a mild intellectual 
disability (estimated IQ = 60). He could not read or write except to recognise a few 
simple words. However, in spite of a speech difficulty, he could verbalise reasonably 
well and was able to make his feelings and wants understood. He could also count 
reasonably well. However, he was unable to handle simple financial transactions, 
although he could differentiate the value of money of different denominations.
The decision problem M encountered was whether or not he should regulate his 
spending as he tended to spend more than he received from his weekly supplementary 
benefits. Most of his money was spent on CB radio components, stereo equipment and 
records. His mother understandably felt that he had been squandering his money and this 
had been a source of conflict between himself and his family particularly when his 
demand for more money was not met.
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M ethod o f  Intervention and the E volved Procedure
Step 1: Eliciting Information
The first task in the procedure was to elicit information from M and his family in 
respect of his choice making problem: whether or not to control his spending. This was 
done during two separate interview sessions. Information obtained from the interview 
was transcribed into index cards. Each card represented a statement of an event relating 
to his choice problem.
Two decks of cards were constructed. The first deck contained possible choice 
alternatives. The second deck were outcome events associated with the choice 
alternatives. As M was unable to read, pictorial cues were used to assist him in 
understanding the meaning of each card e.g. a picture of Tower Bridge to represent the 
statement of “going to London”.
Step 2: Clarifying Choice Alternatives
M was presented with the first deck of cards (option cards), which contained a 
number of possible courses of action in relation to controlling his spending. He was 
asked to study the cards closely and any card (i.e. option statement) deemed inappropriate 
or unclear was discussed, modified, or eliminated if necessary. When this was 
completed, a finalised deck of “option” cards evolved. He was asked to study them again 
and to familiarise himself with all the available options.
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Step 3: Card Sorting -  M atching Outcomes to Options
At this stage, M was presented with the second deck of cards, the “outcome” cards. 
Each card contained a brief description of a consequence. Once again, pictorial cues 
were used to facilitate M’s understanding of the statement on each card. The cards were 
presented to M, one at a time and after he had studied the cards, he was required to match 
the “outcome” card(s) to one of the “option” cards. The result of this procedure was a 
hierarchy of choice alternatives and outcomes. The hierarchy serves the same function as 
a decision tree representing available options and the individual’s perception of the 
likelihood of respective outcomes. Table 1 gives the hierarchy, which evolved from our 
work with M.
Step 4: Evaluating Payoffs
A simple procedure was devised in which M indicated his subjective payoff value 
for each card with “ticks” or “crosses”. Red coloured ticks were used to indicate positive 
values, as red was M ’s favourite colour. Alternately, black crosses were used to indicate 
negative value with black being his least favoured colour. The relative strength of the 
payoff value was represented by the number of ticks or crosses assigned, with 3 red ticks 
to indicate maximum positive value, and 3 black crosses to indicate maximum negative 
value.
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Step 5: Determining the Optimal Choice
This was accomplished, by firstly calculating the total expected utility associated 
with each choice alternative. The preferred choice was then determined by the choice 
with the most number of ticks and the least number of crosses.
The result of the case study was encouraging with M showing little difficulty in 
using the simplified behavioural decision procedure. Further details about M ’s choice 
making are shown in Table 1.
Conclusion
From the experience working with M and a few other individuals with learning 
difficulties, the Decision Analytic technique has shown to provide a coherent and didactic 
framework for aiding people to make choices rationally, even in its simplified form. It is 
clearly a procedure worthy of further investigation and study, which may include its use 
on other client groups and clinical problems e.g. working with children in adolescent, or 
aiding individual facing difficult life decision. It can be argued that the significance of 
the procedure is that it imposes a logical structure upon the individual’s choice behaviour. 
Through its step by step approach, it “forces” the individual to consider the pros and cons 
of all the available options. By bringing the important issue of the choice problem into 
focus, it makes explicit the usually implicit process of choice making, thereby enabling 
the individual to “see” the logical implication of the chosen behaviour. Clearly, decision 
theoretic technique such as Decision Analysis has important practical implication in 
clinical psychology, which warrants further research attention.
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Finally, it has been suggested that good psychological intervention or support for 
people with learning difficulties should ideally fulfilled three basic criteria (Emerson et 
a/., 1998):
a. It should be socially valid. That is to say, it should address a problem, which 
have important social implication and outcomes.
b. It should be functionally based.
c. The intervention should be constructional by emphasising on growth and 
development, as opposed to elimination of problems.
The Decisional Theoretic technique, which may enable people with learning difficulties 
to make choices, I believe, is representative of such an approach.
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Table 1.
M’s Decision Hierarchy of Options and Outcomes
Decision
problem
Whether to control spending
Options 1. Mother to control 
M ’s spending
2. M to save five 
pounds a week in a 
building society
3. Save nothing
Outcomes Money being 
controlled by mother 
XX
May have savings to 
visit London
V v v
Can buy more CB 
radio and stereo 
equipment V V
More argument with
Mother
XXX
May have saving to 
visit Llandudno in 
Wales V V V
More rows with
mother
XXX
May upset other 
family member (esp. 
elder brother)
XX
No chance of buying 
extra CB radio & 
stereo equipment 
XX
May upset other 
family member esp. 
his brother 
XX
May have savings to 
visit London
V V V
Fewer rows with 
mother
H
No London trip 
XXX
Money being left in 
mother’s account 
X
Family happier with 
him
V
No Llandudno trip 
XX
Have savings to visit 
Llandudno in Wales
V V  V
Having money in own 
saving account
V
No money in account 
X
Total Expected Utility of Option 1 (Mother to control spending) = 6 ticks & 7 crosses
Total Expected Utility of Option 2 (Save 5 pounds a week) = 10 ticks & 2 crosses 
Total Expected Utility of Option 3 (Save nothing) = 2 ticks & 11 crosses
The preferred option (i.e. the choice with maximum expected utility) = Option 2
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Section 3.1
The role of Placebos in Psychotherapy Research
48
Introduction
In medicine, it has long been recognised that “sham” treatments such as sugar pills 
or saline injections, which have little apparent intrinsic medical value, can produce 
healing effects, sometimes of a remarkable nature (Honingfeld, 1964; Shapiro, 1971). In 
the literature, this phenomenon has been referred to as the placebo effect. The word 
placebo derives from a Latin root that means, literally, “ I shall please”. Clinically, it 
refers to a medicine or therapeutic procedure that is supposed not to have active, curative 
ingredients, but rather is given solely for the purpose of pleasing or calming the patients 
(Benson, 1984). For this reason, as a scientific endeavour, placebo effects are considered 
as artifacts in medical treatments, which need to be controlled to evaluate the true 
effectiveness of drugs and other medical procedures. Placebos have become an important 
construct in medico-pharmacological studies by providing the benchmark for evaluating 
treatment effectiveness.
The controversy in Psychotherapy
After the initial use in medicine, the notion of placebos has gained a highly 
respected place in psychotherapy research. Rosenthal and Frank (1956) were largely 
responsible for extending the placebo construct from the medical to psychological 
domains. For a long time, psychologists have been aware of the possible contribution of 
non-specific ingredients in therapy outcome research and the methodological requirement 
to exclude them as possible rival hypotheses. In this regard, placebo controls have been
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purported to be the cornerstone of cause-and-effect therapy outcome designs (Paul, 
1969). Its importance in psychotherapy research can be illustrated by its inclusion as a 
major criterion for evaluating therapy effectiveness in a number of major studies in recent 
years. This includes the NIMH (National Institute of Mental Health) Treatment of 
Depression Collaborative Research Programme (Elkin et a l, 1985), the American 
Psychological Association Task Force on empirically validated therapies (Chambless et 
a l, 1996), and the Sheffield Psychotherapy Project in the U.K. (Shapiro et a l,  1994).
In spite of its important status, serious questions have been raised about the viability 
of placebo effects as a construct in psychotherapy. In terms of research in medicine, 
placebos are merely extraneous factors to be controlled for. That is, it makes good sense 
in medical research, which seeks to isolate the effect of psychological variables such as 
expectation of change, or faith in the treatment. However, it has been contended that the 
use of the medico-pharmacological paradigm which specifically (and logically for 
medicine) seeks to eliminate psychological causes is both logically and theoretically 
untenable for psychotherapy research whose aim is to search for psychological reasons of 
change (Lambert & Bergin, 1994; Wilkins, 1986). Consequently, the adoption of the 
placebo concept in psychotherapy has been criticised by opponents who recommend that 
the construct not be used in psychotherapy research (Bergin & Garfield, 1986; Wilkins, 
1983). In light of the debate, the aim of this essay is to evaluate the role and viability of 
placebo as a construct in psychotherapy research. To this end, its conceptual and 
methodological bases will be examined. For the purpose of this essay, the term
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psychotherapy will be referred to as psychological intervention in general rather than to 
any technique or conceptual orientation.
Conceptual and Definitional Problems
Placebo as an Unreal and Im aginary Variable
A difficulty with the concept of placebo is the argument that its effects are more 
apparent than real, that they are a result of demand characteristics, or perceptual and 
reporting bias. It has been known that in experimental settings subjects may be 
motivated to please the experimenter by confirming the experimental hypothesis (Orne, 
1969). Similarly, in clinical setting, patients may be motivated to confirm the 
expectations of their therapists. Alternatively, the expectation of a change in experience 
may produce a perceptual bias, so that patients or research participants mistakenly 
perceive a change that has not in fact occurred.
However, there is evidence indicating that placebos can produce genuine effects that 
cannot be dismissed easily. One of the classic studies was conducted by Marcia et al. 
(1969), who set up a professional looking “desensitisation programme” for college 
women with fear of spiders. These young women were told that they would be exposed 
to subliminal photos of spiders, along with appropriate time-shocks, to train them out of 
their fear scientifically. In fact, they were simply set in the dark, exposed to random 
flashes of lights and random administration of mild shocks. The remarkable result, as
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commented by Fix and Haffke (1976), was that these participants “showed as much overt 
behavioural improvement and as much satisfaction with the treatment as similar girls 
whom the author treated with systematic desensitisation”
Unfortunately, many of the studies purporting to demonstrate this kind of effect are 
difficult to validate, as they are often based on anecdotal or uncontrolled reports. In 
contrast to the anecdotal and uncontrolled data, Ikemi and Nakagawa (1962) reported a 
well designed within-subject study of suggestion-related production and inhibition of 
contact dermatitis. Thirteen hypersensitive subjects were touched on one arm with leaves 
from a harmless tree but were told that the leaves were from a lacquer or wax tree 
(Japanese trees that produce effects similar to poison ivy). On the other arm, the subjects 
were touched with irritant leaves, which they were led to believe were from a harmless 
tree. All thirteen subjects displayed a skin reaction to the harmless leaves (the placebo), 
but only two reacted to the irritant leaves. Thus, by producing the dramatic result of a 
physiological change, this result shows that the effects of placebos are unequivocally real. 
That said, the mechanism of placebo remains a mystery for which there is still little 
cogent explanation.
Placebos as Therapeutically Inert Factors
Conceptually, there are also a number of reasons why it is difficult to employ the 
placebo concept in psychotherapy research. One of the major reasons has been the 
difficulty of finding a logically acceptable definition of placebos in the literature. 
Traditionally in medicine, a placebo has been defined as “pharmacologically inert
52
substance that the doctor administers to relieve the patients’ distress” (Frank, 1961). In 
this regard, placebos are therefore viewed as “non-drug” variables, which need to be 
controlled in order to validate the actual treatment effects. Medically, this definition 
seems to make good sense because the placebos, despite their observable effects, are said 
to exert their action by way of psychological mechanisms. However, such a definition 
would be inappropriate and paradoxical in the psychological domain, as both the placebo 
condition and the test treatment are psychologically active and pharmacologically 
inactive. In this context, a basic definitional and logical problem arise for placebos as a 
psychotherapy construct as it becomes a term that contradicts itself (Wilkins, 1986).
Medically, by definition, the effects of placebo are not supposed to be the direct 
consequence of the chemical placebo per se (e.g. sugar pills), but the psychological 
process of the “pill-giving rituals” (Honingfeld, 1964). Under the medical paradigm, 
placebos are supposedly “therapeutically inert” agents. However, in psychotherapy 
where the placebo itself is a psychological variable and thus cannot be regarded as 
therapeutically inert, a number of serious logical problems arise. First, it will lead to the 
nonsensical and circular meaning that the effects of placebo (i.e. psychological change) 
are a result of the placebo (psychological variable). Secondly, from the standpoint that 
psychotherapies and placebos are both “chemically inert”, it will lead to the argument of 
whether part or all of the effect of psychotherapy is attributable to placebos (Wilkins, 
1986). In the medical paradigm, all effective elements of “non-drug” agents are 
attributable to placebos, thus implying that all psychotherapies are placebos. On the 
other hand, it has been argued that since the therapeutic effects are produced by
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psychological means, they are therefore the properties of psychotherapy, and thus there is 
no such thing as placebo in psychotherapy (Bergin & Garfield, 1994). Whatever the 
merits of these arguments, the fact that both of these interpretations are staking a 
proprietary claim on the effect of psychotherapy inevitably precludes placebos from 
being logically used in any form of psychotherapy research.
Placebos as Theoretical Inert Factors
To circumvent the aforesaid conceptual shortcomings, placebo-in-psychotherapy has 
been defined as “fit therapy in which clients have equal faith but would not be expected by 
the theory o f  therapy being studied to produce the same effect” (Rosenthal & Frank, 
1956). Here a conceptual distinction is drawn between theoretically inert and 
therapeutically inert. This distinction is made as placebo-in-psychotherapy is often 
misconstrued as therapeutically inert. However, as Critelli and Neumann (1984) pointed 
out, nothing in the history of placebo effects in either medicine or psychology supports 
such belief. By virtue of its conceptual meaning, all placebos are at least effective 
enough to arouse recognition and attention within their community of origin. Otherwise, 
we would not be so interested in controlling for placebo effects in experimental research 
at the outset.
Under this definition, psychotherapies and placebos are therefore being conceived as 
belonging to two different classes of treatment. Psychotherapies are assumed to be 
unique treatments with mechanisms targeting some specific theoretical concept.
54
Placebos, on the other hand, are assumed to tackle the off-target factors which have little 
to do with the theoretically “potent” elements of the treatment being tested, but more to 
do with other conditions besides the targeted problem (Basham, 1986; Critelli & 
Neumann, 1984; O’Leary & Borkovec, 1978).
There are, however, serious difficulties with this definition. From the viewpoint of 
any specific theory of cure, virtually every other currently established psychotherapy 
would be considered as off-target elements, therefore theoretically inert, and thus a 
placebo (Critelli & Neumann, 1984). Conversely, it is obvious that conditions designated 
as placebos at one time or another may also be theoretically active in other therapies. For 
instance, desensitisation, a well known therapeutic procedure derived from the 
behavioural principles, has been used as a placebo to control for the effects of 
psychoanalytic therapy (e.g. Goldstein, 1960). In this instance, what is one school’s 
therapy may be another school’s placebo.
Furthermore, and depending on one’s perspective and the target problem, placebos 
may have effects that are on target as well as off-target. In a study by Steffen (1975), 
“contemplation” was designated as a placebo, while the feedback-assisted relaxation was 
the targeted treatment condition. The contemplation procedure was intended to be an off- 
target treatment condition, but arguably its resemblance to meditation might in fact 
produce the same effect on the target condition as an alternative form of relaxation 
therapy.
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The Concept o f  Non-specificity
Placebos as Factors without Specific Actions
In addition to their conceptualisation as theoretically inert treatments, placebos have 
also been labelled under the rubric of non-specific factors. In relation to the concept of 
placebo, at least three different versions of the term “non-specificity” have been 
identified in the literature (Castonguay, 1993; Critelli & Newmann, 1984). In the first 
version, placebo is regarded as “a procedure that is without specific activity for the 
condition being evaluated...” (Shapiro, 1971; Borkovec & O’Brien, 1976). Implicit in 
this definition is the assumption that therapy operates through a specific mode of action 
while placebo only works as a general or central mediator. While this kind of assumption 
appears to make sense in the medical domain, it is less plausible in psychotherapy. First, 
there are theories in psychotherapy, which posit central mediators as the basis of 
therapeutic improvement. The theory of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977, 1982) and self- 
actualisation tendency (Rogers, 1959), are examples of such central mediators. Secondly, 
although the ingredients of a placebo may be non-specific, its effect may be very specific. 
For example, depending on the information available to the recipient, placebos are known 
to produce specific effects which can influence pain perception, alcohol tolerance, gastric 
motility, sexual arousal and fear reactions (Kirsch, 1997). Placebos given as 
tranquillisers also produced very different effect to those presented as stimulants 
(Frankenhaeuser et al. 1963). Thus, not only is the separation of therapy and placebo into 
specific and non-specific factors an arbitrary process, but instead of clarification, it 
creates even more confusion and contradictions.
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Placebos as Unspecified Factors
The second interpretation of non-specificity refers to placebos as potentially active 
ingredients whose exact nature and therapeutic effect have not yet been specified 
(Jacobson & Baucom, 1977; Shapiro, 1978). Here, “unspecified” seems a more 
appropriate meaning than the conventional meaning of “non-specific”. Again, such 
usage of the term creates more ambiguity than clarity. For example, it is unclear how 
much specification should be considered sufficient for a procedure not be regarded as a 
placebo. Is Roger’s theory o f self-actualising tendency (1959), which has been 
traditionally regarded as a therapy in it own right, constituted sufficient specification to 
distinguish itself from a placebo? Alternatively, specific mechanisms such as motivation 
for change (Jensen & Karoly, 1991) and the expectancy of cure (Kirsch, 1997), are often 
viewed as central placebo variables. Would the naming of these variables, or of the 
theory behind their mechanisms (e.g. Bandura’s self-efficacy theory), be sufficient to 
make these variables no longer a placebo? Clearly, there are also difficulties in using this 
criterion as a definition of placebos.
Placebos as Common Factors
Placebos have also been described as factors that are presumably common to most 
types of psychotherapies (Wilkins, 1979; Kazdin, 1979a). The major theoretical 
conceptualisation of common factors was put forward by Frank (Frank, 1971; Frank & 
Frank, 1991). In his study of methods of healing in primitive or non-Western cultures, 
Frank noted that common elements exist across all forms of psychotherapies. These 
included, inter alia, warmth, acquisition of new experience, a healing setting, a
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confidential environment, a plausible explanation of symptoms and distress, and an 
alliance between the client and the therapist. According to Frank, these common 
interpersonal elements serve to combat “demoralisation”, which is a central feature of 
patients seeking therapy. By equating placebos as common factors, and their playing a 
central role in therapeutic change, this definition again invites the circular argument of 
whether psychotherapy is placebo and vice versa.
Moreover, there are empirical and theoretical problems, which have subjected this 
definition into a number of criticisms. First, the concept of common factor in 
psychotherapy has been criticised as providing neither meaningful nor adequate 
guidelines for research (Haaga, 1986). For example, common factors such as 
“acquisition of new experience” may have different meanings from different theoretical 
orientations. Secondly, common factors considered as central to one therapy may be 
considered inappropriate or irrelevant in other theory. In a review o f 50 publications in 
order to discern commonalities among therapies, Grencavage and Norcross (1990) 
encountered a diversity of factors totalling 89 elements, which raises the question of the 
“universality” of common factors. Among the most commonly cited elements were 
“catharsis”, and “acquisition and practice o f new behaviours”. It is obvious that 
“catharsis” would not be a central feature of behavioural and cognitive therapy, while 
“acquisition o f new behaviour” would not apply to psychodynamic therapy.
The concept of common factors encounters similar difficulties as a placebo control. 
Hovath (1988) reviewed 39 studies in psychotherapy research, which employed placebo-
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control components. Not only was there little empirical support o f commonalities among 
the placebo variables used in these studies, the components of placebo controls were in 
fact, very different from the components o f the designated therapies.
Epistem ological Problem s
As has been observed, all current interpretations of placebos tend to define it open- 
endedly as a “catch-all” category, which embraces a bewildering catalogue of diverse 
variables. These include, among other things, minimal treatment, neutral expectancy, 
counter demand, component control, attention control, expectation control, and treatment 
control (Shapiro & Shapiro, 1997). As noted by Sharpiro and Morris (1978), even 
measurement artifacts, such as practice effects in testing, have been included as placebo 
factors. To the extent that these artifactual aspects o f treatment may inflate outcome 
results, the rejection of its use in psychotherapy research may be partially deserved.
From the epistemological perspective, however, the use of a single term to describe 
disparate phenomena of placebo effect can be misleading as well as creating a spurious 
impression of homogeneity (Richardson, 1995; Kazdin, 1979). It may well be argued 
that grouping the diverse phenomena together under the rubric o f placebo can facilitate 
communication between researchers. In so far as the medico-pharmacological studies are 
concerned, the use of such a generic term may indeed be a convenient way o f describing 
any therapeutic change not directly attributable to the action of drugs. To psychotherapy 
research where one of the principle aims is to elucidate the psychological mechanism of
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change, it is questionable whether the employment of such term would confer any 
particular advantage.
Theoretically, it is apparent that the use of placebos as a “catch-all” category in 
psychotherapy will limit not only the explanatory power o f its effects, but it may also 
obfuscate the way the mechanisms of placebos operate to influence change. For 
example, different psychological processes are believed to influence the event o f pain 
perception and hence effective placebo analgesia could conceivably be achieved through 
the manipulation of these processes. Thus, one placebo may involve diverting the 
patient’s attention such as transcutaneous nerve stimulation (Langley & Sheppeard,
1987), another may be used to reduce anxiety and reassure the patient (e.g. traditional 
sugar pill or saline injection: Evans, 1974), and yet another may involve psychosocial 
processes such as improving patient’s compliance to treatment regime (Horowitz et ah, 
1990). For these reasons, by “lumping” these separate phenomena into a single entity, it 
only serves as an unhelpful obstacle into the understanding of mechanism and effects of 
placebos, which are already shrouded with tales o f magic and mystery.
As a single-term psychological construct, placebos may also give a mistaken 
impression of its being an exclusively psychological mechanism, which inevitably 
reinforces the unfortunate Cartesian split o f what is body and mind (Ross & Olson, 
1981). However, it is clear that this common dualistic view overlooks the important role 
played by neurophysiological mechanisms (Price & Fields, 1997). The important link 
between placebos and neural mechanisms has been demonstrated by a number of
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experimental and clinical studies in pain research, which suggest that placebos may 
increase the release o f endorphin — a natural pain killer (Levin et al., 1978; Levin & 
Gordon, 1984). In summary, to the extent that there are studies suggesting that placebos 
may operate at different channels and levels involving both psychological and 
physiological mechanisms, it seems unwise and inappropriate to use “placebo” as a single 
term psychological construct in psychotherapy research.
Methodological Problems
Problem s o f  D ouble-blind
One of the main foci of outcome research to-date has been the construction of 
designs that are capable of clearly demonstrating specific cause-and-effect relationships 
by ruling out likely artifacts or rival hypotheses that could reasonably account for 
observed outcomes (Champbell & Stanley, 1963). In principle, the placebo control was 
designed to hold constant the so-called non-specific elements common to all therapies 
such as therapist attention, motivated effort, expectancy of improvement, empathy, 
warmth, and so on. However, in practice, utilising placebo groups in actual research 
studies have proven to be more difficult than anticipated, for several reasons. First, the 
design actually calls for a double-blind strategy wherein therapists as well as patients 
believe they are involved in the ‘test treatment’ regardless o f which condition they are in. 
Otherwise, there are likely to be differences in the non-specifics between groups (e.g.
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therapists and patients in the placebo condition may display less enthusiasm for the 
treatment). But how to keep clinicians or patients blind as to whether they are involved 
in a “real” or “placebo” treatment has proved to be a formidable task. In fact, the 
suspicion that clinicians and patients may be able to discern treatment and placebo 
allocation, thus unmasking the blind, was raised nearly five decades ago by Goodnow et 
al. (1951). In a more recent study, Margraf et al. (1991) revealed that 72% of the placebo 
condition were correctly identified by the clinicians, while patients guessed correctly 
56% of the condition. In a review o f 27 clinical trials with placebo controls between the 
years 1967 to 1989, Shapiro and Shapiro (1997) revealed that on average, clinicians 
participated in the studies could correctly identified 93% of the treatment conditions and 
67% of the placebo conditions, while the patients correctly identified 73% of the 
treatment conditions and 67% of the placebo conditions.
Problem s o f  D evising Adequate Control Conditions
Notwithstanding the problem of the double blind strategy, the creation o f an 
adequate placebo condition is, in itself, an extremely difficult task. As in any study, it is 
essential that the placebo control be a credible therapeutic procedure, identical to the 
therapy to be tested except for the specific principles of the therapy to be evaluated 
(Bowers & Clum, 1988). For example, the placebo must be the same with regard to the 
number and duration of visits, the patients’ motivation for the therapy, and the therapists’ 
interest in the treatment. In addition, no study of psychotherapy to-date has been able to 
accomplish these goals, in part because of the difficulty of finding a placebo that is not
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used as a specific therapeutic technique in another form of therapy (Shapiro & Shapiro, 
1997; Parloff, 1986). This problem can be illustrated in a study by Kirsch and Henry 
(1977), in which “systematic ventilation” was used to equate the elements o f the 
treatment condition (i.e. systematic desensitisation). In this condition, socially anxious 
subjects freely associated a series of childhood incidences. The subjects were found to be 
highly involved with this exercise and at times expressed considerable affect. The fact 
that this placebo condition resembles classical analysis makes it difficult to consider it 
merely as a non-specific “noise”.
Inappropriate Use o f  Placebo Control in Therapy Evaluation
Methodologically, concerns have been raised about the way with which placebo 
controls are being used in psychotherapy research. To clarify the nature of the arguments 
concerning the use o f placebo in psychotherapy research, it is important to distinguish 
research designs investigating therapeutic effectiveness from those whose primary aims 
are to isolate the active psychological process or mechanism (Wilkins, 1986; Hovath, 
1988). In medical research, such distinction is regarded unnecessary and both purposes 
of the research are normally fused. This would make sense from the medical perspective 
as both the physio-chemical mechanism and its effectiveness can be logically concluded 
once the effects of placebos are subtracted from the equation.
In psychotherapy where both the placebo and the therapy are psychological 
variables, such distinction is considered necessary. It has been argued that placebo
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controls in psychotherapy should only be used as a strategy for evaluation of the 
specificity of therapy mechanism, and not for effectiveness (Wilkins, 1986; Hovath,
1988). In studies of therapeutic effectiveness, it is more important to demonstrate that the 
therapy can produce changes that are of significance, clinically (Barlow, 1981; Garfield, 
1981a), and functionally (Jacobson et a l, 1984). As discussed earlier, since placebos are 
not therapeutically inert, interpreting the comparative difference of effectiveness between 
a therapy and a placebo control can therefore be problematic. Failure to find incremental 
effects does not necessary mean that the therapy is ineffective since the placebo may be 
an alternative therapy, and all that is proven is that both are equally effective. 
Alternatively, if incremental effects are found, it is still not known whether the therapy is 
sufficiently effective to be of clinical significance. However, as Wilkins (1986) noted, 
placebo controls are often misused as a strategy for evaluating therapy effectiveness.
Ethical Issues
Another argument against the transferring of the placebo concept from the medical 
domain to psychotherapy research is their pejorative connotation. Because the medical 
paradigm does not allow psychological causes, placebo as a concept is often tainted with 
hints of charlatanism and quackery. Having said this, such negative connotation is 
largely undeserved, and would be removed once the concept is transferred to and viewed 
from the psychological perspective, which legitimises non-pharmacological causes 
(Critelli & Neumann, 1984).
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Nevertheless, the use of placebo invariably involves deception, benevolent or 
otherwise. This inevitably raises the difficult question of ethics, especially in studies 
involving clinical subjects who seek help from the profession. In the context of 
psychotherapy, several ethical issues need to be addressed. First, the use o f placebo 
controls is often based on the assumption that the potential benefits outweigh the risks to 
patients. Such presumption is, however, questionable. For example, the harm to the 
patients in the form of increased frustration and lack of confidence in the helping 
profession could have a serious consequence (Garfield, 1987). It can also be argued that 
placebo is, de facto, an alternative therapy, and given the well-known Dodo Bird verdict 
proclaimed by Luborsky, Singer, & Luborsky (i.e.," Everyone has won and so all must 
have prizes”', 1975), the placebo control may theoretically do no worse than the test 
treatment. However, from the ethicisf s point of view, the use of any form of deception is 
to be condemned (Bok, 1978).
An obvious solution to this ethical dilemma is having an informed consent in the 
research procedure. However, as placebo-in-psychotherapy is a more complex condition 
than the “pill giving rituals”, there is the problem of how to explain the experimental 
control without jeopardising the credibility of the condition. Moreover, patients may 
refuse to believe the explanation (Park & Covi, 1965), others may have difficulty 
understanding that some of them who wanted the treatment would not receive it 
(Appelbaum et a l,  1987).
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The key here is how to find an approach, which can strike a realistic balance 
between conserving the spirit of informed consent without “snuffing out the flame” of 
responsible clinical study. One way to bypass this is to borrow a procedure from 
medicine by providing the assurance that those receive placebo will be given the 
‘standard’ treatment (Shapiro, 1989). The ethical constraints may also be bypassed by 
other actions in experimental design, for example, by having a criteria specified in 
advance to remove the patients from clinical trial if their clinical status worsens or fails to 
improve during the clinical trial (Klerman, 1986). In utilising placebo in psychotherapy 
research, the issue of ethics is clearly a nettle which responsible clinicians have to grasp.
Conclusion
From the preceding discussion, it should be evident that a general conclusion and 
consensus concerning the contribution of placebos to psychotherapy research is difficult. 
Distinctions between placebos and psychotherapies seem logically and theoretically 
untenable, partly because of the conceptual and methodological difficulties associated 
with the placebo concept, but also because of the problems inherent in psychotherapy 
research. A major dilemma in psychotherapy is the difficulty in identifying specific 
effective components as well as the underlying basis of therapeutic change. This problem 
persists, despite the rigors of a number of large scaled and well-designed studies in recent 
years. Comparative studies such as the NIMH Treatment of Depression Collaborative 
Program in the U.S. (Elkin et a l, 1985), and the Sheffield Psychotherapy Project in the 
U.K. (Shapiro et a l, 1994) continues to give the familiar story of equivalent outcomes
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between different therapies (Lambert & Bergin, 1994; Garfield, 1981b). Indeed, several 
decades of psychotherapy research have seen the same famous question being repeatedly 
posed: “What kinds of change produced by what kinds of treatments, for what kinds of 
patients, with what kind of problems, by what kinds of therapists under what kinds of 
conditions and at what cost” (Paul, 1969; Kiesler, 1966; Kazdin & Wilson, 1978). In the 
evaluation of psychotherapy, it is not difficult to see that conceptual and methodological 
issues have again become pivotal.
As a construct for controlling the effects of artifacts, the use of placebo in 
psychotherapy is clearly conceptually and procedurally flawed. This inevitably raises the 
important question: Is the concept of placebo-in-psychotherapy much ado about nothing? 
To the extent that the phenomenon is still not sufficiently understood and difficult to 
define operationally, its continual use in psychotherapy research is clearly limited. 
However, psychotherapy research has clearly flourished and become more sophisticated 
since the spectre of “placebo-genesis” was raised by Eysenck over four decades ago 
(Eysenck, 1952). Ironically, the disillusionment about placebo as a research strategy 
might have served to catalyse the continual refinement of research method on 
psychotherapy, as witnessed by the emphasis on firstly effective treatments, and more 
recently, on the importance of validated therapies by way of process research (Dobson & 
Craig, 1998). One notable example is the development of the “dismantling strategy” in 
cognitive and behavioural therapy, which examines specific components in an effective 
treatment technique (e.g. Rehm et al., 1981). Another development has been the interest 
in process studies which focuses on specific in-therapy events including the conventional
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non-specific variables such as therapeutic alliance, empathy, warmth, and genuineness, as 
predictors o f outcomes (see Hovath & Greenberg, 1994; Beutler, Crago & Arizmendi, 
1986). On that basis, the construct of placebo may be credited for providing the impetus 
in psychotherapy research.
To conclude, although placebo-in-psychotherapy appears to be a construct in 
difficulty, there is the possibility for a positive transition. New research designs are 
emerging that may uncover needed knowledge, as well as becoming more sophisticated 
in their application. William McGuire (1969), a social psychologist, once described 
“three stages in the life of an artifact”: first it is ignored; then it is controlled for its 
presumed contaminating effects; and finally it is studied as an important phenomenon in 
its own right. The time is ripe for a paradigmatic shift to study systematically the 
phenomenon of placebo in its own right.
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Section 3.2
A cognitive analysis of obsessions
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Introduction
During the past two decades, clinical psychologists have increasingly relied 
upon the concepts and methods of cognitive psychology to account for disturbances 
associated with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) (Rachman, 1997; Salkovskis, 
1985). The explosion o f cognitive approaches to OCD has also been matched by an 
increasing interest in the experimental validation o f the underlying theoretical 
formulation. It is now generally acknowledged that clinical obsession is essentially 
a cognitive phenomenon (Rachman & Hodgson, 1980; Rachman, 1997). A 
cognitive model o f the disorder is now gaining ground as a new paradigm for 
explaining the underlying pathology as well as for developing empirically based 
therapeutic strategies.
According to Rachman and Hodgson (1980), “obsessions are intrusive, 
repetitive thoughts, images, or impulses that are unacceptable and/or unwanted and 
give rise to subjective resistance. The person finds them difficult to dismiss or 
control. The necessary and sufficient conditions fo r  defining a thought, impulse, or 
image as obsessional are intrusiveness, internal attribution, unwantedness and 
difficulty o f  control”^  AQi). Likewise, the current diagnostic criteria for obsessive- 
compulsive disorder defines the problem as recurrent unwanted intrusive cognition 
which the sufferer “attempts to ignore or suppress... or to neutralise... ” (DSM-IV, 
American Psychiatric Association, 1994). By definition, this means that cognitive 
processes such as what people think and do with their unwanted intrusive thoughts,
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impulses, or images are critical elements in the understanding o f clinical obsessions. 
The aim of this essay is to examine those cognitive processes that are critical in the 
pathogenesis o f obsessive-compulsive problems.
The nature o f  intrusive thoughts
Central to current cognitive theories of obsessions is the role of the 
unwanted, distressing intrusive thoughts (impulses and images) in the pathogenesis 
of obsessive-compulsive problems. Intrusions have been defined as repetitive, 
unacceptable, or unwanted thoughts (impulses or images) that interrupt ongoing 
activity; they are attributed to an internal origin and are difficult to control 
(Rachman, 1981). The definition emphasises the process characteristics o f the 
thoughts (i.e., degree o f intrusiveness, uncontrollability) as opposed to their content. 
However, it is evident that when trying to identify an intrusive thought, people refer 
not only the process characteristics o f their thought, but also to specific details of 
their content (Edwards & Dickerson, 1987). Characteristically, the content of 
obsessional thoughts converges on a number of common themes: dangerous, 
harmful, repugnant, immoral, sinful, criminal and blasphemous (Akhtar et al., 1975; 
de Silva & Rachman, 1997; Rachman & Hodgson, 1980). However, evidence from 
recent studies showed that about four-fifths o f the general population also 
experience unpleasant intrusions that are highly similar in form and content to those 
in obsessive-compulsive disorders (Rachman & de Silva, 1978; Salkovskis & 
Harrison, 1984; Freeston, Ladouceur, Thibodeau & Gagnon, 1991; Purdon & Clark,
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1993). While these findings can be construed as an indication that unwanted 
intrusive thoughts are almost universally experienced, and that normal and 
abnormal obsessions may be on the same line o f continuum, the dividing line is 
rather fuzzy and unclear. Moreover, intrusive thoughts have also been shown to be 
a construct overlapping several emotional disorders such as anxiety (Barlow, 1980), 
depression (Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Roper, 1988) and post-traumatic stress disorder 
(Foa, Steketee, & Rothbaum, 1989). Thus, it would appear that cognitive intrusion 
might be a predisposing necessary but insufficient condition in the pathogenesis of 
OCD.
Simply looking at the intrusive thought itself may well be a ‘red herring’. 
Drawing from findings in recent experimental and clinical studies on anxiety, it has 
been proposed that obsessions are caused by highly negative misinterpretation of 
the significance o f one’s thoughts, images, or impulses (Clark, 1992; Rachman, 
1997). The basic premise is that pathological obsessions have their origin in the 
unwanted intrusive thoughts found in normals (Rachman & Hodgson, 1980; 
Salkovskis, 1985, 1989). The transition from normal to pathological obsessions is a 
product of the meaning obsessional sufferers assign to the occurrence and content of 
their intrusive cognition (Clark & Purdon, 1993; Rachman 1993, 1997; Salkovskis,
1994).
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A ppraisa l o f  In trusions
The way meaning is given to a specific event such as the occurrence of an 
intrusive thought has been referred to as appraisal. Appraisals may take the form of 
expectations, interpretations or other types of judgements o f events (Salkovskis, 
1985, 1989; Freeston et a l ,  1996). This includes: (a) the importance of, or the 
responsibility for the thought; (b) the probability, importance of, or responsibility 
for the event happening (e.g., “having a thought means that it might be true”); and 
(c) the obligation to act in a particular way to prevent the event and its consequence 
occurring (Salkovskis, 1985, 1989; Freeston et al, 1996). On this basis, appraisals 
may be measured by the perceived frequency and persistence o f the intrusion, and 
the perceived consequence o f and responsibility in relation to the event. It may also 
be measured by an account or inventories o f thought that may occur in response to 
the intrusion (Rachman, 1998; Freeston et al., 1996)
It is hypothesised that obsessional sufferers tend to interpret aspects o f their 
own mental functioning -  such as thoughts, images, impulses, doubts and memories 
-  differently from non obsessionals (Salkovskis, 1996; Rachman, 1997). There is 
considerable supporting evidence for this hypothesis. In a study on the appraisal 
responses o f 270 students to their most upsetting intrusive thought, the manner in 
which the subjects appraised their intrusive thoughts (e.g., perceived controllability) 
was found to be the major determinant o f the frequency and persistence o f the 
intrusion (Purdon & Clark, 1994). In this study, it was also found that subjects with
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high obsessive compulsive scores on the Padua Inventory, reported more unwanted 
intrusive thoughts than the low-score-subjects. In addition, these “highly 
obsessional” subjects rated their intrusion as significantly more frequent and 
believable than the “low-obsessive” subjects.
In a number o f studies involving clinical subjects, there is also evidence that 
people with OCD have a different symptom presentation on measures o f cognitive 
appraisal than normal and non-OCD subjects. For example, using the Obsessive- 
Compulsive Disorder Cognitive Schemata Scale (CSS) which was designed to 
measure core cognitive schema of OCD, Sookman and Pinard (1995) revealed that 
people with OCD could be discriminated from normal controls, and from those with 
anxiety or mood disorder. Similar finding was reported by Freeston and colleagues, 
who found a measurable difference between OCD patients and normal controls, on 
measures o f appraisal and intrusions (Freeston, Ladouceur, Gagnon, & Thibodeau, 
1992; Freeston, Rheaume, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1995). In summary, these findings 
are consistent with the hypothesis that obsessionals have certain enduring 
propensity to misinterpret normal intrusions leading to an escalation and 
intensification of the unwanted mental intrusion. This results in a heightened 
discomfort and distress and subsequently a variety o f ritualistic safety-seeking 
behaviours such as repetitive checking and reassurance seeking, in order to avert the 
perceived aversive consequences (Salkovskis, 1985, 1989).
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Cognitive B iases in Obsessions
There is ample evidence that shows that the way in which people judge or 
evaluate events are influenced by pre-existing erroneous beliefs and biases (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974). While these cognitive biases and erroneous beliefs are 
employed by most people and are not necessarily pathological (Nisbett & Ross, 
1980), they can inadvertently influence judgement resulting in distorted or 
exaggerated appraisals or reactions.
It has been argued that obsessional individuals also operate on certain 
erroneous beliefs and fallacious assumptions resulting in their propensity to 
appraise their intrusions as having exaggerated personal significance and 
responsibility. Some o f the erroneous beliefs or cognitive biases that characterise 
individuals with obsessional problems are discussed in the following sections.
Overestim ation o f  threat and intolerance o f  uncertainty
There are a number of studies demonstrating that obsessionals are prone to 
overestimate the degree of threat and danger associated with their intrusive 
thoughts. Kozak, Foa, and McCarthy (1988) suggested that this occurred because 
obsessionals adopted a different mode o f epistemological reasoning than normal 
people. Most people, when considering fear information, operate on the assumption 
that in the absence of evidence for danger, a given situation is safe. Obsessionals, 
however, assume that in the absence o f evidence for safety, the situation is
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dangerous. It has been argued that it is the over-sensitivity to threat and the 
difficulty o f ensuring an absolute safety which results in the obsessionals’ 
tormenting indecisiveness and doubting (e.g., Walker, 1967; Milner, Beech, & 
Walker, 1971). In a recent study of risk-taking behaviour using the Everyday Risk 
Inventory to measure subjects’ responses, OCD patients were shown to be more 
“risk-aversive” than the normal controls (Steketee & Frost, 1994). Several other 
studies also lend empirical support on the association between OCD and 
overestimation o f threat (Freeston et al., 1992; Steketee et al., 1996; Steiner, 1972). 
However, in a recent study on the assessment o f general classes o f dangerous events 
(e.g., traffic accident, earthquake), subjects’ performance on probability assessment 
of these events were found to be uncorrelated with score on the revised Maudsley 
Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (Simos et al., 1995). An interesting 
interpretation of this negative finding is that obsessional symptoms may be related 
not to overestimation of harm or danger in general, but perhaps related more 
specifically to harm of a personal nature. Having said this, intolerance of 
uncertainty has also been observed in other conditions (Steketee et al., 1996). In 
view o f this, it remains to be seen whether this difficulty is specifically more 
strongly associated with OCD than with other disorders.
In relation to the overestimation o f threat, people with OCD have also been 
noted to have difficulty making decisions (Beech & Liddell, 1974; Kozak, Foa & 
McCarthy, 1987). It has been suggested that the difficulty may arise from distorted 
beliefs about the need for certainty (Carr, 1974). In a study in which subjects’
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response to a probabilistic inference task were evaluated, obsessionals showed a 
‘poorer’ performance than the normal and phobic group in terms o f their requiring 
greater amount of evidence prior to a decision (Volan, 1977). Intolerance of 
uncertainty has also been reported in other studies (e.g., Frost, Lahart, Dugas, & 
Sher, 1988) in which people with obsessional symptoms, compared to other control 
group, tend to be more cautious, take longer to categorise information or request 
information to be repeated. However, it has to be noted that intolerance of 
uncertainty has also been reported among other clinical (e.g., Steketee et al., 1996) 
and non-clinical subjects (Wright & Phillips, 1980). For this reason, it remains to 
be seen whether this difficulty is a feature more strongly associated with OCD than 
other conditions.
R esponsibility  B iases
The account of exaggerated responsibility espoused by Salkovskis (1985, 1989) 
is probably one of the most influential and enlightening analysis of the cognitive 
processes underlying clinical obsession. According to Salkovskis, obsessionals are 
predisposed to misinterpret their intrusive thoughts in terms of the harm that the 
thoughts can do to themselves or others. The evaluation of the anticipated harm arises 
from a dysfunctional cognitive schema of an exaggerated personal responsibility. 
Some examples of these kind of dysfunctional cognitive schema (or cognitive biases) 
are described by Salkovskis (1985,1989,1996) to include the following beliefs: 
“Having a thought about an action is like performing the action ”
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“Failing to prevent (or fa iling  to try to prevent) harm to s e lf  or others is the same 
as having caused the harm in the f ir s t p lace ”
“Responsibility is not reduced by other factors such as something being 
improbable ”
“N ot neutralising when an intrusion has occurred is similar or equivalent to 
seeking or wanting the harm involved in the intrusion to happen. ”
“One should (and can) exercise control over on e’s thoughts. ”
In Salkovskis’(1989) view, those individuals who hold these dysfunctional 
thoughts very strongly are the ones who will develop abnormal obsessions. Using 
Salkovskis’s argument, these dysfunctional thoughts would be triggered by a 
cognitive intrusion. These dysfunctional thoughts distort the perceived power to 
cause or to prevent over negative consequences. In simpler terms, the intrusions 
experienced by obsessionals tend to provoke feelings o f responsibility because they 
hold the erroneous beliefs that they are the “agency” which possess the power and 
influence to avert or change the outcome.
There are a number o f empirical studies, which provide support to the 
relationship between responsibility and obsessional symptoms in non-clinical 
population. For example, in a study on college students’ response to the cognitive 
intrusion questionnaire, Freeston et al. (1992) found that responsibility was one of 
the major predictors to obsessional symptoms, while other predictors were guilt and 
disapproval. In another study, college students’ response to the Padua Inventory
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and the Responsibility Questionnaire developed by the investigators was examined. 
Regression analysis revealed that responsibility accounted for majority o f the 
variance (Rheaume et al., 1995). In an experimental study o f OCD patients, 
Lopatka and Rachman (1995) found both the discomfort and the urge to perform 
compulsive rituals declined significantly when experimentally induced 
responsibility decreased, thus giving further empirical support for the theory.
However, it is important to note that there are also studies, which failed to 
found an association between responsibility and OCD (e.g., Rheaume et al., 1992; 
Rachman et al., 1995; Frost et al., 1994). The discrepancy in findings may be 
attributable to differences in measurement, which highlights differences in the 
definition o f responsibility. For example, the subscale o f Jackson Personality 
Inventory used by Frost et al. (1994) appears to assess social responsibility (“I 
contribute to charity regularly”), while the use o f Responsibility Appraisal 
Questionnaire by Rachman et al. appears to measure responsibility o f causing harm 
and the responsibility o f social etiquette. Thus, defining the construct of 
responsibility operationally is clearly an issue, which needs to be addressed and 
clarified. A more promising development recently is one that defines responsibility 
operationally as “the belief that one has pivotal power to provoke subjectively 
crucial negative outcomes that may be actual or real or moral” (Salkovskis et al., 
1996). This conceptualisation of responsibility was found to predict 88% of the 
variance in scores of obsessional symptoms (Rheaume et al., 1995).
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Although biases o f exaggerated responsibility have been demonstrated in 
clinical and non-clinical subjects with obsessional symptoms, how ubiquitous is 
their presence amongst the obsessionals remains to be investigated. For example, 
there are suggestions that exaggerated responsibility is less common or intense 
among “cleaners” than among “checkers” (Rheaume et al., 1995). Clinically, it has 
been observed that the distortive influence o f responsibility biases also varies within 
the individual affected, as Rachman (1993), noted:
“ A sense o f  excessive responsibility is typically manifested at home and at work, 
but can spread to any place in which people may come to harm -  i f  the affected 
person feels a sense o f  belongingness in the place. Within this broadened sense o f  
responsibility, however, some curious features can be observed. Even the most 
dedicated possessors o f  elevated responsibility acknowledge sharp borders. 
Characteristically, affected people will experience little or no responsibility in the 
homes or workplace o f  other people. They fe e l responsible within their own 
psychological territory ... ” (p. 150)
Implicitly, this implies that the cognitive biases o f exaggerated 
responsibility is not pan situational, but situational specific. This kind of 
observation highlights not only important implications in terms o f therapeutic 
strategies, but also the complexity in the concept o f responsibility biases, which has 
yet to be elucidated.
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Moreover, results from recent researches (e.g. Rheaume et al., 1995; 
Freeston & Ladouceur, 1996) suggest that responsibility would only be one of the 
possible cognitive distortions among OC individuals. Thus, although inflated sense 
of personal responsibility may be an important theme influencing the appraisal, 
other themes such as uncertainty, perceived threat, control and intentionality, as 
well as the degree to which the thought is believed to be true, may also be present. 
It is also possible that exaggerated responsibility may be more prominent in certain 
subtype of OCD patients, for example, in those who check compulsively (Rheaume 
et al., 1995). In some types of obsessions, such as harming obsessions, other kind 
of dysfunctional beliefs (e.g., perfectionism) may play a more central role.
Salkovskis’ proposal(1985) about the role o f exaggerated responsibility, 
nevertheless, is of considerable importance. Firstly, it explains one o f the ways 
intrusive thoughts are misinterpreted by obsessional sufferers. Secondly and perhaps 
more importantly, it highlights and explains the undue significance with which 
obsessionals attached to their intrusive thoughts. As Rachman (1997) observed, 
obsessional sufferers not only feel responsible for having the unwanted intrusive 
thoughts, but they also have the erroneous belief that merely having the unacceptable 
thought may actually increase the occurrence of the dreaded (aversive) event. Such 
beliefs include:
“I  think about it because it is important, and it is important because I  think 
a b o u tit”.
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“I f  I  think about it, it means I  want it to happen; it reveals my true nature 
“I  am morally responsible fo r  these objectionable thoughts 
“I f  I  think about it then I  am more likely to do i t”.
Thus, for the affected individual, having a morally repugnant thought would 
be seen as equivalent to having carried out the relevant action, or as an indication of 
moral “corruption”, or as a sign that carrying out the action will be more likely in 
the future. This phenomenon, which has been recently identified as thought-action 
fusion (Rachman, 1993; Shafran, Thordarson, & Rachman, 1996), is clearly related 
to the exaggerated sense of responsibility. At present, there are few studies 
investigating this phenomenon but clearly it has important theoretical and practical 
implications which are worthy of attention.
Perfectionism
As early as 1903, perfectionism had been specified by Janet as having a central 
role in the aetiology of obsessive-compulsive disorder (Pitman, 1987). Clinically, 
the compulsive obsessions o f symmetry, completeness, and “just right” phenomena 
are well known examples o f perfectionistic behaviour observed in OCD (Rasmussen 
& Risen, 1989). Other forms o f perfectionism observed in OCD, albeit covert, 
include the need for certainty, or the need to know or control (Freeston, Rheaume, 
& Ladouceur, 1996). Given the phenomenological prominence o f perfectionism in 
OCD, its importance, both as a clinical and theoretical construct, is obvious.
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Perfectionism has been defined as “the belief that a perfect state exists that 
one should try to attain” (Pacht, 1984). From this theoretical perspective, it is the 
striving for attaining perfection in performance, certainty, appearance and morality 
that keeps individuals with OCD in turmoil. There is empirical evidence supporting 
a link between perfectionism and OCD, but mainly from non-clinical or sub-clinical 
populations. For example, in a study by Frost, Marten, Lahart, and Rosenblate 
(1990), significant correlation was found between Frost Multidimensional 
Perfectionism Scale (FMPS) and the Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive Inventory 
(Hodgson & Rachman, 1977) and the Everyday Checking Behaviour List (Sher, 
Frost, & Otto, 1983). In this study, the dimensions o f “Concern Over Mistakes” 
and “Doubts about Actions” emerged as more closely related to OC symptoms. In 
another study by Frost, Steketee, Cohn, and Greiss (1994) on non-clinical subjects, 
perfectionism as measured by the FMPS was also found to be associated with 
higher level of OC symptoms. Similar finding on non-clinical subjects was also 
reported in a study by Rheaume et al. (1995), in which the score o f perfectionism on 
the FMPS was revealed as a significant predictor of OC symptoms.
In addition to these findings, associations between perfectionism and 
specific OC symptoms (e.g., checking, washing, and hoarding) have been reported 
in some studies. For example, higher perfectionism scores on the FMPS were found 
among non-clinical “checkers” than “non-checkers” (Gershunny & Sher, 1995). 
Studies on other non-clinical samples also revealed a correlation between 
perfectionism and hoarding (Frost & Gross, 1993). This led to the hypothesis that
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perfectionism may be related to specific classes o f OCD such as the “washers”, that 
is, those striving for a “perfect” state of cleanliness (Tallis, 1996).
Despite the wealth o f evidence from the non-clinical population, clinically the 
link between perfectionism and OC symptoms is difficult to validate, for several 
reasons. Firstly, there is, as yet, no systematic study o f perfectionism on the clinical 
population. Secondly, on the few studies in which clinical subjects were used, the 
evidence has been inconclusive. For example, significant and positive correlation 
was found between perfectionism score, as measured by the Perfectionistic 
Cognitive Inventory (PCI,: Flett et al., 1994), and OC symptoms, among a group of  
volunteers who reported to have been diagnosed as OCD (Ferrari, 1995). 
Unfortunately, their diagnostic status could not be validated, thus rendering the 
interpretation of the finding difficult. In a more recent study by Frost and Steketee 
(1997), patients with OCD were shown to have significantly elevated perfectionism 
score on the FMPS compared to non-patient control (Frost & Steketee, 1997). 
However, little significance on the total perfectionism score was found when they 
were compared to patients with phobia or panic disorder.
Moreover, it has been pointed out that perfectionism can be a positive as well 
as a psychopathological trait (Hamacheck, 1978). On that basis, clinical measure of 
perfectionism should focus on the exaggerated form of the trait, since it is this 
dimension which may be associated with psychopathology. In terms o f the 
instruments currently employed in measuring perfectionism (e.g., FMPS; PCI), how
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well these scales measure the essence o f ‘pathological perfectionism’ is clearly an 
important issue, which needs to be addressed and resolved. To complicate the issue 
further, recent research has suggested perfectionism may be a pervasive trait in 
terms of its relationship with emotional disorders (Burns, 1980), which include, 
among others, depression (Hewitt & Flett, 1991), eating disorders (Bastinai, Rao, 
Welzin, & Kaye, 1995), and social phobia (Juster et al., 1996). Such findings 
inevitably raise further questions about the uniqueness o f perfectionism in terms of 
its role in the genesis o f OCD.
In summary, despite its phenomenological prominence, the relationship 
between perfectionism and OCD is still not clearly understood. Given 
perfectionism is common to many forms o f psychopathology, it may well be a 
necessary but insufficient trait in the genesis o f OCD. As a clinical construct, and 
in light o f its importance and therapeutic implications, the role o f perfectionism in 
the genesis o f OCD is clearly worthy o f more systematic attention and investigation.
N eutralisation
The active and usually counter-productive attempts to resist, escape, avoid, 
remove or counter the obsessions have been referred to as “neutralisation” 
(Rachman, 1976). The concept o f neutralisation is central to Salkovskis’ writing on 
obessional compulsive problems. According to Salkovskis (1985, 1989),
neutralisation serves an important psychological function as they are attempts to 
“put things right”. The neutralising acts are essentially attempts to prevent or
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mitigate the anticipated effects o f obsessions. These may include compulsive 
behaviours, reassurance seeking, efforts to eliminate intrusive thoughts, and 
avoidance o f situations linked to the obsessive thoughts. Reassurance seeking 
behaviours, for example, can be seen as a way o f spreading the responsibility and 
reducing blame. It is argued that these attempts to prevent the occurrences or 
mitigate the effect o f obsessional intrusions inadvertently heighten attention to the 
very mental processes or events the individuals desperately wanted to avoid thus 
contributing to their persistence and maintenance.
Neutralising acts are therefore seen as dysfunctional or maladaptive 
strategies. The argument, as proposed by Salkovskis (1996), goes like this: 
knowing that one has the possibility o f being able to reduce or prevent the 
responsibility of potential harm is tantamount to the admission o f assuming 
responsibility for the possible outcomes. That is to say, by acting to reduce one’s 
responsibility, one implicitly accepts the implications o f being responsible in the
first place  “evasion o f  responsibility has the additional unwanted effect o f
strengthening more enduring beliefs concerning the extent to which one is 
responsible in the firs t place and in the future"  (p.62). More recently, in a series of 
experiments, Wenger (1989, 1994) also demonstrated certain efforts to suppress or 
control negative intrusive thoughts increased intrusion-focussed monitoring, which 
resulted in the paradoxical effect of enhancing intrusions in question. Neutralising
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strategies, in their overt or covert form, seem to be rituals that play a key role in the 
maintenance o f clinical obsessions.
There is, indeed, ample o f evidence to support this kind o f hypothesis. For 
example, in their study of strategies o f thought control in obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (OCD), Amir, Cashman, & Foa (1997) found that OCD subjects employed 
maladaptive strategies more often than non-patient control. Specifically, 
punishment (e.g., getting angry at themselves for having the thought), and worry 
(dwelling on other worries) were examples o f such maladaptive strategy. 
Conversely, non-OCD subjects used more adaptive strategies such as distraction 
(e.g. doing something that they enjoy).
However, there are also some drawbacks about this kind o f postulation on 
the role o f neutralisation. In a study o f 29 OCD patients with dominant obsessive 
thoughts, Freeston and Ladouceur (1996) found that some o f OCD subjects could 
indeed, use strategies that could be considered adaptive, (e.g., talk to others, replace 
with good thought), and with moderate efficacy in terms of removing their intrusive 
thoughts. In further analysis o f the repertoire o f strategies used by the subjects, 
majority o f the strategies were not cognitive rituals nor neutralisation in the narrow 
sense of “attempting to put things right”, even though they were effortful, 
intentional and deployed in a strategic way.
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This raises the question o f whether neutralisation should be seen as a 
dysfunctional or maladaptive act which inadvertently contributes to the spiral of 
misinterpretation o f the unwanted intrusions and which increases the frequency of 
intrusions and their subsequent distress. Looking from the evidence presented thus 
far, one can either redefine neutralisation as specifically a dysfunctional mechanism 
“to put things right”; the alternative is to accept that it is simply a mechanism to 
deal with the stresses and distresses o f cognitive intrusions which can also be 
adaptive at times. For the former, Rachman & de Silva (1978) did make an attempt 
to distinguish neutralisation and coping mechanism. Neutralisation was referred to 
as acts that are intended to enable escape from or avoid the obsession. Coping 
mechanism, unfortunately, was not defined except some examples o f thought 
stopping, distraction and physical avoidance. A more useful distinction was 
proposed by Salkovskis (1991) in which coping mechanisms are defined as 
responses that deal with anxiety; while maladaptive acts (i.e., neutralisation) are 
responses that deal with threat. The argument was that by dealing with anxiety, a 
coping response might enhance cognitive change by providing an alternative non­
threat based account of the intrusion. In reality, however, making the distinction on 
that basis is difficult because the appraisal o f anxiety may also be part of the 
perception o f threat (Arntz, Hilderbrand, & van den Hout, 1994). Given the role of 
neutralisation in the conceptualisation o f OCD, and the emerging popularity of 
cognitive strategies in the treatment o f obsessions, understanding what patients
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actually do with their intrusive thoughts is clearly an issue which need to be 
clarified.
Sum m ary an d  Conclusion
In conclusion, despite the lack of conclusive evidence, the cognitive theory of 
obsession nevertheless provides a useful framework for future research and 
investigation. To recapitulate, the theory starts with the premise that unwanted 
intrusive thoughts are the seeds o f obsessions that are almost universally 
experienced. Whether it will sprout and grow into a full-fledged obsessive- 
compulsive disorder depends on the effect of a number o f basic ingredients: the way 
in which meanings are attached to the intrusion, which in turn hinges on the 
strength o f certain underlying dysfunctional cognitive schema or biases held by the 
individuals. Dysfunctional cognitive schema such as exaggerated responsibility 
gives rise to a misinterpretation of the significance o f intrusive thoughts resulting in 
discomfort and distress. Neutralisation which are seen as futile attempts to counter 
or combat the unwanted intrusions, usually only adding fuel to the problem. The 
consequence of this is an escalation of frequency and severity o f the intrusions thus 
producing a spiral o f torment to the affected individuals.
Although the theory discussed above appears to have considerable 
explanatory power, some difficulties remain. Foremost in mind is how to translate 
the theory into effective therapeutic strategies. Unfortunately many cognitive
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strategies which purport to tackle the obsessional intrusions seem to have backfired 
(Wenger, 1994; Salkovskis, 1989). Presumably, this is because there is still a lot to 
learn about the characteristics o f obsessional thinking. Clearly, more research in 
these areas needs to be taken on before a coherent and effective therapeutic strategy 
can be formulated for obessional problem. Nevertheless, as the old Chinese used to 
say, “A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step”. Adopting the 
experimental cognitive approach to the psychopathology o f clinical obsession, in 
my view, is already a colossal and exciting step forward.
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Abstract
To investigate the distinctive characteristics o f neurasthenia and its relationship with 
anxiety and depression, the present study employed a clinical sample comprising three 
diagnostic groups: “pure neurasthenia”, depression, and anxiety disorders. Several 
established psychometric scales were compiled and administered to the participants. 
These included BAI, BDI, DASS, PSWQ and the locally developed neurasthenia scale 
(NS). Scores on the psychometric scales revealed a significant group difference 
between the “pure neurasthenics” and the anxiety and depression controls. In 
comparison with the depression and anxiety groups, the neurasthenics consistently 
obtained a significantly lower score on all o f the self-report mood measures for stress, 
anxiety and depression. Although the neurasthenics also scored significantly lower on 
the “Irritability and Nervousness” sub-scale o f the NS, no reliable group difference was 
found on the other three sub-scales measuring “Fatigue and Sleep Difficulty”, 
“Musculoskeletal Aches and Pain”, and the non-specific “Dysfunctional Symptoms”. 
The results could be taken to infer neurasthenia as a milder form o f distressed 
condition, characterised by a relative absence of the affective component. 
Furthermore, multiple regression analysis revealed that the total NS score was best 
predicted by the measure o f stress, while depression and anxiety measures only 
accounted for a minor proportion of the variance. Similar finding emerged in the 
discriminant function analysis in which the measure of stress was the best contributor 
for group-differentiation, while the depression and anxiety measures failed to provide
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significant impact. Overall, these findings suggested that neurasthenia may be more 
closely affiliated with the construct of stress, and did not support the proposition of its 
being a variant of anxiety and depression. Conceptual and taxonomic implications of 
neurasthenia as a clinical construct were discussed.
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Introduction
Medical conditions characterised by persistent and excessive fatigue for which 
there is no simple explanation have been one o f the major concerns in medicine and 
psychiatry of the last century (Shorter, 1992). The problem of fatigue has aroused 
intense interest not only among clinicians, but also among politicians, scientists, 
educators, novelists and the general public (Führer & Wessely, 1995). Fatigue as a 
syndrome has been given many names by clinicians including myalgic 
encephalomyelitis (ME), Royal Free Disease, post-viral and post-infectious fatigue 
syndrome, neurocirculatory asthenia, fibromyalgia, chronic fatigue syndrome, and 
neurasthenia (White, 1990). Of these diagnostic labels, neurasthenia is probably the 
most prominent and the most frequently diagnosed condition o f the last century. 
Conceived as a psychosomatic illness, neurasthenia has a rather controversial and 
chequered history (Wessely, 1995; Shorter, 1992). At the beginning o f the century, it 
was virtually a household name, and was considered the most fashionable and popular 
disease o f the era (Dubois, 1909). Among the many sufferers o f this clinical 
condition, it has been reported, were Charles Darwin and Florence Nightingale (c.f. 
White, 1990). This meteoric rise of popularity was, however, rather short-lived. 
Under the scrutiny of experimental medicine, it was quickly dismissed in the West as a 
quirky hypothetical construct, which was vague, over-inclusive, and destitute o f 
objective signs (Blocq, 1894; Shorter, 1992). To most Western clinicians nowadays, 
neurasthenia is regarded an outmoded and anachronistic diagnosis, which has been
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replaced by more refined, and viable clinical concepts in modern psychiatry (Chatel & 
Peele; 1970).
While its acceptance as a legitimate clinical entity tapered in the West, the 
diagnosis burgeoned in the East, particularly in Chinese societies such as Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and Mainland China. Before the 1980s, an estimate o f up to 80% o f psychiatric 
outpatients were diagnosed as neurasthenic in China (Zheng et al., 1997). In fact, the 
years between 1950 and 1980 were hailed as the “age o f neurasthenia” during which the 
concept simply bloomed and flourished (Zhang, 1989). As Chinese make up about 
one-fifth o f the world’s population, this phenomenon in China and other Chinese 
societies is clearly o f immense clinical significance. Controversies and professional 
debates about the validity and reliability o f the epidemiological findings in Chinese 
societies inevitably followed. Critics were quick to point out the possibility of the 
diagnosis being misused or abused (Lee, 1994). Others, who noted a resemblance of 
symptom presentation between neurasthenia and affective disorders, argued that the 
observed epidemic of neurasthenia in China was primarily anxiety or depressive 
disorders masquerading as a somatic illness (e.g. Chatel & Peele, 1970; Kleinman, 
1982).
On the surface, the debate would appear to be yet another difference o f views 
between the East and West. Behind the façade o f the cultural divide, however, lies a 
fundamental issue. What is at stake is not simply the question o f neurasthenia’s 
legitimacy as a diagnostic entity, but also how it should be construed and understood as
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a clinical phenomenon. As an entity, the historical vicissitude o f neurasthenia, which 
arouses intense dissents and debates, clearly highlights the need for psychological 
investigation.
Historical Perspective
The word neurasthenia was originated from Greek and means literally Tack of 
nerve strength”. It was first introduced by a Scottish physician John Brown two 
centuries ago as a term for the clinical syndrome of fatigue (Brown, 1780). However, 
the popularity o f the term was largely the credit o f a New York neurologist, George 
Beard (1869). In a brief paper presented at the Boston Medical and Surgical Journal, 
Beard introduced neurasthenia as “a disease o f  the nervous system, without organic 
lesion, which may attack any or all parts o f  the system, and characterised by 
enfeeblement o f  the nervous force, which may have all degrees o f  severity, from  slight 
loosening o f  these forces down to profound and general prostration ” (Bouveret, cited 
by Deale and Adams, 1894). At the core o f the condition was “nervous exhaustion” 
characterised by “undue fatigue on slightest exertion, both physical and mental” (Cobb, 
1920), or fatigue or muscular weakness (Berkley, 1901; Mitchell, 1908). This fatigue 
had certain characteristics -  “it comes early, is extreme and lasts long” (Mitchell, 
1883). In spite o f the “abnormal quick fatigability and slow recuperation”, sufferers in 
general tended to look well with no obvious sign of illness (Jaspers, 1964).
I l l
Concomitant with the fatigue were a host o f over seventy-five somatic or somato­
psychic symptoms such as headaches, insomnia, vague pains, pressure and heaviness in 
the head, lack of concentration, dyspepsia, palpitations and flushing (Beard, 1881).
Aetiologically, in Beard’s view, the diverse symptoms o f neurasthenia were the 
common consequence of an excessive expenditure o f nervous energy resulting in a 
condition called “nervousness”. In essence, neurasthenia was conceived as a draining 
of nervous energy in the face of excessive demands made upon the nervous system. 
During the early years o f interest in neurasthenia, the prevailing paradigm for the cause 
of “nervous exhaustion” was a reflex hypothesis. This postulated that excessive 
irritation or stimulation of the nervous system led to exhaustion o f the peripheral 
nerves, which could spread to other bodily organs (see Lopez-Pinero, 1983; Shorter, 
1992). Under the critical scrutiny of the then flourishing neurophysiology in the U.K., 
such postulation was soon condemned. The discreditation o f the reflex theory led to a 
revised view conceiving neurasthenia as a consequence o f the weakness or 
degeneration of the central nervous system (Pershing, 1904). But again, this organic 
view could not be sustained as there was little evidence supporting the neuro- 
pathological theory (Meyer, 1919). At the turn of the century when neurology was 
establishing itself as a scientific discipline, neurasthenia as an organic disease was 
rapidly losing ground in the medical fraternity and was subsequently abandoned as a 
neurological condition in favour of a psychological model (Wessely, 1995). There 
were two main reasons for the decline. First, the neuro-pathological basis o f the illness
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was discredited. Secondly, physical treatments, such as rest, were either unsuccessful, 
or efficacious principally for psychological reasons (Shorter, 1992; Wessely, 1995).
The failure of the organic paradigm paved the way for a psychological model. 
Intriguingly, Beard claimed that this “nervousness” was a peculiarly American 
phenomenon since, in the then most advancing modern society with a “Protestant 
ethic”, too many psychological demands were placed on the population. In his view, 
neurasthenia was an organic disorder arising out of the socio-psychological stresses of a 
rapidly changing and moving world. Beard viewed neurasthenia as the prototype of 
many diseases, both physical and mental. In particular it was the forerunner o f all the 
mental diseases, from neurosis to psychosis, the “soil from which all mental illnesses 
spring” (Arndt, 1892). In short, the organic concept o f neurasthenia had been 
transformed and a psychosomatic view has taken root.
At a time when psychiatry was mainly confined to the custodial management of 
the insane, articulating neurasthenia from a mix o f contemporary scientific, social, and 
psychological theories was an attractive and appealing proposition. As a result, it 
quickly became the “maladie a la mode”, a fashionable new disease whose name was 
on everybody’s lips (Dubois, 1909; Certhoux, 1961). Its popularity was not simply 
limited to America, but also propagated like an epidemic in industrialised Europe. In 
America, for example, Nice (1908) estimated that 15 to 20 % o f patients who attended 
general practitioners in the early 1900s were diagnosed as suffering from neurasthenia. 
In Europe, when psychiatry and medicine was still under the dominant influence of
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Freud and Charcot, the diagnosis o f neurasthenia was six times more common than 
hysteria (Schofield, 1906; c.f. Shorter, 1992). Both Freud and Charcot used the 
diagnosis extensively. Freud (1895), in fact, regarded neurasthenia as physical 
exhaustion secondary to psychosexual problems, which he attempted to treat with 
psychoanalysis.
However, as a single disease entity, neurasthenia had been criticised as an 
exceptionally “broad church” which embraced a wide spectrum of symptoms many of 
which were as non-specific as they were ambiguous (Shorter, 1992). It had been 
dubbed as a diagnostic wastebasket, which was used over-inclusively by both 
professionals and lay people. Perhaps unfairly, it even became an object o f derision 
and it was ridiculed that “everything could be explained by neurasthenia, suicide, 
decadent art, dress, and adultery” (Certhoux, 1961).
From Beard’s original writings on neurasthenia. Shorter (1992) discerned that 
there were at least four ways in which neurasthenia could be conceptualised. Firstly, it 
was viewed as a synonym for general nervousness, a mixture o f mood disorder, anxiety 
disorder or psychoneurosis, combined principally with somatoform symptoms. 
Secondly, it was regarded as the male form of hysteria, as both neurasthenia and 
hysteria were characteristically underlain with irritability. The onset o f neurasthenia 
was conceived as an outcome of overwork and excessive devotion to duty. 
Accordingly, the diagnostic conception involved a desirable social connotation that 
helped to bring working males to doctors’ attention. Thirdly, neurasthenia was
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conceptualised as a mild form of depression, in view of the frequent overlap of 
symptoms between the two conditions. Finally, neurasthenia was conceptualised as 
chronic fatigue -  a fatigue neurosis whose “cardinal characteristics were an inordinate 
sense of physical or mental fatigue” (Neu, 1920). As modern psychiatry emphasised 
specificity, validity, and reliability of diagnoses, this kind of conceptual vagueness and 
lack of specificity inevitably led to its gradual decline in popularity as a legitimate 
diagnostic category (Abbey & Garflnkel, 1991; Wessely, 1990).
The Nosological Controversy
Position o f  Am erican and Western Psychiatry
Probably for the aforesaid reasons, the treatment of neurasthenia in the diagnostic 
and statistical manual of mental disease in America has been inconsistent. It was listed 
in the Diagnostic Manual of Disease Diagnosis and Statistics by the American 
Psychiatric Association in 1939, and by the American Medical Association in 1942 as a 
psycho-physiological, autonomic nervous system, and visceral functional disorder. In 
1952, neurasthenia as a diagnostic entity was excluded altogether from the category of 
neurosis in the first edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 1952). In its place, under the heading of 
“psychophysiologic nervous system reaction,” a footnote was attached to indicate what 
would replace the diagnosis of neurasthenia: “009-580 Psychophysiologic nervous 
system reaction.” This included psychophysiologic asthenic reaction, in which general
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fatigue is the principal complaint. In 1968, neurasthenia as a formal diagnostic entity 
re-appeared as a subtype of neurosis in DSM-II to refer to conditions of chronic 
weakness, easy fatigability, and sometimes exhaustion. Unlike hysterical neurosis, the 
patient's complaints are genuinely distressing to him and there is no evidence o f  
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disorder in the nature o f  the predominant complaint. It differs from  depressive 
neurosis in the moderateness o f  the depression and the chronicity o f  its course”. By 
1980, neurasthenia as a clinical entity was again, deleted from the DSM-III and DSM- 
III-R (American Psychiatric Association, 1980; 1987). It was only listed in the subject 
index at the end of the DSM-III-R to refer reader to Dysthymic Disorders. The current 
position of the American psychiatrist is probably best reflected in the DSM-IV Options 
Book -  a forerunner of the DSM-IV which states that “the availability o f  this diagnosis 
may lead clinicians to use it as a waste basket category, resulting in their overlooking 
other mental disorder (e.g. Depression)”. In their view, neurasthenia should not be 
included in the official classification, but instead, to “appear as a subtype o f  
undifferentiated somatoform disorder” (American Psychiatric Association, 1991, 
section 1, p. 11). Neurasthenia is now officially expunged from the DSM-IV. The 
pendulum has swung back in the other direction, what was initially the ‘American 
Disease’ is now no longer a disease in America.
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Situation in Chinese Societies
In contrast to its rapid decline in the West as a legitimate diagnostic category, 
neurasthenia has enjoyed a wide popularity since its introduction into the East in the 
1920s, especially in Chinese societies (Lin, 1989). Translated as “shen jin g  shuai 
rwo”(SJSR), which literally means “weakness of nerves or nervous system”, it has 
flourished as a fashionable diagnostic concept not only in the psychiatric profession, 
but also among traditional doctors and lay people. It has been suggested that the 
conception of neurasthenia corresponded with the traditional Chinese medical concept 
of illness as a functional disharmony of vital organs and imbalance of energy flow 
(Fabrega, 1990; Liu, 1989; Zhang, 1989). This, as Liu (1989) argued, might account 
for its popularity and ready acceptance in Chinese societies.
As mentioned, the diagnosis of neurasthenia has been extremely prevalent in 
Chinese societies, especially before the 1980s. In the People’s Republic of China, a 
number of large-scale community-wide epidemiological surveys reported prevalence 
rates of neurasthenia ranging from 6% to 10% (Zheng et al., 1997). For example, in a 
study of 10,830 adult citizens in Chendu City of the Shichuan province, 5.9% were 
found to be suffering from neurasthenia for more than 3 consecutive months (Li et al., 
1959). The popularity of neurasthenia also fared similarly in Hong Kong and Taiwan, 
in spite of the presence of many Western-trained doctors (Lin, 1989; Cheung, 1989).
In recent years, the use of neurasthenia as a diagnostic category has decreased 
precipitously in China, probably as a result o f their adopting the Westernised diagnostic
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criteria. Nevertheless, many patients in China continue to suffer from a condition 
reported as neurasthenia. For example, recent surveys found a prevalent rate of 5.5% to 
6.3% in clinical setting (Liu & Song, 1986), and one nationwide epidemiological study 
found a rate of 1.3% in the general population (cf Zheng et a l ,  1997).
While acquiescing that neurasthenia might have been too leniently diagnosed in 
China, many Chinese psychiatrists remain convinced that it is a clinical entity in its 
own right (Lee, 1994). In an attempt to clarify what diagnoses would be given in terms 
of modern Western diagnostic criteria, Zhang (1989) re-examined patients in Shanghai 
who were diagnosed as suffering from neurasthenia. The diagnostic system used in the 
study included Catego computerised system based on findings from the Psychiatric 
State Examination (Wing, 1974), and the criteria of the Diagnostic Interview Schedule 
(Robins et al., 1982). Using these Westernised systems, the author found that there was 
a proportion of patients (ranging from 10 to 15%) who, while neatly fitting the classical 
definition of neurosis, could not be validly classified as suffering from any major 
psychiatric diagnosis such as depression or anxiety. Similar findings and conclusions 
were reported in studies in other areas in China (e.g. Zhao et al., 1993).
Based on these empirical findings and their clinical experience, many psychiatrists 
in China considered it premature to delete neurasthenia from psychiatric classification. 
The diagnosis of neurasthenia was retained and reformulated. Currently, a stringent 
diagnostic criteria in China are based on the Second edition of the Chinese 
Classification of Mental Disorder (CCMD-2), the current official nosological system in
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China (Chinese Medical Association & Nanjing University, 1995). By keeping the 
neurasthenia entity whilst being mindful of the Western critique, the CCMD-2 include 
cautionary statements which acknowledge that as a psychiatric disorder, neurasthenia 
“has aroused international disputes”, and that “other form s o f  neurotic and 
psychophysiological disorders should be prudently excluded before the diagnosis is 
made” (Young, 1989, pp.557).
Under the CCMD-2, neurasthenia is classified as a neurotic disorder and requires 
any three symptoms out of five non-hierarchical groups of symptoms, as follows:
1. Weakness symptoms: mental fatigue, lack of energy, slowness of thinking, 
poor memory, or difficulty in concentration.
2. Emotional symptoms: vexatiousness, worry, easily irritable, frequently 
accompanied by secondary anxiety and distress.
3. Excitement symptoms: mentally easily excitable, as manifested in the 
uncontrollable increase of recollections and thought associations; the 
excitement is accompanied by unpleasant feelings and is not associated with an 
increase in psychomotor activity.
4. Nervous pain: tension headache or myalgia.
5. Sleep disturbance: difficulty falling asleep, distressed by too many dreams, 
unrefreshed on waking, loss of sense of having slept, chaotic sleep-wake 
schedule (not sleeping at night, listless and sleepy in the daytime).
119
Like other neurotic disorders in the CCMD-2, the condition must last at least 3 
months, and should: (a) lower the efficiency of work, study or social function; (b) cause 
mental distress; or (c) make the subject volunteer to seek treatment. Other physical and 
psychiatric disorders that produce similar symptoms must be excluded.
Position o f  the W orld H ealth Organisation (WHO)
As the diagnosis of neurasthenia as a disease entity continues to be widely used in 
China, and many other non-English speaking countries (Wessely, 1990; WHO, 1992), 
its diagnostic status has been retained by the diagnostic system of the World Health 
Organsation (WHO). In the 10th edition of the International Classification of Diseases 
(ICD -10), neurasthenia is subsumed under “other neurotic disorders” as a relatively 
uncommon diagnostic category. The ICD-10 definition is based on a narrower 
definition provided by Kraepelin (1908). In this definition, the diagnosis requires the 
presence of persistent fatigue (or weakness) after minimal mental or physical effort, and 
two out of seven subsidiary symptoms, including muscular aches and pains, dizziness, 
nervous headaches, sleep disturbance, inability to relax, irritability and dyspepsia. 
There is also the stipulation that Hallmarks o f  the syndrome are the p a tien t’s emphasis 
on fatigability and concern about lowered mental and physical efficiency (WHO, 
1992)’. Thus, under the ICD-10, neurasthenia is primarily being conceived as a fatigue 
syndrome as espoused in Shorter’s (1992) review. Table 1 presents the diagnostic 
criteria of neurasthenia in ICD-10.
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It is clear that the ICD-10 criteria represent a ‘compromised’ position to 
accommodate differing views. But todate, the division between psychiatrists in the 
West and those in the East stays entrenched (Lee, 1994).
Table 1. 
The Diagnostic Criteria of Neurasthenia in ICD-10 under Other Neurotic Disorder 
(World Health Organisation, 1992)
A. Either of the followings must be present:
(1) Persistent and distressing complaints of feelings of exhaustion after minor 
mental effort (such as performing or attempting to perform everyday tasks that 
do not require unusual mental effort;
(2) Persistent and distressing complaint of feelings of fatigue and bodily weakness 
after minor physical effort.
B. At least one of the following symptoms must be present:
(1) Feelings of muscular aches and pains
(2) Dizziness
(3) Tension headaches
(4) Sleep disturbance
(5) Inability to relax
(6) Irritability.
C. The patient is unable to recover from the symptoms in criteria A (1) or (2) by means 
of rest, relaxation or entertainment.
D. The duration of the disorder is at least 3 months.
E. Most commonly used exclusion clause. The disorder does not occur in the presence 
of organic emotionally labile disorder, post-encephalitic syndrome, post- 
concussional syndrome, mood (affective) disorder, panic disorder or generalised 
anxiety disorder.
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The Overlap with Chronic Fatigue Syndrom e
Despite the West’s rejection of “neurasthenia”, the presence of unexplained 
clinical syndromes of persistent fatigue continues to be a thorny issue to which Western 
psychiatry needed to address. In a community survey of 1517 women in the U.K. 
using the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ), Hobbs et al. (1983) identified 3 main 
factors of distress, namely, “debility”, “depression” and “somatic” factors. The debility 
factor had the largest proportion of variance consisting items such as “lack of energy”, 
“feeling in need of a tonic”, “not coping”, and “lack of pleasure”. Interestingly, in a 
subsequent analysis, they suggested that the debility factor, which could arguably be a 
factor of fatigue, was mainly a manifestation of mild anxiety and depression. 
Likewise, Goldberg et al. (1987) examined the dimensions of distress experienced by 
patients at primary care settings in the U.K. They also found a dimension of distress, 
which included tiredness, lack of energy, sleep symptoms and self-pity. In a different 
setting in Scandinavia, Verhaest and Pierloot (1980) entered the symptoms of 
psychiatric outpatients into a cluster analysis. The authors found a separate cluster of 
fatigue, exhaustion and various somatic complaints especially headaches and dizziness. 
A single factor of fatigue was also revealed by McNair and Lorr (1964), in a study of 
psychiatric outpatients in which symptoms were factor-analysed. Associated symptoms 
included weariness, sluggishness, being worn-out and sleepy. The validity of fatigue 
symptoms as a common condition of distress would appear to have been affirmed. 
What remained unclear was, how this constellation of unexplained physical and 
psychological symptoms of fatigue, and their associated distress, should be classified.
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It therefore came as little surprise when a new illness called Chronic Fatigue 
Syndrome (CFS) eventually emerged as a new epidemic during the last decades. Like 
neurasthenia in the late 1800s, it was one of the most frequently diagnosed illnesses. 
For example, in a community study conducted by Jason and his colleagues in the 
U.S.A. (Jason, Fitzgibbon et a l,  1993), individuals who reported having CFS were 
examined by a physician and interviewed by a psychiatrist to determine whether they 
met case criteria for CFS. About 0.2% of the sample were diagnosed with CFS by the 
research team. Likewise, Buchwald et al. (1995) found rates from 75 to 267 per 
100,000 in a sample of individuals enrolled in a health maintenance organisation in the 
U.S.A. In the primary care setting, Bates et al. (1993) found that among the patients 
seeking medical care for any reason, CFS occurred in approximately 1 in 100 adults. In 
the U.K., preliminary estimate of new cases per year of CFS in the primary care was 
about 3 to 5% (Wessely 1995), whereas the population-based incidence was about 0.4% 
(Lawrie et al., 1997).
Clinically, and similar to neurasthenia, CFS presents as a cluster o f heterogeneous 
symptoms characterised by non-specific complaints of disproportionate, prolonged 
fatigue and/or malaise following minor physical activity (Holmes et al., 1988; Wessely 
& Powell, 1989; Komaroff & Buchwald, 1998; Sharpe et al., 1997). Typically, the 
symptoms would result in a significant impairment of daily functioning for a period of 
6 months or more (Holmes et al., 1988; Lloyd et a l,  1988). Sufferers usually report an 
array of other concurrent physical and neuropsychiatrie symptoms such as unexplained 
muscle weakness, sore throat, sleep disturbance, labile mood, impaired memory and
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attention (Wessely, 1995; Abbey & Grafinkel, 1991; Katon & Walker, 1993; Hickie et 
al., 1990). The current diagnostic criteria for CFS is presented in Table 2 (Sharpe, 
1995).
Table 2.
Diagnostic Criteria for Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (from Sharpe, 1995) 
Inclusion Criteria
Clinically evaluated, medically unexplained persistent relapsing fatigue of at least 
6 months’ duration that is
of new onset (not life long) 
not the result of ongoing exertion 
not substantially alleviated by rest
- a substantial reduction in previous level of activities
The occurrence of four or more of the following symptoms
subjective memory impairment 
sore throat 
tender lymph nodes 
muscle pain
- joint pain 
headache 
unrefreshing sleep
- post-exertional malaise lasting more than 24 hours
Exclusion Criteria
active, unresolved or suspected disease
psychotic, melancholic or bipolar depression (but not uncomplicated major 
depression)
- psychotic disorders 
dementia
anorexia nervosa or bulimia nervosa 
alcohol or other substance abuse 
severe obesity
*The authors also suggested that chronic fatigue syndrome is best seen as a 
provisionally defined subgroup o f  a larger category o f  medically unexplained or 
idiopathic fatigue. Data from  Fukuda et al. 1994
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Until recently, the syndrome was hypothesised to be due to viral infection, 
specifically Epstein-Barr virus (Jones et a l ,  1985; Strauss et a l ,  1985) immune system 
dysfunction (Lloyd et a l,  1989), chronic infections (McDonald et a l ,  1990) or 
exposure to toxins. Rheumatological conditions such as fibrositis and fibromyalgia 
have also been implicated. But as yet, none of these hypotheses have been proven 
(Hickie, 1995), and no clear pathophysiology or effective treatment have been 
established (Straus, 1991; Wilson et a l ,  1994).
It has been suggested that chronic fatigue syndrome is a modernised version of 
neurasthenia in disguise (Abbey & Garfinkel, 1991; Wessely, 1990; Merikangas & 
Angst, 1994; Ormel et a l,  1994) and there is evidence in support o f such proposition. 
Firstly, complaint of persistent fatigue, both mental and physical, is the hallmark 
featured in both diagnoses. Neuromuscular symptoms and signs such as muscle aches 
and pains are also common complaints in both CFS and neurasthenia. Beard (1869) 
noted that “one of the most frequent complaints among the neurasthenic is heaviness 
and vague aching of loins and limbs, and sometimes of the whole body” (p.55). Other 
symptoms overlapping both diagnoses include headache, concentration difficulty, 
subjective forgetfulness and a host of other minor symptoms. Secondly, they were 
both initially viewed as entirely organic. Thirdly, they were both conceived as a 
consequence of socio-environmental stress. Finally, similar treatments such as rest and 
exercise were recommended for both conditions. But perhaps more importantly, both 
are associated with heterogeneous symptoms, and considerable overlap with depressive
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and anxiety disorder, with similar controversies about validity as a discrete clinical 
entity (For a review of the problem, please refer to Shorter, 1992; Jason et al., 1997).
In summary, in spite of the fact that Western psychiatrists rarely use the diagnosis 
nowadays (Chatel & Peele, 1970), “neurasthenia” somehow has found a way into 
medical or psychiatric glossaries. From history to contemporary, from the West to the 
East, and from approval to dismissal, its legitimacy as a clinical entity continues to 
arouse dissent and debate. What is not in dispute is the validity of the existence of the 
medically unexplained symptoms of fatigue. But what remains in hot dispute is the 
epistemological issue of how these symptoms should be interpreted, and under what 
diagnostic label should they be classified.
Culture and Nosology
In clinical science, the primary purpose of a classification is to describe and define 
the relationships of symptoms to each other and to simplify these relationships so that 
general statements can be made about the membership of symptom(s) to a particular 
diagnostic entity. Assigning a diagnostic entity to a set of symptoms presupposes that a 
clear, natural boundary exists between diagnostic categories, and that classification is 
simply “the art of carving nature at the joints”. However, as Kendall (1989) revealed, 
these endeavours are rarely straightforward. Judgement in clinical diagnosis, as Sir
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William Osier, a famous Canadian physician once said, "is a science of uncertainty and 
an art o f probability”. Nature, in reality, “has no joints”.
Studies on decision making have shown that human judgement is fallible, 
vulnerable to heuristic biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), and easily influenced by 
the way in which information is presented (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Similarly, in 
the medical setting, the influence of attributional style and beliefs on symptom 
representation and communication is well documented (e.g. Bishop & Converse, 1986; 
Leventhal, Meyer & Nerentz, 1980). By the same token, public beliefs about illnesses 
and culturally constituted cognitive style also affect the way patients identify and report 
their symptoms, as well as how they seek help (Lin, Tardiff, Donetz, & Coresky, 1978). 
Conceptions about clinical conditions, therefore, vary across individuals, and across 
countries according to social and cultural experience and beliefs (Jenkins, Kleinman, & 
Good, 1991). At this point, it is pertinent to make a distinction between “disease” and 
“illness”. The former refers to abnormalities in the function or structure of the body 
organ and system. Illness, on the other hand, refers to the personal experience and 
perception of changes in the state of wellbeing, which is susceptible to psychological, 
social and cultural influence (Einsenburg, 1977). Clinicians in general, tend to assume 
that disease is a universal and medical entity. From a medical anthropological point of 
view, however, all clinicians’ diagnoses are based on the theoretical models available, 
or the scientific paradigms extant at the time. Likewise, patients’ illness perception and 
communication are cognitive constructions based on their social-cultural schema. The 
distinction of illness and disease is useful from a cultural perspective as it illustrates
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how culture intervenes in clinical diagnosis by “legislating” what is a legitimate entity, 
and with it “mandating” what are the appropriate responses to or treatments for the 
disease (Shorter, 1992).
In relation to neurasthenia in China, it has been suggested that its popularity 
reflected a number of core cultural themes (Kleniman, 1982, 1986; Lin, 1989). For 
example, the consonance between Pavlovian theory and the original conception of 
neurasthenia as defined by Beard (1869), has been attributed as a reason for its wide 
acceptance as a disease entity in China (Li et al., 1960; Young, 1989). Until recently, 
Soviet psychiatry prevailed in almost every aspect of Chinese clinical practice. 
Medical thoughts were dominated by the Pavlovian psychophysiological theories and 
many neurotic symptoms were given a Pavlovian explanation (Lin, 1989).
Traditional and contemporary Chinese culture has also been said to have 
permeated the experience of neurasthenia (Kleinman, 1986). Originally conceived as a 
construct of organic disease, neurasthenia struck a cord with Traditional Chinese 
medicine (Huang Ti Ni Ching). Like neurasthenia, weakness and exhaustion are 
concepts featured notably in Chinese medicine, which view them as an imbalance of 
energy flow (qi) between the vital organs of the body. Within the paradigm of 
traditional Chinese medical doctrines, experiences of distress, be they physical or 
psychological, are manifestation of functional disharmony of energy flow between the 
vital body organs (for a review of the relationship between neurasthenia and traditional 
Chinese medicine, see Zhou et a /.,1986; Fabrega, 1990). In essence, traditional
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Chinese medical paradigms do not follow the dualistic principle o f Western medicine in 
separating the body and mind. Whereas Western psychiatry tends to view neurasthenia 
from a “psychological” perspective, traditional Chinese medicine would adopt a 
primarily “somatic” orientation. Although there is, as yet, little systematic and clinical 
research to demonstrate the influence of traditional Chinese medical doctrine (Lin, 
1989), the idea of linking the somatic orientation in Chinese societies to the concept of 
neurasthenia has created a great deal of debate and interest.
Somatisation and Neurasthenia
D efinition and Prevalence
The term “somatisation” has been introduced recently to describe the process of 
expressing or amplifying physical complaints in the absence o f defined organic 
pathology (cf. Katon, Kleinman & Rosen, 1982). The term has also been used to 
describe a variety of processes that lead patients to seek medical help for somatic 
symptoms that are misattributed to organic disease (Murphy, 1989).
Somatisation has shown to be a prevalent process. For example, in a study of the 
primary care setting in the U.K., Goldberg and Bridges (1989) examined the psychiatric 
status of the patients who consulted their doctors for somatic complaints. O f those 
patients who ascribed their complaints to physical disease, almost 20% of them had a 
treatable psychiatric disorder. In a medical outpatients clinic, Eastwood (1971)
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revealed that o f 124 patients diagnosed to be suffering from psychiatric illnesses, these 
psychiatric problems had not been identified by their general practitioners in about 50% 
of the women and 60% of the men because of somatic complaints. In the hospital 
setting, substantial proportions of patients referred to psychiatric service fulfill the 
criteria for somatisation. It has been estimated that about 30% of patients referred to 
liaison service in the U.K. are “somatised” (Thomas, 1983), while in the U.S.A., 
somatisation cases formed 38% of referrals (Katon et al., 1984).
Association between somatisation, and affective disorders has been emphasised by 
numerous writers (Kleinman, 1982; Kellner, 1986; Cadoret et al., 1980). Goldberg 
(1979), for example, found that over half of the patients attending a primary care setting 
had significant somatic symptoms as part of their depressive illness. In another study 
by Raft, Davison, Toomey, Spencer and Lewis (1975), of the 29% of patient who were 
diagnosed as depressed, the depression status of 12% of these patients was masked by 
physical complaints. In a more recent study of patients attending family clinics in 
Montreal, more than 75% of the patients were found to have either major depression, 
panic disorder, or milder form of mixed depression-anxiety (Kirmayer, Young and 
Robbins, 1991). Emotional distress therefore seemed to have an important association 
with somatisation.
The communication of distress in the form of somatic symptoms may be seen as a 
reflection of underlying cognitive processes such as perception, attribution, labelling, 
coping and communication style. For example, it has been argued that inability to
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verbalise distressing emotions may predispose an individual to “somatise” (DeGood et 
al., 1985). Likewise, an individual’s style of attribution determines not only the way 
the symptoms of distress are perceived, but also what treatment may be sought.
Culture, Som atisation and N eurasthenia
As discussed earlier, culture and cognition are inextricably linked. On this basis, 
the question of cultural influence inevitably arises. From an ethno-cultural perspective, 
it has been suggested that somatisation tends to be a more prevalent phenomenon in 
non-Western countries. For example, when compared with depressed subjects in North 
America, higher rates of somatisation have been found among dépressives in a number 
of non-Western countries. These included Saudi Arabia (Racy, 1980), Iraq (Bazzoui, 
1970), West Africa (Binitie, 1975), Peru (Mezzich and Raab, 1980), India (Teja, 
Narang, & Aggarwal, 1971), China (Kleinman, 1982), Taiwan (Yeh et al., 1985), and 
Hong Kong (Cheung, Lau, & Waldman, 1981). These observations have led to the 
proposition that in certain non-Western culture, expressing distress in “somatic” terms 
is perceived as preferable to articulating it in “psychological” terms (Mechanic, 1980).
With reference to the Chinese culture, somatisation has been seen as a socially 
acceptable and preferred alternative of expressing their emotional distress (Kirmayer, 
1989). For instance, it has been observed that there is an absence o f words for anxiety 
and depression in many non-Western countries including China (Leff, 1981). Implicit 
in this observation is that Chinese tend to have difficulty in psychologizing emotion, 
which is predominantly a recent and westernised characteristic. It has also been
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hypothesised that under the Confucius doctrine, negative emotional expression is either 
denied or suppressed in Chinese societies (Tseng, 1973). A similar view has been 
echoed by other scholars (e.g. Kleinman, 1977; Cheung, 1981) who argued that Chinese 
are less capable of articulating their inner feelings due to a “lack o f semantic network 
for conceptualising or expressing such affect”.
It has been shown that psychological distress in the form of affective disorders, are 
rarely reported in Chinese society. Comparative epidemiological studies in Chinese 
and Western societies reveal significant differences in the rates for affective disorders. 
For example, in a large scale Epidemiological Catchment Area (ECA) study on 
depression, the life time prevalence rate of depression was estimated to be 2.3 to 4.4% 
for males and 4.9 to 8.7% for females in the United States (Robins et al., 1984). A 
recent National Co-morbidity survey in the U.S. reported a even higher rate of 8 to 11% 
for males and 18 to 23% for females (Blazer, Kessler, McConagle & Swartz, 1994). By 
comparison, the rate of depression in Chinese societies has been consistently lower. A 
study in Taiwan, for instance, obtained a life time prevalence rate for depression of 
only 0.9% in males and 1.7% in females (Yeh, Hwu, Chang & Yeh, 1985). In Hong 
Kong, the corresponding prevalence rates are 1.1 to 1.5% for males and 2.1 to 2.8% for 
females (Chen et al., 1993). In China, rates of depression are either unreported or 
extremely low. In a psychiatric outpatient clinic in Hunan, Kleinman (1982) observed 
that of the 361 attendants, only 1% was diagnosed as depressed.
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Exposure to traditional Chinese medicine’s emphasis on the symbolic 
correspondence between human emotion, and body organs, might have also influenced 
the way in which symptoms are conceived or reported. In a study of language usage 
by ethnic Chinese in San Francisco, Tung (1994) revealed that body related expressions 
for human conditions are indeed, a very prevalent and common practice. In Hong 
Kong, Cheung et al. (1981) examined the report of symptoms by depressed patients in a 
general practice. Of all the symptoms listed, the three most frequent complaints were 
feeling of tiredness and fatigue (90%), aches and pain (89%), and 
gastrointestinal/cardiovascular symptoms (87%). Interestingly, these were also the 
somatic complaints in Beard’s list of the symptoms of neurasthenia. Other studies in 
Hong Kong by Wong & Chan (1984), and Lau et al. (1981) reveal similar findings.
It must be noted that there is considerable criticism of the stereotype of “the 
inscrutable Chinese”, and that Chinese have difficulties articulating the nuances of 
emotions (Cheng, 1995). That said, there remains a deeply entrenched view that 
somatisation, as an idiom of distress, is socially sanctioned in the Chinese culture. 
Conceived as a somatic or somato-psychic illness in Chinese societies, questions about 
neurasthenia inevitably arise. Is neurasthenia a product of interplay between 
somatisation and the Chinese culture? Could its reported epidemic in China be seen as 
a result of this culturally sanctioned mode of expressing psychological distress? Could 
the dispute about its nosological status in China, an outcome of different social and 
cultural construction?
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The Hunan Study in the People’s Republic of China
To clarify the relationship between neurasthenia, somatisation and affective 
disorders, Arthur Kleinman, an American psychiatrist, undertook an empirical study in 
Hunan Province in the People’s Republic of China in 1980 (Kleinman, 1982). One 
hundred patients with a diagnosis of neurasthenia, aged between 18 and 56, were 
selected for the study. A modified form of the Schedule for Affective Disorders and 
Schizophrenia (SADS), and the diagnostic criteria o f the American Psychiatric 
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Third Edition (DSM-III 1980) was 
used as part of the assessment procedure. O f the 100 patients examined by Kleinman, 
87% met the DSM-III diagnostic criteria for depressive disorder. Anxiety disorders 
were diagnosed in 71% of the cases, while 44% were classified as Chronic Pain 
Syndrome. However, about a quarter of the sample showed classic symptoms of 
hysteria as defined under DSM-III’s Somatoform Disorder category.
In terms of presenting symptoms or complaints, analysis of symptoms reported by 
the patients revealed that 90% reported headaches, 78% insomnia, 73% dizziness, and 
48% various pains. Weakness and loss of energy, or exhaustion, were presented in 
30% to 35% respectively. Only 9% articulated depression, or affective symptoms as 
their chief complaint, which was regarded by Kleinman as an indication of suppression. 
Further quantitative analysis of symptom presentation revealed a preponderance of
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somatic complaints. O f the mean 7 complaints reported per patient, 5 were somatic and 
1.8 were psychological (cognitive and affective).
Patients’ explanation of their illness was also investigated. In spite of their 
attending a psychiatric clinic, 78% of patients saw their condition as wholly or partially 
organic and only 22% regarded their condition as psychological. In terms of diagnostic 
labels, 44% named their disorder as neurasthenia, 27% called it a neurological disorder 
and only 18% classified it as minor psychological disorder. Remarkably, none gave the 
name depression.
Two major findings can be elicited from the result of Kleinman’s study. First, 
using the diagnostic system of the West (i.e. DSM-III), most of the neurasthenic 
patients in China would be regarded as suffering from depression or anxiety disorder. 
Second, there was a preponderance of self-reported somatic complaints among all of 
the neurasthenic patients. The preponderance of somatic complaints was therefore seen 
as evidence of somatisation in the Chinese neurasthenic subjects. A link between the 
somatic complaints, and depression (or anxiety) was also assumed (i.e. by Kleinman, 
1982), leading to the conclusion that neurasthenia in China was primarily depression 
under the guise of somatisation. Drawing from his own observations of the Chinese 
culture, Kleinman posited that from a cultural and anthropological perspective, 
neurasthenia in China could be seen as the indigenous mode of legitimising and 
expressing the experience o f psychological distress.
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The argument put forward by Kleinman was both provocative and interesting. It 
was provocative in the sense that a misdiagnosis in China was implied. Theoretically, 
conceiving neurasthenia as a somatised form of depression or anxiety might, however, 
open a way for illuminating its nature as a clinical phenomenon.
Conceptual and Methodological Issues regarding the Hunan 
Study
Conceptual Am biguities
One of the aims of clinical investigation, like any scientific endeavour, is to 
specify clearly the characteristics of the subject matter under study, as well as clarifying 
its relationship with other associated conditions or events. In the context of the Hunan 
Study on neurasthenia, the principal subject matter under investigation is the symptoms 
of somatic complaint, which has been linked to the concept of somatisation, depression 
and anxiety. However, there are conceptual and methodological ambiguities, which 
render Kleinman’s interpretation of his findings somewhat problematic.
Firstly, although there may well be an association between depression and the 
somatic complaints, this in itself does not justify depression having aetiological 
primacy. The possibility that depression derives from somatic disturbances, or both 
relate to an independent condition is equally plausible. For example, in thyroid
136
disorder, it has been reported that the manifestation of some of these patients may 
resemble depression or anxiety, and may even meet their formal diagnostic criteria 
(Kathol & Delahunt, 1986; Kathol et a l,  1986). In this case, physical illness can elicit 
symptoms, such as fatigue, low mood, sleep difficulties, loss of libido, agitation, and 
hyper-arousal, which mimic symptoms of psychological disorder (Derogatis & Wise,
1989)
Alternatively, physical illness can also cause depression and anxiety by way of the 
reaction to the illness and its effects (Derogatis & Wise, 1989). The demoralising 
effect of illness leading to depression and other psychological problems has been 
documented in people with cancer (Derogatis et al., 1983; Maguire, 1984), stroke 
(Newman, 1984), and heart disease (Langosch, 1984), to name but a few. In fact, the 
stresses and distresses of vague and non-specific symptoms such as prolonged fatigue, 
malaise, weakness, and aches and pains, have long be known to be associated with 
depression and mood instability of the chronically ill (Lobstein et al., 1989; Cassem, 
1987; Derogatis & Wise, 1989).
The fact that those patients in Kleinman’s study in China had unexplained somatic 
complaints, and appeared to have evidence of depression, does not necessarily mean 
that the two events were causally related. For example, it has been known that in 
developing countries, patients often present somatic complaints in order to gain access 
to limited health care provision (Kirmayer & Young, 1998). It has also been observed 
that in some countries, the restriction of scarce psychiatric services to only the most
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severely ill might result in patients emphasising their somatic complaints in order to 
ensure much needed attention (Kwanishi, 1992). These observations reinforce the long 
held view that organic, psychological and social processes and events often interact in 
various manners and degree. For this reason, it may be unwise to offer depression and 
other diagnostic categories a “monopoly” status over a cluster of unexplained somatic 
complaints.
Finally, it is an accepted fact that several illnesses can co-occur simultaneously 
(Feinstein, 1970). To complicate the issue further, not only can two or more illnesses 
co-exist simultaneously, the presence of one illness may sometimes mask, or facilitate 
the nature of the other illness (Lipowski, 1988; Kaplan & Feinstein, 1974). In 
Kleinman’s finding, in addition to the diagnosis of depression, anxiety disorder was 
diagnosed in 71% of the cases. Intriguingly, the role of anxiety in relation to 
depression or neurasthenia was not addressed. Conceptually, anxiety and depression 
are distinct entities, but clinically there is a considerable overlap in their symptoms 
(Gotlib & Cane, 1989). (For a review of the conceptual and methodological issue about 
these two overlapping concepts, see Clark & Watson, 1991a; and Mineka, Clark & 
Watson, 1998). Many of their overlapping somatic complaints such as fatigue, 
insomnia, irritability, restlessness and difficulty concentrating are also symptoms 
reported in Beard’s description of neurasthenia. For these reasons, it is unclear when 
these diagnostic categories are inter-related, or independent and discrete entities, or 
variants of the same underlying illness.
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M ethodological Problem s
These conceptual ambiguities highlight serious methodological limitations in the 
Hunan Study in which a taxonomic approach was adopted to evaluate the non-specific 
somatic complaints o f the neurasthenics. While these complaints such as vague pains, 
headache, sleep disturbances, and fatigue may be regarded as legitimate criteria for 
depression, their validity becomes ambivalent and questionable when the possibility of 
the other diagnoses, including anxiety, somatoform disorders and other medical 
illnesses, have not been considered. For example, in a study of thyroid and depression, 
the number of cases of depression was markedly reduced when associated somatic 
symptoms were excluded as relevant diagnostic criteria (Kathol & Delahunt, 1986). 
Thus, if somatic symptoms are assumed to be insignificant in the illness, there is a risk 
of false positive. If, on the other hand, somatic symptoms are considered important 
and a somatic basis of the illness is emphasised, then there is a corresponding risk of 
false negative.
A key issue concerns the use of DSM-III as a diagnostic procedure, which 
imposes stringent criteria for establishing clinical entities such as depression, and does 
not allow for multiple diagnosis. As such, its ability to examine relationship between 
related clinical conditions (e.g. relationship between depression, anxiety and 
somatoform disorders) are limited. By imposing the exclusion procedure, which limits 
the co-existence of other diagnoses, it runs the risk of sacrificing validity for diagnostic 
reliability (First et al., 1990).
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Another problem associated with the taxonomic approach is their emphasis on 
diagnostic categories. In the context o f the Hunan study, while the somatic complaints 
appeared to overlap with neurasthenia, depression and anxiety, there may be 
divergences in their symptom presentations. This might have been overlooked by the 
assessment procedure of the DSM-III adopted in the study, which tends to place greater 
emphasis on ascribing symptoms to diagnoses rather than examining differences in 
their symptom presentation. In fact, clinical conditions such as depression and anxiety 
are known to be o f multi-faceted nature comprising dimensions such as cognitive, 
affective and somatic symptoms. To tap differences in these symptom dimensions 
between the diagnostic groups, it may be better to employ a number of 
psychometrically sound instruments. The psychometric approach may be advantageous 
not only in terms of its being a more powerful and sensitive assessment method, but 
also in terms of gaining better understanding of the psychological constructs underlying 
particular constellations of symptoms. Moreover, the relationship between 
psychological constructs under investigation can also be examined.
In place of the taxonomic approach adopted in the Hunan’s study, a number of 
validated and powerful self-reported scales can be considered. These include the Beck 
Depression Inventory (Beck & Steer, 1987), Beck Anxiety Inventory (Beck, Esptein, 
Brown, & Steer, 1988), and the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS) (Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1993). The latter (DASS) is a self reported scale, which has been shown to 
be able to maximise differentiation between anxiety and depression. O f particular 
interest with the DASS is the emergence of a third factor, which resembled the original
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construct of “stress” as conceived by Selye (1956, 1974). In the context of 
neurasthenia, the content of “stress” may be of relevance as it includes measurement of 
persistent arousal and tension with a low threshold for becoming upset or frustrated.
Objectives of the Present Study
In summary, psychiatry and clinical psychology have never found it easy to 
accommodate patients with somatic symptoms that do not have an organic basis and in 
whom psychological factors come into play. The arguments and controversies about 
neurasthenia, and the ensuing empirical study in China are cases in point. They 
epitomise the epistemological dilemma of interpreting what is physical and 
psychological, in the face of unexplained somatic complaints. Numerous theories have 
been proposed to explain this clinical condition. However, most of these theories are 
primarily of the medical, nosological, psychiatric or anthropological orientations. As 
yet, there is little study on the psychological aspect of this condition. At present, and 
notwithstanding the debates about its nosological legitimacy, the psychological nature 
of neurasthenia remains unexplored and unresolved.
The empirical study by Kleinman, despite the conceptual and methodological 
ambiguities, provided a much-needed perspective for psychological investigations. 
However, in spite of the findings in Hunan, the nature of the relationship between 
neurasthenia and mood disorders remains controversial and inconclusive. For example,
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support for the proposition of an association between neurasthenia and mood disorders 
tends to come from studies on Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, which is assumed to be a 
modernised version of neurasthenia (e.g. Morrison, 1980; Taerk et al., 1987; Manu, 
Lane & Matthews, 1988; Wessely & Powell, 1989). But as reviewed earlier, whether 
CFS represents a variant of neurasthenia is still opened to debate. More importantly, as 
discussed, in the Hunan’s study, the confounds o f co-morbidity of anxiety and 
depression with neurasthenia were not controlled, thus rendering their findings difficult 
to interpret. The importance of controlling the co-morbidity was made even more 
apparent in a recent community survey on ethnic Chinese in San Francisco (Zheng et 
al., 1997). Using a diagnostic criteria which excluded those with co-morbid diagnoses 
of anxiety and/or depression, it was found that the “pure neurasthenics” tended to 
manifest significantly fewer psychiatric symptoms than the control groups of mood 
disorders as measured by the Symptom Check List 90 (SCL-90). Thus, how a 
relatively “pure” form of neurasthenia would manifest itself becomes an interesting 
question, both clinically and theoretically. From the clinical perspective, the obvious 
but important question is whether real cases of “pure neurasthenic” can be found. At 
present, there is a dearth of research on neurasthenia especially in the clinical setting, 
and given the findings from the Hunan’s study, there is clearly a need to elucidate the 
nature of neurasthenia as a clinical and psychological construct. For these reasons and 
from a theoretical perspective, a psychological investigation is needed not only in terms 
of charting the distinctiveness of neurasthenia from affective disorders of anxiety and
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depression, but also in analysing their commonalites, which may illuminate 
psychological processes germane to both.
With these objectives in mind and as in light of the problem of co-morbidity in the 
Hunan Study, a “pure neurasthenic” group will be employed in the present study to 
examine the distinctive characteristics of neurasthenia without the confounds of 
depression and anxiety. For this purpose, a comparative study will be presented to 
investigate the distinctive features of neurasthenic patients, in contrast to depression 
and anxiety controls. Moreover, in addition to the diagnostic-interview approach as 
adopted by Kleinman (1982), the present study also uses a comprehensive range of 
psychometric test measuring neurasthenia, depression and anxiety. The advantage of 
using a psychometric approach will allow not only the opportunity o f examining in 
details the indigenous construct of neurasthenia among the clinical subjects in Hong 
Kong, but also its relationship with other related clinical constructs, including anxiety 
and depression.
There are several specific aims of the present thesis:
(a). Although most of the well-established scales are available locally, researches 
pertaining to their psychometric and conceptual bases were conducted mainly in the 
West using non-Chinese subjects. For this reason, one of the aims of this thesis is to 
investigate and evaluate the extent to which the factor structure of these scales fit a 
Chinese population in a clinical setting to enable cross-cultural comparability and 
generalisability of findings.
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(b). Given the dearth o f empirical research on neurasthenia, and in light o f its 
reported overlapping relationship with depression and anxiety, another aim o f the thesis 
is to investigate the relationship between these constructs. As this is an exploratory 
investigation, no specific hypothesis will be tested. However, should the 
aforementioned assumption be true, a strong measured association between the three 
constructs is expected.
(c). To identify those factors characteristic o f neurasthenia, and which may be 
distinctive from anxiety and depression. It is generally predicted that factors 
representing the symptoms o f fatigue will be the major “markers” distinguishing 
neurasthenia. Likewise, the “markers” for distinguishing depression and anxiety will 
be the measures representing their corresponding affects.
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Method
Participants
All subjects were ethnic Chinese adults normally residing in Hong Kong. Subjects 
with depression or anxiety disorders were outpatients attending and receiving 
treatments at either the psychiatric outpatient clinic o f a local university hospital, or one 
of the major psychiatric outpatient centres in the territory. The neurasthenics were 
recruited from a local primary health centre, none of these subjects were having any 
therapy at the time of research. Initially, 250 questionnaires were distributed to 
participants at all o f the outpatient clinics or centres. Those who were under the age of 
18, or over the age of 75 were excluded from the study. Also excluded from the study 
were those who omitted more than five items from any of the scales, or those who 
appeared to have endorsed scale items with non-varying responses. The final sample 
comprised a total of 197 subjects who completed the questionnaires as instructed. Of 
this total, 61 (31%) were diagnosed with neurasthenia, 72 (37%) were diagnosed with 
major depression and 64 (32%) were diagnosed with primary anxiety disorders.
Each of the patients was examined and diagnosed by a qualified psychiatrist at 
their respective clinic or centre, using a semi-structure diagnostic procedure as part of 
the routine clinical practice. “Pure” neurasthenia was diagnosed in accordance with 
clinical criteria of neurasthenia as specified in the 10th Edition of the International
145
Classification of Diseases (ICD-10; World Health Organisation, 1992). Those with a 
co-morbid anxiety or depressive disorder were excluded from the present study. The 
diagnostic groups of depression and anxiety were selected on the basis of the primary 
diagnoses, owing to the practical difficulty of obtaining pure depression and anxiety 
samples. For both groups, diagnosis was made using a clinical procedure adopted from 
the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), which was used by the 
psychiatrists practising in the Hospital Authority in Hong Kong. The adopted 
procedure included, among other things, an intake o f clinical and psychiatric history, 
symptom presentation, and mental state examination. The depressed group consisted of 
those assessed as meeting the diagnostic criteria for major depression as their primary 
diagnosis. The anxious group included patients with at least one of the following 
primary diagnoses: social phobia, specific phobia, panic disorders with or without 
agoraphobia, obsessional compulsive disorder, and generalised anxiety disorder. Details 
of the composition of the anxiety disorder sub-diagnoses are presented in Appendix I.
M easures
The questionnaire consisted of a number of psychometric scales in the stated 
orders: (a) a cover sheet for demography; (b) Neurasthenia Scale (NS); (c) Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ); (d) Beck Depression Inventory (BDI); (e) Beck Anxiety 
Inventory (BAI); and (f) Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS). With the exception 
of the Neurasthenia Scale, which was developed locally, all the scales were translated 
into Chinese language and back translated by a group of local psychologists for
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semantic consistency and reliability. A copy of the questionnaire is presented in 
Appendices II (English version), and III (Chinese version).
(a) NS. The Neurasthenia Scale (Wong, 1996) contains 26 items of symptoms 
related to neurasthenia was constructed by a local practising local clinical psychologist. 
Items in the scale were adopted from the diagnostic criteria of neurasthenia specified in 
the revised second edition of the Chinese Classification of Mental Disorder, CCMD-II- 
R (Chinese Medical Association & Nanjing Medical University, 1995) and the locally 
developed Neurasthenia Illness Questionnaire (NIQ; Lee & Wong, 1995). Subjects 
rate their response to a list of somatic symptoms on a 4-point scale (0 = never; 1 = 
seldom; 2 = often; 3 = always), which represents their experience o f the past week. A 
neurasthenia score is obtained by the sum-total of the rating on the 26 items. The 
internal consistency of the scale has been reported to be good with Cronbach’s alpha 
(a) = .94 (Wong, 1996).
(b) PSWQ. The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & 
Borkovec, 1990) is a widely used self-rating scale for assessing the general trait of 
worry. It consists of 16 items designed to tap general aspects of worrying on a 5-point 
scale (“not at all typical of me” to “very typical of me”). The PSWQ score is the 
aggregate of ratings for all the 16 items. Studies on clinical and non-clinical samples 
provide evidence for its internal consistency (a) ranging from .91 to .95. The scale has 
also received empirical support for its unidimensional structure reflecting a trait of
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worry typical to that of General Anxiety Disorder (Brown, Anthony, & Barlow, 1992; 
Meyer et al. 1990).
(c) BDI. The Beck Depression Inventory (Beck & Steer, 1987) is generally held 
as a psychometrically robust self-report measures of depression (Carson, 1986). The 
questionnaire measures the affective, cognitive, motivational and physiological 
domains of depression (Beck & Steer, 1987). It consists of 21 items in which each 
item contains a 4-point ordinal scale ( 0 - 3 ) ;  each point of the scale is associated with a 
statement indicating the severity of a particular symptom experienced in the past week. 
A total score for the degree of severity is determined by aggregating the 21 items’ 
ratings to yield a single depression score. Current reviews of its psychometric 
properties have revealed a mean coefficient alpha of .86, high concurrent validity with 
alternate measures o f depression, as well as good discriminant validity with measures 
of anxiety (Beck & Steer, 1987; Beck, Steer & Garbin, 1988).
(d) BAL The Beck Anxiety Inventory (Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988) is 
a self-rating scale for the measurement of severe anxiety symptoms. It consists of 21 
items each of which are rated on a 4-point ordinal scale (0 -3 ) to indicate the severity of 
the symptom experienced over the past week. It was developed specifically to evaluate 
somatic, affective and cognitive symptoms characteristic of anxiety. Psychometrically, 
it is reported to have a high internal consistency ranging from .85 to .94 (Beck & Steer,
1990) and a test-retest reliability of .75 over a one-week period. It has a high
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subjects’ to the nature of the experiment to remove any possible effect of demand 
characteristic. The questionnaire was administered in the order of NS, PSWQ, BDI, 
BAI and DAS S. Subjects were also asked to complete a cover sheet, which contains a 
brief description of the nature of the study, and questions for personal details such as 
age, sex, education, and occupational status.
Research Design and S tatistical A nalysis
To investigate the distinctive characteristics of neurasthenia as compared to 
anxiety and depression, the present study employed a research design consisted of one 
independent variable referring to the group membership of subjects: Neurasthenia, 
Depression and Anxiety. The dependent variable referred to scores on the various 
psychometric scales employed in the present study. In order to assess group 
differences, one way analysis of variance was performed on a list of planned orthogonal 
contrasts. Statistical significance was determined in accordance with the Bonferroni 
procedure.
The factor structure of each psychometric scale was examined using exploratory 
factor analysis (Gorsuch, 1983). To evaluate the extent to which the extrapolated 
factors conform to the established models, confirmatory factor analysis based on 
structural equation modelling was performed. In addition, relationships among the 
psychometric scales of neurasthenia (NS), depression (BDI, DASS-Depression), 
Anxiety (BAI, DASS-Anxiety), Stress (DASS-Stress), and worry (PSWQ) were 
assessed by Pearson’s product moment correlation and multiple regression analyses.
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Finally, discriminant function analysis was used to evaluate relative contributions of 
various psychometric measures for discriminating neurasthenic patients from patients 
with depression and anxiety. Extensive reference was made to Hair, Anderson, Tatham 
& Black (1995) for conceptual and procedural details pertaining to the multivariate data 
analysis applied. All statistical analyses were computed by SPSS 7.5, except that 
LISREL 8.0 was used for confirmatory factor analysis.
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Results
D em ographic Characteristics
The demographic characteristics of the subjects are presented in Table 3. As 
shown in the table, there was no reliable age difference among the three groups giving 
an overall mean age of 42.89 (F = .99; p > .37). Out of a total sample of 197 subjects, 
68 were males, 124 were females, and 5 participants omitted to fill in their gender. 
There were significantly more females than males in the Neurasthenia and Depression 
groups while the Anxiety group has an equal proportion of the genders (%2 = 7.83; p < 
.02). Marital status of the subjects was as follows: 125 were either married or in 
cohabitation, 41 were single, 10 were separated or divorced and 9 were widowed; 16 
subjects did not fill in their marital status. In the neurasthenic group, there were 
significantly fewer Ss with single or not married status than the other 2 diagnostic 
groups (%2 = 27.41; p < .01). Educational level of the subjects ranged from 3 years to 
17 years, with a mean of approximately 5 years (SD = 3.16). In general, the 
Neurasthenic group was significantly better educated than the Depression and Anxiety 
groups (F = 55.16; p < .01).
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Table 3.
Summary of Key Demographic Characteristics of Subjects
Diagnostic Groups
Characteristics Neurasthenia 
(n = 61)
Depression 
(n = 72)
Anxiety 
(n = 64 )
Test
Statistics
Sig.
Age:
Mean (SD)
Distribution (%)
44.7(10.05) 42.14(13.45) 41.94 (12.98) F = .99 p > .37 
(NS)
Up to 30 years 
3 1 - 4 5  years 
45 - 60 years 
60 years or above
5 (8.2%) 
22(42.6%) 
30(39.4%) 
4 (9.8%)
14(20.9%)
26(38.8%)
17(25.4%)
10(14.9%)
12(19.4%) 
28(45.1%) 
17(27.4%) 
5 (8.1%)
Sex of Subjects: (%)
Female
Male
44(72.1%)
17(27.9%)
48(70.6%)
20(29.4%)
32(50.8%)
31(49.2%)
%z = 7.83 p <.02
Marital Status: (%) %' = 27.41 p < .01
Married/Cohabitate 
Divorced/ Widowed 
Never Married
52(85.2%) 
3 (4.9%) 
6 (9.8%)
31(49.3%)
12(19.0%)
20(31.7%)
42(68.8%) 
4 ( 6.6%) 
15(24.6%)
Education (in years)
Mean (SD) 8.03(3.83) 3.78(1.67) 4.07(1.17) F = 55.16 p<. 01
No formal education 0 0 0
Up to 5 years 
Up to 10 years 
Over 10 years
14(23%)
32(52.4%)
15(19.7%)
61(95.3%)
2(3.1%)
1(1.6%)
52(88.1%)
7(11.9%)
0
Note. NS = N ot signij lean t
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Confirm atory Factor Analyses
Maximum-likelihood confirmatory factor analyses (Lisrel 8.0; Joreskog & 
Sorbom, 1993) were conducted to examine the extent to which the factor structures of 
the psychometric scales employed in the present study conformed to the factor models 
of the scales as established in the West. Initially the Chi-square value and the adjusted 
goodness of fit index (values = .9 or greater) were the intended criteria for determining 
the extent to which the present data fit with a model. However, examination of the 
analyses revealed that the Chi-square values obtained appeared to have been inflated. 
Chi-square values have been known to be a sensitive and unstable measure, which 
could be easily affected by a number of factors such as sample characteristics, thus 
rendering their interpretation difficult (Marsh, Balia & McDonald, 1988; Cole, 1987; 
Floyd & Widaman, 1995). In view of this, additional indices would have to be used 
for the evaluation of the present data, e.g. the Comparative Fit Index (CFI, value greater 
than .90) the Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI, value greater than .90), and the Incremental 
Fit Index (IFI, value greater than .90). The results of the analyses for the data on the 
different scales are summarised in Table 4.
Overall, with the exception of the NS, the results show a moderate to marginal fit 
of the data to their corresponding tested models. Bearing in mind the relatively small 
sample of the present study, a better fit o f the model might well be obtained if the 
sample size is sufficiently large. As for the NS, the result indicated a good fit of the 
data to the original model by Wong (1996).
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Table 4.
Summary of Measures for Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Psychometric Scale 
(Reference Study)
%2
(df)
AGFI CEI NNFI IFI
NS 557 .78 .91 .91 .90
(Wong, 1996) (269)
PSWQ 300 .77 .89 .87 .89
(Meyers et aL, 1990) (104)
BDI 365 .82 .86 .84 .86
(Schotte et al., 1997) (169)
BAI 791 .62 .76 .73 .76
(Beck et al., 1988) (188)
DASS 1926 .61 .81 .80 .81
(Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) (766)
X2(df) = Chi square (degree of freedom) AGFI = Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index
CFI = Comparative Fit Index NNFI = Non-normed Fit Index
IFI = Incremental Fit Index
Exploratory Factor A nalysis
In order to examine the factor structure of the psychometric scales employed in 
the present study, exploratory factor analysis was conducted using the principal 
component model as the method of extraction (Gorsuch, 1983). While orthogonal 
rotation was applied for the unitary measures of single constructs (NS, PSWQ, BDI and 
BAI), non-orthogonal rotation was adopted for DASS in view of the established
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relationship between depression, anxiety and stress (Lovibond and Lovibond, 1995). 
The number of factors was determined by eigen values and scree test (Cattell, 1966).
Neurasthenia Scale (NS). Principal-component analysis with varimax rotation 
extracted four factors, which accounting for 65.8% of the variance. The first factor 
accounting for 49.4% of the variance with the other three factors accounting for 7.9%, 
4.4% and 4.1% respectively. The first factor comprised 13 items involving 
psychological symptoms of nervousness and edginess. The second factor comprised six 
somatic items relating mainly to musculoskeletal aches and weakness. The third factor 
consisted of five items, relating mainly to fatigue and sleep difficulty. The fourth factor 
consisted of two non-specific items relating to sexual drive and health concern. A 
reliability analysis yielded an alpha value of .96, showing excellent internal 
consistency. Table 5 presents the factor loading and eigen values for NS.
However, a closer inspection of the distribution of factor loadings gave the 
impression that the factor structure was somewhat less cohesive than the original factor 
structure reported by Wong (1996) as shown in Appendix II. More specifically, in the 
present analysis, several items in Factor 3 also loaded significantly on Factor 1 (items 
7, 14, 18, 22) and Factor 2 (items5, 8, 12, 24), resulting in an overall structure with a 
lesser degrees of distinctiveness among the corresponding factors in terms of 
conceptual clarity.
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Table 5.
Varimax-Rotated Principal-Axis Factor Loadings of Neurasthenia Scale
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Nervousness and Edginess
9.Worried about little things .816 .047 .206 .050
10. Became agitated easily .800 .284 .205 .120
11. Very trivial things feel nervous .769 .210 .211 -.035
6. Hasty and agitated in mood .749 .230 .117 .146
19. Nervous and difficult to relax .724 .229 .277 .227
20. Easily got upset, had lots of thoughts .712 .285 .089 .297
18. Easily disturbed by daily hassles .707 .019 .390 .259
23. Suspicious and oversensitive .691 .211 .233 .214
16. Overreacted to surroundings .688 .271 .208 .095
7. Mixed up in mind .676 .226 .370 .179
15. Easily lose temper on “minor” matters .658 .315 -.120 .098
14. Mind clouded with thoughts all times .650 .152 .434 .011
22. Memory much worse than before .442 .312 .378 .269
Musculoskeletal aches & Weakness
3. Experienced muscle pain .108 .818 .168 .205
25. Aches & stiffness around neck & shoulder .271 .753 .123 .228
5. Weak and fatigue on the limbs .276 .653 .367 .083
8. Body was fragile .323 .569 .369 .083
24. Feeling of dizziness .345 .564 .435 .159
12. Felt tired with no apparent reason .386 .533 .518 -.040
Fatigue & Sleep Difficulty
2. Felt like unrefreshed after sleep .082 .187 .784 .150
1. Felt physically tired .269 .482 .591 -.048
13.Headaches .195 .335 .590 .283
17. Difficult to fall asleep at night, feeling 
tired at day times
.415 .161 .558 .344
4. Difficult to concentrate .499 .316 .539 .055
Non-specific
26. Diminished sexual drive/ performance .098 .127 .169 .815
21. Afraid I would suffer from serious illness .380 .274 .115 .655
Eigen values 12.85 2.06 1.15 1.05
Variance accounted by the factor 49.4% 7.9% 4.4% 4.1%
Note. Factor loading values of .300 or over (i.e. significant) were presented in bold.
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Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ). Principal-component analysis with 
varimax rotation yielded a factor that accounted for 45% of the variance. This factor 
consisted of 11 items, which reflect a general worry trait. Two smaller overlapping 
factors also emerged, which reflect positive beliefs and coping-strategies. Reliability 
analysis revealed a good internal consistency with an alpha value of .89. Table 6 gives 
the factor loading and eigen values for the scale.
Table 6.
Varimax Rotated Principal Component Factor Loadings of PSWQ
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
General Worry
15. Worry all the time .880 -.071 -.074
7. Always worry about something .858 -.019 -.080
13. Notice that I have been worrying about things .846 .013 -.132
14. Once starts worrying, can’t stop .838 -.050 -.079
6. When under pressure, worry a lot .824 -.020 .036
12. Have been a worrier all my life .822 -.099 .018
4. Many situations makes me worry .820 -.158 -.027
5. Known shouldn’t worry, but just can’t help it .788 -.033 .079
16. Worry about projects until they all done .739 .149 .132
9. As soon as finish one task, start to worry others .716 .146 -.153
2. My worries overwhelm me .690 -.258 .063
Positive Coping
8. Find it easy to dismiss worrisome thoughts .034 .871 -.027
11. When nothing can do about a concern, don’t .032 .672 .447
worry anymore
10. Never worry about anything -.189 .411 .356
Positive Beliefs
1. If don’t have enough time to do everything, -.020 -.032 .852
don’t worry about it
3. Don’t tend to worry about things -.016 .338 .631
Eigen Values 7.19 2.10 1.02
Variance accounted by the factor 45% 13.1% 6.4%
Note. Factor loading values of .300 or over were presented in bold.
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Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). Using the principal-axis factoring of the 
BDI items with varimax rotation, four factors were extracted from the analysis, which 
accounted for 54.6% of the variance. The factor loadings and eigen values are 
presented in Table 7. As can be seen from the table, factor 1 contributed most of the 
total variance (37.4%). A smaller percentage of the variance was attributed to the 
remaining three factors, accounting for 6.7%, 5.6% and 5% respectively.
The first factor, which appear to be a composite of mainly negative cognition and 
affect, comprised seven items (i.e. failure, sadness, punishment, lost of pleasure, self- 
criticism, pessimism and self-hate). The second factor consisted of five items which 
characterised the negative perception of functional ability (social withdrawal, body
image, work difficulty, indecision and fatigability). It also overlapped with the first
factor on the cognitive items of pessimism and self-hate, presumably because of the 
apparent relationship. The third factor was loaded with 5 items, which represented 
somatic complaints. This included weight loss, insomnia, loss o f appetite, somatic 
preoccupation except for the last item “guilt” which appears to be semantically more 
congruent with Factor 1 as shown by its moderate loading on the factor. The fourth 
factor consisted of a mix of somatic, cognitive and affective items involving loss of 
libido, irritability, crying spells and suicidal ideation. In view of this, no specific label
was assigned. Cronbach alpha value for the scale was .91.
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Table 7.
Varimax Rotated Principal-Axis Factor Loading of BDI
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Cognitive-Affective
3. Sense of failure .737 .071 .136 .219
1. Sadness .667 .358 .269 -.018
6. Sense of punishment .660 .133 .193 .139
4. Loss of pleasure .611 .322 .177 .250
8. Self criticism .538 .356 .101 .240
2. Pessimism .537 .441 -.109 .247
7. Self-hate .526 .439 .188 .100
Performance & Functional Abilities
12. Social withdrawal .214 .710 .001 .344
14. Body Image .286 .628 .165 -.041
15. Work difficulty .274 .606 .308 .048
13. Indecision .270 .588 .184 .318
17. Fatigability .118 .581 .381 .114
Somatic-Vegetative Functions
19. Weight loss .126 -.005 .701 .058
16. Insomnia .195 .283 .609 .258
18. Loss of appetite -.046 .436 .536 .228
20. Somatic preoccupation .314 .264 .506 -.014
5. Guilty feelings .486 .217 .501 .093
Non-specific
11. Irritability .275 .179 -.012 .709
21. Loss of libido .005 .101 .110 .661
10. Crying spells .506 .024 .207 .614
9. Suicidal ideas .272 .183 .368 .508
Eigen Values 7.85 1.39 1.17 1.06
Variance accounted by the factor 37.4% 6.7% 5.6% 5%
Note. Factor loading values of .300 or over was presented in bold.
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Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI). Varimax-Rotated Principal-Axis Factor
Loading of BAI revealed 4 factors that had eigen values greater than 1. The first factor, 
which accounted for 46.6% of the variance, appeared to represent a dimension of 
subjective fear. The items that loaded on this factor were: unable to relax, terrified, 
nervous, unsteadiness, fear of worst happening, scare, fear o f losing control, loss of 
appetite and fear of dying. The second factor comprises five items, which appeared to 
characterise the autonomic symptoms of panic. This included the feeling of fainting, 
breathing symptoms, dizziness, choking and heart pounding. The third factor consisted 
of three items representing symptoms of autonomic arousal of general nervousness. 
This included trembling, shaking and sweating. The fourth factor appeared to represent 
symptoms of non-specific autonomic arousal. The items loaded in this factor were 
numbness, feeling hot, wobbliness and face flushed. Owing to its non-specific nature, 
the fourth factor was also loaded moderately by three other items (indigestion, dizziness 
and sweating). The Cronbach alpha value for the scale was .94. Details o f the factor 
loading and eigen values are shown in Table 8.
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Table 8.
Varimax Rotated Principal-Axis Factor Loading of BAI
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Subjective Fear
4. Unable to relax .799 .007 .097 .350
9. Terrified .765 .303 .281 .127
10. Nervous .756 .152 .037 .344
8. Unsteady .751 .318 .112 .294
5. Worst happening .749 .150 .295 .035
17. Scared .709 .395 .351 <001
14. Losing control .627 .239 .512 .021
18. Indigestion .517 .113 .138 .404
16. Dying .516 .401 .319 .020
Panic
19. Faint .219 .740 .023 .274
15. Breathing .166 .647 .376 .117
6. Dizzy .192 .645 .052 .462
11. Choking .284 .635 .384 .188
7. Heart pounding .434 .481 .228 .306
Autonomic Arousal: Nervousness
12. Trembling .175 .205 .810 .165
13. Shaky .365 .243 .756 .169
21. Sweating .254 .063 .611 .463
Autonomic Arousal: Non-specific
1. Numbness .088 .142 .186 .742
2. Feeling hot .213 .242 -.011 .670
3. Wobbliness .248 .275 .334 .592
20. Face flushed .113 .381 .298 .450
Eigen Value 9.78 1.67 1.32 1.00
Variance 46.6% 7.9% 6.3% 4.8%
Note. Factor loading values of .300 or above were presented in bold.
162
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS). Principal component analysis with 
promax rotation initially extracted six factors, accounting for 68.3% of the variance. 
The eigen value and factor loadings of DASS items are shown in Table 9. Overall, the 
initial six-factor solution appears to conform well to the originally proposed three factor 
structure of the DASS, in terms of its item cluster into stress (Factor 1), depression 
(Factors 2, 4) and anxiety (Factors 3, 5, 6).
A three-factor solution was undertaken in an attempt to see whether the three 
proposed constructs of depression, anxiety and stress could be discerned. Table 10 
presents the three-factor solution for the 42 DASS items. From the analysis, the three 
original DASS factors were elicited which accounted for 58.1% of the variance. The 
first factor consisted of 18 items, 13 of which were the original DASS Stress items. Of 
the other five items, four of which were related to situational anxiety (items 30, 9, 40, 
2) while the remaining one item was concerned with lethargic symptom of depression 
(i.e. couldn’t seem to get going). The second factor comprised 15 items, all but two of 
which are derived from the original DASS Depression. The other two items loaded on 
Factor two are anxiety symptoms of panic and fear (items 28 and 36). The third factor 
consisted of nine items, all but one of which was derived from the original DASS- 
Anxiety scale. The remaining odd item loaded on Factor 3, “getting agitated” (39), was 
an item from the original DASS-Stress scale. The Cronbach alpha values for the 3 
factors were as follow: DASS-Depression, a  = .96; DASS-Anxiety, a  = .91; DASS- 
Stress, a  = .94.
163
Table 9.
Oblige-Rotated Principal-Component Factor Loading of DASS: A 6-Factor solution
1 2 3 4 5 6 Scale
Factor 1
1.Getting upset by trivial things .951 .213 -.141 .317 -.013 .102 S
6.Over-react to situations .823 -.101 .232 -.189 .025 .010 S
30.Feared being ‘throw n’ by trivial but familiar task .732 .043 -.157 .085 .061 -.007 A
40. Worried about situations, got panicked .647 -.086 -.194 .242 .244 .082 A
29.Hard to calm down after something upset .635 -.056 .175 .034 .155 .003 S
8.Difficult to relax .613 -.020 .405 -.134 -.010 -.039 S
18.Rather touchy .565 .110 -.073 .169 -.044 .321 S
9.In situations so anxious would relieved when ended .554 -.128 .379 .088 -.068 .049 A
33.In a state o f nervous tension .550 -.117 .332 -.018 .155 -.061 S
27.Very irritable .518 -.051 .076 .199 .201 .101 S
14.Getting impatient when delayed in any way .506 -.218 .325 .258 -.131 .053 s
11.Getting upset rather easily .503 .310 .131 .070 -.153 .034 s
12.Using a lot o f nervous energy .457 .069 .270 .181 -.166 .001 s
Factor 2
38.Life was meaningless -.129 1.028 -.086 -.026 .052 .078 0
34.Pretty worthless <001 .908 -.236 .080 .105 .031 D
37.Could see nothing in the future hopeful -.103 .897 -.035 .089 .043 .066 D
21.Life wasn’t worthwhile .212 .850 -.171 -.212 .206 .048 D
17.W asn’t worth much as a person -.010 .824 .012 -.064 .133 .034 D
10.Had nothing to look forward to .040 .733 .265 .031 -.300 .089 D
13.Sad and depressed .256 .448 .295 -.086 -.035 -.090 D
Factor 3
15. A feeling o f faintness .003 -.193 .764 -.017 .137 .097 A
4.Experienced breathing difficulty .007 .033 .743 -.135 .142 .282 A
7. A feeling of shakiness .099 .078 .639 -.231 386 -.071 A
2 5. A ware o f action o f heart in absence o f exertion .070 -.049 .552 -.065 .426 .024 A
5.Couldn’t seem to get going .175 .193 .327 .188 .040 -.162 D
Factor 4
32.Difficult to tolerate interruption .313 -.133 -.233 .791 .040 .036 S
23.Difficulty in swallowing .372 -.078 .112 .755 .275 .124 A
31.Unable to become enthusiastic about anything .004 .101 -.104 .752 -.027 -.182 D
3 5.Intolerant o f anything that kept from getting on .368 -.078 -.186 .592 -.046 .116 S
24.Couldn’t seem to get enjoyment out of things -.091 .339 .017 .590 .001 -.011 D
3.Couldn’t seem to experience positive feeling .053 .363 .130 .503 -.191 -.027 D
16.Had lost interest in just anything -.064 .315 .298 .461 -.054 -.130 D
42.Difficult to work up the initiative to do things .046 .275 -.029 .435 .217 .009 D
22.Hard to wind down .372 -.013 .139 .387 .062 <001 S
Factor 5
41.Experienced trembling -.126 .014 .350 -.084 .778 -.013 A
36.Felt terrified .285 .152 -.028 .072 .569 -.103 A
20.Scared without any good reason .308 -.036 -.066 .215 .507 -.043 A
28.Close to panic .161 .194 .036 .192 .501 -.117 A
39.Getting agitated .185 .233 .159 .065 .471 -.069 S
26.Felt downhearted and blue .124 .317 .157 .142 .347 -.092 D
Factor 6
2.Aware o f dryness o f my mouth .309 .147 .176 -.085 -.180 .769 A
19.Perspired noticeably -.272 .075 .449 .249 .269 .482 A
Eigen Value 20.6 2.3 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.1
Variance (in percentage) 49.1 5.36 4.98 3.32 2.98 2.54
Note. Only factor loadings of .300 or over were presented in bold. 
S = the original DASS scales under which the items subsumed; 
Scale = Stress; D = Depression; A = Anxiety
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Table 10.
Oblique-Rotated Principal-Component Factor Loadings of DASS: A 3-factor Solution
Factor 1 
Stress
Factor 2 
Depression
Factor 3 
Anxiety
Scale
Stress
6. Over-react to situations .910 -.195 -.012 S
1. Upset by trivial things .892 .117 .352 S
30. Feared being ‘throw n’ by trivial but unfamiliar task .766 .157 -.212 A
8. Difficult to relax .755 -.137 .138 S
14. Getting impatient when delayed in any way .745 -.183 .121 S
9. In situation so anxious, most relieved when ended .729 -.144 .212 A
29. Hard to calm down after some upset .714 .003 .122 S
12. Using a lot o f nervous energy .669 .074 .018 s
33. In a state o f nervous tension .665 -.120 .242 s
40. Worried about situations got panic etc. .659 .145 -.021 A
11. Getting upset rather easily .639 .300 -.116 S
18. Rather touchy .606 .193 -.095 S
27. Very irritable .584 .097 .166 S
22. Hard to wind down .540 .175 .150 s
35. Intolerant o f anything that kept from getting on .520 .294 -.116 s
32. Difficult to tolerate interruptions .498 .299 -.041 s
5. Couldn’t seem to get going .353 .252 .218 0
2. Awareness o f dryness o f mouth .310 -.022 .103 A
Depression
38. Life was meaningless -.199 1.063 -.072 D
34. Pretty worthless -.075 1.042 -.155 D
37. Could see nothing in the future hopeful -.119 .970 -.018 0
21. Life wasn’t worthwhile .058 .868 -.115 D
17. W asn’t worth much as a person .059 .839 .037 D
10. Had nothing to look forward to .082 .628 -.065 D
24. Couldn’t seem to get any enjoyment out of things .184 .620 .109 D
42. Difficult to work up the initiative to do things .125 .555 .183 D
3. Couldn’t seem to experience positive feeling .292 .535 .002 D
31. Unable to become enthusiastic about anything .225 .484 -.011 D
16. Had lost interest in ju st about anything .183 .479 .218 D
26. Felt downhearted and blue .151 .474 .327 D
28. Close to panic .134 .445 .356 A
13. Sad and depressed .385 .408 .070 D
36. Felt terrified .204 .377 .314 A
Anxiety
4L Experienced trembling -.234 .123 .837 A
19. Perspired noticeably -.213 .140 .746 A
25. Aware o f action o f heart in absence o f exertion .106 -.056 .711 A
15. A feeling o f faintness .170 -.318 .711 A
4. Experienced breathing difficulty .112 -.150 .702 A
7. A feeling o f shakiness .130 -.033 .681 A
23. Difficulty in swallowing .227 .310 .537 A
39. Getting agitated .161 .384 .407 S
20. Scared without any good reason .284 .223 .344 A
Eigen value 20.49 2.23 1.67
Variance (in percentage) 48.78% 5.33% 3.99%
Note. Only factor loadings of .300 or over were presented in bold.
Scale = the original DASS scale under which the items subsumed; 
S = Stress, D = Depression, A = Anxiety.
165
Correlation A nalysis
The correlation matrix pertaining to all of the scales used in the present study are 
displayed in Table 11. As shown in the table, the correlation between the two measures 
of depression, BDI and DASS-Depression, was .83, and the correlation between the two 
measures of anxiety, BAI and DASS-Anxiety, was .84. These high correlations 
suggested satisfactory convergent validity for the corresponding depression and anxiety 
measures. On the other hand, lower correlations were obtained between the anxiety 
and depression scales: r = .67 for BDI and BAI, r = .69 for DASS-Depression and BAI, 
r = .76 for DASS-Anxiety and BDI, thus providing support for discriminant validity 
between the anxiety and depression measures (t > 4 . 5 0 , <  .01).
With respect to the DASS, the correlation among the Depression, DASS-Anxiety 
and DASS-Stress scales ranged between .81 and .87, indicating a high degree of 
overlap. In other words, there appeared a lesser degree of differentiation across the 
three DASS scales in our sample, when compared to the original findings by Lovibond 
& Lovibond (1995), in which the obtained correlation was considerably lower (r = .54 
to .65).
In regard to the NS, high correlations were obtained with the DASS-Stress (r = 
.84), DASS-Anxiety (r = .80) and BAI (r = .84). By contrast, lower correlations were 
obtained between the NS and the two depression scales, namely BDI (r = .68) and 
DASS-Depression (r = .69). Finally, the correlations of PSWQ with the affective 
measures for depression and anxiety were noted to be modest, ranging from .56 to .61.
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By comparison, relatively higher correlations were obtained with DASS-Stress (r = .75) 
and the NS (r = .73) respectively.
Table 11.
Correlation Matrix of All Scales in the Study
Measure 1. NS 2. PSWQ 3. BDI 4. BAI 5.
DASS
Depress
6.
DASS
Anxiety
1. NS
2. PSWQ .73
3. BDI .69 .58
4. BAI .84 .60 .67
5. DASS-Depress .68 .56 .83 .69
6. DASS-Anxiety .80 .61 .76 .84 .81
7. DASS-Stress .84 .75 .74 .75 .83 .87
Note. N = 197. All correlations are significant at p < .01 level (two tailed).
NS = Neurasthenia Scale; PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; 
BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory; DASS = Depression Anxiety Stress Scale
M ultiple Regression A nalysis
To further explore the relationship between the construct of neurasthenia and 
other psychometric measures, a stepwise multiple regression analysis was performed 
using the NS as the criterion and the respective scores of PSWQ, BDI, BAI and DASS- 
Stress as predictors. The DASS-Depression and DASS-Anxiety were omitted in the 
regression analysis to avoid duplicating measures for depression and anxiety. The BDI 
and BAI were preferred in the present analysis in view of their better discriminant
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validity as specific measures for depression and anxiety, as shown by the correlation 
data displayed above.
Table 12 presents a summary of results o f the stepwise multiple regression 
analysis. To evaluate the relative strength or power of the predictor variables, several 
indices were calculated including the adjusted R2, beta coefficient, and t-value. 
According to the stepwise analysis, the DASS-Stress was first entered into the equation, 
followed by BAI and PSWQ. All of the three variables were found to be significant 
predictors of NS, accounting in total for 80.3% of the variance as reflected by the 
adjusted R2. The BDI did not acquire sufficient predictive power to be included in the 
regression equation.
Table 12.
Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis of DASS-Stress, BAT BDT and PSWQ on the 
Total Score of Neurasthenia
Predictor Adjusted
R2
B Beta t-value Sig. Level
DASS-
Stress .69 .80 .45 8.90 J9<.01*
BAI .80 .67 .45 9.90 pc.Ol*
PSWQ .80 .14 .10 2.37 j9<.02*
BDI — — — — ^>.32
N ote. The predictors are listed according to the order of entry in the regression analysis. 
The asterisk* denotes statistical significance.
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Comparison o f  Scale Scores: Neurastheniay Depression & Anxiety
One way analysis of variance (ANOVAs) was conducted to evaluate group 
differences in scores on the psychometric scales (NS, PSWQ, BDI, BAI, and DASS). 
The present analysis employed a single factor design with multiple measurements for 
the dependable variable. The single factor comprised the three diagnostic groups 
namely Neurasthenia, Depression and Anxiety. The dependent measures were the 
scores obtained for the various psychometric scales. In order to assess differences 
between groups on each measure, a list of planned orthogonal contrasts was written and 
tested for significance according to the Bonferroni procedure. With significance level 
set at .05, 194 degrees of freedom and 2 contrasts, this yielded a critical F of 5.02.
A summary of the result of the analysis is presented in Table 13. As can be seen 
from the table, the Neurasthenic group obtained significantly lower scores than the 
groups of Depression and Anxiety on all o f the psychometric scales, with the NS and 
PSWQ just above the statistical level of .05. There was no statistical difference 
between the Depression and Anxiety groups on any of the scales.
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Table 13.
Means and Standard Deviations for Psychometric Measures in All Groups.
Neurasthenia
Mean
(SD)
Depression
Mean
(SD)
Anxiety
Mean
(SD)
F-value 
Contrast 1
F-value 
Contrast 2
NS 26.47 (14.98) 32.58 (20.31) 33.35 (17.05) 5.30* .06
PSWQ 47.15 (12.05) 52.61 (14.97) 50.98 (11.09) 5.45* .54
BDI 8.74 (7.64) 16.69(12.91) 13.58 (9.67) 14.75* 2.75
BAI 12.21 (9.58) 17.58 (14.63) 16.75 (11.03) 6.40* .14
DASS-Depression 5.42 (5.52) 13.26(12.36) 11.51 (9.39) 20.39* 1.05
DASS-Anxiety 6.95 (5.10) 13.53 (10.26) 14.32 (8.58) 27.25* .27
DASS-Stress 10.27 (6.39) 17.54 (11.27) 17.96 (9.62) 23.63* .06
Note. The asterisk* denotes significant results which was determined by using the 
Bonferroni procedure for testing planned orthogonal contrasts.
Contrast 1 = Group Neurasthenia versus Group Depression + Group Anxiety 
Contrast 2 = Group Depression versus Group Anxiety 
Critical F (1,194) for two orthogonal contrasts = 5.02
Com parisons o f  Sub-scale Scores
To further map out the distinctive features of neurasthenic patients from the 
diagnostic groups of anxiety and depression, the scores on the subscales of DASS and 
Neurasthenia Scale were examined via one-way analysis of variance.
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According to Lovibond and Lovibond (1995), the three major scales of the DASS 
(DASS-Depression, DASS-Anxiety and DASS-Stress) could be further divided into 16 
low-level subscales, enabling a finer analysis on the various measures. Each of these 
DASS subscales comprised 2 to 6 items, which were categorised according to content 
analysis as shown in Appendix V. Score for each subscale was determined by adding the 
scores for the respective items.
For the NS, the original factor structure reported by Wong (1996) was used, for sake 
of conceptual clarity in terms of its distinctive factors. Score for each of the sub-scales 
were determined by the aggregate total of scores for items constituting each factor.
For this analysis, the PSWQ was omitted as it has been consistently shown to be 
composed of a unidimensional structure (Meyer, Miller, Metzger & Borkovec, 1990). 
Also omitted from the analysis were sub-scales of the BDI and BAI, so as to avoid 
redundancy due to duplication of depression and anxiety items already included in the 
DASS-Depression and DASS-Anxiety scales.
Table 14 presents the means and standard deviations of the DASS sub-scales for 
group comparison in terms of F  values for each planned contrast. The result shows that 
the neurasthenic group score significantly lower than the combined group of 
Depression and Anxiety on all of the sub-scales. Again, no significant difference was 
found between the Depression and Anxiety groups on any of the sub-scales o f the 
DASS.
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Table 14.
Group Comparisons on Sub-scale Scores of Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (PASS)
DASS Sub-Scales:
Neurasthenia 
Mean (SD)
Depression 
Mean (SD)
Anxiety 
Mean (SD)
F-value 
Contrast 1
F-value 
Contrast 2
Dysphoria 1.13(1.21) 2.34(2.02) 2.14(1.86) 16.54* 0.45
Hopelessness 0.71(1.25) 2.00(2.07) 1.60(1.64) 16.58* 1.78
Devaluation of life 0.41(0.88) 1.47(1.89) 1.03(1.55) 12.31* 2.80
Self-depreciation 0.35(0.68) 1.56(1.97) 1.04(1.50) 16.35* 4.00
Lack of interest 1.10(1.33) 1.98(1.89) 1.71(1.52) 8.65* 0.92
Ahedonia 0.79(0.99) 1.94(1.85) 1.85(1.54) 21.40* 0.10
Inertia 1.11(1.18) 2.23(1.90) 2.04(1.57) 17.00* 0.47
Autonomic arousal 2.74(2.29) 4.26(3.74) 4,61(2.85) 12.28* 0.43
Skeletal-muscular 0.76(0.93) 1.69(1.80) 1.85(1.85) 16.06* 0.35
Situational anxiety 1.98(1.69) 3.70(2.78) 3.96(2.30) 25.79* 0.43
Subjective anxiety 1.40(1.69) 3.87(3.40) 4.04(2.92) 34.30* 0.13
Difficulty relaxing 2.18(1.84) 3.91(2.66) 4.44(2.53) 28.14* 1.59
Nervous arousal 2.12(1.42) 2.70(1.98) 3.32(1.59) 11.26* 4.47
Easily upset/ agitated 2.03(1.74) 3.81(2.65) 3.76(2.27) 24.56* 0.02
Irritable/over-reactive 2.20(1.48) 3.76(2.62) 3.57(2.54) 24.56* 0.21
Impatient 2.13(1.61) 3.28(2.46) 3.68(2.07) 16.42* 1.21
Note. The asterisk * denotes significant results
Significance was determined by using the Bonferroni procedure for testing planned 
orthogonal contrasts.
Contrast 1 = Group Neurasthenia versus Group Depression + Group Anxiety
Contrast 2 = Group Depression versus Group Anxiety
Critical F value = F  ( \ ,  194) for two orthogonal contrasts = 5.02
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Table 15 presents the means and standard deviations of the NS sub-scales for 
group comparison in terms of F  values for each planned contrast. For all NS sub­
scales, no reliable difference was obtained between the diagnostic groups of depression 
and anxiety. While showing significantly lower score for the ‘Irritability and 
Nervousness’ sub-scale, the Neurasthenic group obtained similar score on the sub­
scales of ‘Fatigue and Sleep Difficulty’, ‘Musculoskeletal Aches & Pain’ and the non­
specific ‘Dysfunctional Symptoms’, as compared to the combined group of Depression 
and Anxiety.
Table 15.
Group Comparisons on Sub-scale Scores of Neurasthenia Scale (NS)
Sub-scales
Neurasthenia
Mean
(SD)
Depression
Mean
(SD)
Anxiety
Mean
(SD)
jF-value 
Contrast 1
F-value 
Contrast 2
Irritability & 10.32 15.93 16.33 17.47* 0.06
Nervousness (7.26) (10.01) (8.96)
Fatigue & Sleep 10.10 10.93 11.75 1.38 0.49
Difficulty (6.30) (7.57) (6.25)
Musculoskeletal 2.70 2.28 2.30 2.09 <01
Aches & Pains (1.80) (1.91) (1.83)
Dysfunctional 3.10 3.57 3.29 0.85 0.50
Symptoms (2.13) (2.76) (189)
Note. The asterisk * denotes significant results.
Significance was determined by using the Bonferroni procedure for testing planned 
orthogonal constrasts.
Contrast 1 = Group Neurasthenia versus Group Depression + Group Anxiety 
Contrast 2 = Group Depression versus Group Anxiety 
Critical F {1, 194) for two orthogonal contrasts = 5.02
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D isrim inant Function Analysis
As opposed to its conventional use as a multivariate method for maximising group 
differentiation for classification purpose, discriminant function was used here to 
evaluate differential contribution of selective psychometric variables for differentiating 
the diagnostic groups. The psychometric measures employed as discriminating 
variables in the present analysis were NS, PSWQ, BDI, BAI and DASS-Stress. The 
two measures, DASS-Depression and DASS-Anxiety, were excluded in order to avoid 
duplication of redundant measures for depression and anxiety as discussed earlier. All 
the discriminating variables were entered with the stepwise procedure to ascertain their 
relative importance in group-differentiation. Three separate discriminant analyses were 
performed to distinguish neurasthenic patients from (a) the anxiety group, (b) the 
depressive group, and (c) the combined group of anxiety and depression.
Several indices have been recommended for evaluating the discriminatory power 
of the variables (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1995). The discriminant loading 
(i.e. structure correlation values), the discriminant coefficient (analogous to beta 
weights), and the univariate F-values would be used as the main criteria in the present 
analysis. However, the discriminant loading would be considered as the more valid 
indicator, as the discriminant coefficient tended to be an unstable index, vulnerable to 
the effect of collinearity between the discriminating variables.
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Discriminant Analysis I: Neurasthenia versus Depression
The discriminant function was found to be statistically significant meaning that the 
profile scores could distinguish efficiently the diagnostic group of neurasthenia from 
that of depression (p < .001). Of the five variables in the function, DASS-Stress, NS 
and BDI emerged as potent discriminating variables, while the other two variables (BAI 
and PSWQ) were excluded from the stepwise analysis. The inclusion of NS in the 
analysis, despite having the lowest loading among the five variables, reflected its 
having a more unique contribution in the group differentiation than perhaps BAI or 
PSWQ, in the presence of DASS-Stress. That is to say, on it’s own, the NS had little 
discriminatory power, but nevertheless could provide additional contribution if  
operated in conjunction with DASS-Stress. A summary of the measures obtained from 
the analysis is presented in Table 16.
Table 16.
Summary Measures of Discriminant Analysis: Neurasthenia versus Depression
Variables Discriminant
Loading
Discriminant
Coefficient
F- value
DASS-Stress .70 1.45 18.07
BDI .68 .75 17.31
BAI .40 NI 6.23
PSWQ .38 NI 4.83
NS .35 1.49 4.55
NI = Not included in the stepwise solution.
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Disriminant Analysis II: Neurasthenia versus Anxiety
The discriminant function for the Neurasthenic and Anxiety groups was shown to 
be statistically significant (p < .001). DASS-Stress again emerged as the most potent 
discriminator in the analysis the effect o f which would also be augmented by the 
inclusion of the NS. The measures of BAI, BDI and PSWQ were excluded in the 
stepwise solution. Table 17 presents a summary of the measures for the analysis.
Table 17.
Summary Measures of Discriminant Analysis: Neurasthenia versus Anxiety
Variables Discriminant
Loading
Discriminant
Coefficient
F-value
DASS-Stress .90 1.42 31.35
PSWQ .51 NI 3.25
BDI .50 NI 8.30
NS .42 .68 6.81
BAI .29 NI 7.81
NI = Not included in the stepwise solution.
Discriminant Analysis III: Neurasthenia versus Anxiety and Depression
This analysis evaluates the relative discriminatory power o f the variables in 
distinguishing the diagnostic group of neurasthenia from a mixed diagnostic group of 
anxiety and depression. The discrimination function was highly significant {p < .001). 
DASS-Stress, once again, emerged as the sole significant discriminator, with the NS
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providing the extra contribution when both variables operated in unison. The BDI, BAI 
and PSWQ were excluded from the stepwise solution. Table 18 presents the result of 
the analysis.
Table 18.
Summary of Measures for Discriminant Analysis: Neurasthenia versus Anxiety & 
Depression
Variables Discriminant
Loading
Discriminant
Coefficient
F-values
DASS-Stress .86 1.64 26.79
BDI .50 NI 15.02
PSWQ .45 NI 5.05
NS .43 .94 6.75
BAI .38 NI 8.21
NI = Not included in the stepwise solution.
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Discussion
The primary objective of the present thesis was to elucidate the characteristics of 
neurasthenia as a distinctive clinical entity. The key issue to be addressed was whether 
neurasthenia is distinguishable from anxiety and depression, or as has been argued, that 
it is primarily an affective disorder masquerading as a somatic illness (Kleinman, 
1982). In addition, the relationship between neurasthenia, depression and anxiety was 
explored by means of a psychometric approach. Several established psychometric 
scales were compiled and translated for these purposes, including BAI, BDI, DASS, 
PSWQ, and the neurasthenia scale (NS), which was developed locally. Given a paucity 
of psychometric information on these scales in the Chinese population, the present 
thesis also sought to examine their psychometric properties, including internal 
consistency, convergent and divergent validity, and the factor structure of these scales. 
To this end, considerable amount of data pertaining to the above issues was collected, 
the findings and implications of which are summarised hereinafter.
Psychom etric F indings
Internal Consistency and Factor Structures o f  BAI, BDI, D ASS & PSW Q
The present study represented the first attempt to confirm the factor models of the 
psychometric scales of the BAI, BDI, DASS and PSWQ in a clinical sample o f Chinese 
individuals. In general, the psychometric properties of these scales appeared to be
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congruent with models established in the West. Excellent internal consistency was 
attained with Cronbach’s Alpha values ranging from .89 to .96.
As for the factor structures of these psychometric scales, they were confirmed 
with two different approaches. First, confirmatory factor analyses evaluated how well 
the extrapolated factors of the scales conformed to the corresponding models for 
clinical samples in the West. Second, the principal components of the scales were 
examined through exploratory factor analyses. For the DASS, the same 3-factor 
solution (i.e., depression, anxiety and stress) as reported in the original study by 
Lovibond & Lovibond (1995) was broadly reproduced, and confirmatory factor 
analyses also demonstrated an acceptable fit of the data, albeit at a moderate level. 
Likewise, the single general factor model of the PSWQ, proposed in previous research 
by Meyer et al. (1990), was also reproduced and showed a moderate fit to the data.
For the BDI, it is important to note that there is, as yet, little consensus about its 
factor components. Although various studies have identified different numbers of 
factors ranging from three to seven (Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988), it has been 
contended that depression, as assessed by BDI, would best be depicted as a general 
syndrome comprising three highly related components. These three components are 
Negative Self-perception, Somatic Disturbance and Functional Impairment (e.g., Beck 
& Lester, 1973; Clark, Cavanaugh, & Gibbons, 1983; Tanaka & Huba, 1984). The 
present findings on the factor structure of the BDI, which revealed four major factors -
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Negative Cognition and Affect, Performance & Functional Impairment, Somatic- 
Vegetative Functions and a non-specific factor -  would appear to be consistent with the 
construct of depression as depicted in the West. Furthermore, according to the 
confirmatory analysis, the data obtained from the BDI was also found to concur 
moderately to the western factor structures (Schotte et al., 1997; Campbell, Burgess, & 
Finch, 1984).
As for the BAI, although confirmatory factor analysis yielded only a marginal fit 
of the data, the factor structure revealed in the exploratory factor analysis appears to be 
congruent with the construct of anxiety as reported in the West. These four factors 
(i.e., Subjective Fear, Panic, Autonomic Arousal and a factor of Nonspecific 
Autonomic symptoms) also appear to be consistent with contemporary models of 
anxiety (e.g., Beck & Epstein, 1988). In summary, the psychometric characteristics of 
depression, anxiety and worry derived from the present study appear to be consistent 
with those reported in the West, both in terms of their internal consistency and 
construct validity, thus supporting their utility and applicability in a cross-cultural 
setting.
Convergent and Divergent Validity
According to the conventional criterion proposed by Campbell and Fiske (1959), 
if emotional scales tap important and distinct constructs, they should produce clear 
convergent and discriminant patterns. With respect to the anxiety and depression
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measures, satisfactory concurrent validity were demonstrated between the measures for 
depression (BDI & DASS-Depression; r = .83), as well as between the measures for 
anxiety (BAI & DASS-Anxiety; r = .84). Alternatively, a lower correlation was found 
between the BAI and BDI (r = .67) thus demonstrating discriminant validity between 
the two scales (t > 4.50, p  < .01). However, a less satisfactory result was obtained 
between DASS-Anxiety and DASS-Depression (r = .81) indicating a poor 
differentiation between these two measures of affect.
In fact, a significant correlation was found among all the three scales in the DASS 
measuring depression, anxiety and stress (r = .81 to .87). In the original development 
of the DASS, these three measures were empirically derived as specific emotional 
constructs, with satisfactory discriminant validity (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). The 
present finding is therefore at odds with the original study and thus raises doubt about 
the specificity of the three constructs in the DASS. However, given the use o f different 
subject groups between the original and the present study (e.g., the use o f non-Chinese 
and non-clinical subjects in the original study), the discrepant findings in the two 
studies may well be attributed to differences in their sample characteristics.
The Construct o f  Neurasthenia
Another important part o f this study was to examine the construct o f neurasthenia, 
as measured by the newly developed Neurasthenia Scale (NS). According to 
psychometric analysis, the internal consistency o f the NS in this clinical sample (a  =
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.96) was also similar to that found in the original study on non-clinical subjects (Wong, 
1996; a  = .94). Exploratory factor analysis of NS revealed excellent item endorsement 
with no item deletion from the original study. In exploratory factor analysis, the NS 
was found to contain a structure of four major factors comprising Nervousness and 
Edginess, Musculoskeletal Aches and Weakness, Fatigue and Sleep Difficulty and 
Non-specific Dysfunctional Symptoms of concern about health and sexual drive (see 
Table 5). The characteristics of the factor structure appear to constitute a symptom 
profile consistent with the diagnostic criteria specified in the ICD-10 and CCMD-2-R. 
In addition, and despite the presence of a few overlapping items, the elicited factor 
structure appears to bear a close resemblance to that reported in the original study on 
non-clinical subjects by Wong (1996). The congruence of the factor structure was 
further supported by confirmatory factor analysis demonstrating a good fit of the data 
between the clinical and non-clinical samples of Chinese subjects. This finding is of 
clinical significance as it suggests that the manifestation of neurasthenia between 
normal and clinical subjects may fall on the same continuum. Thus, the difference 
between normal and clinical subjects with neurasthenia may be manifested 
quantitatively (i.e., symptom severity), instead of qualitatively (symptom structure).
N eurasthenia and its relationship with D epression, A nxiety  and Stress
As reviewed earlier, there is a prevailing assumption that conceptually and 
diagnostically, neurasthenia is primarily “mis-classified” depression or anxiety disorder
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(Kleinman, 1982). If such an assumption were correct, there should be a strong 
association between the constructs of neurasthenia, anxiety and depression. On the 
other hand, if  neurasthenia is a distinctive construct, its association with depression and 
anxiety measures should be relatively weak. The findings in the correlation analysis 
were somewhat unexpected but interesting. As shown in the analysis, the NS obtained 
a high positive correlation with measures of anxiety (i.e., BAI, DASS-Anxiety; r = .80 
to .84), while its correlation with the depression measures was comparatively moderate 
(i.e., BDI, DASS-Depression; r = .68 to .69). These differential correlations suggest 
that conceptually, the construct of neurasthenia, as measured by the NS, may be more 
convergent with constructs of anxiety than depression. Emanating from correlation 
analysis, however, was the unexpected finding that the measure for stress (DASS- 
Stress) also correlated highly with the NS (r = .84), which would also suggest the 
possibility of a close relationship between these two constructs. It has to be added that 
an examination of the contents of these scales revealed some degree o f item-overlap, 
especially between NS, BAI, and DASS-Stress, which may also account for the 
relatively higher correlation between these scales. The finding therefore raises an 
interesting question about the specificity of these measures.
Interestingly, a strong association between stress and neurasthenia was also 
revealed in the hierarchical multiple regression analysis, in which DASS-Stress was 
found to be the best predictor of the score of NS. In this analysis, while the major part 
of the variance pertaining to the neurasthenia measure was accounted for by stress
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(69%), only a minor proportion of the variance (>11%) was attributable to either the 
anxiety or depression measures. The finding here not only casts doubt on the 
proposition of an overlapping relationship between neurasthenia, depression and 
anxiety, but also reaffirms the close affinity between neurasthenia and stress.
The prominent role of stress became even more evident in the discriminant 
function analyses. The aim of the analysis was to ascertain whether at the syndrome 
level, the diagnostic group of neurasthenia could be distinguished from anxiety and 
depression, by means of the psychometric scales of BAI, BDI, PSWQ, NS and DASS- 
Stress. Two important findings were extracted from this analysis. First, neurasthenia 
was separable as a diagnostic category and thus further substantiated its distinctiveness 
as a clinical phenomenon. But perhaps the more interesting finding was the important 
role of DASS-Stress, which emerged once again as the single most potent contributor 
in group-differentiation. By comparison, the measures for anxiety, depression and 
neurasthenia, which were expected to be major contributors for their respective 
diagnostic groups, failed to provide significant impact in the group-differentiation.
As mentioned earlier, the construct of stress was derived as a specific emotional 
construct in the original development of the DASS, which can be differentiated from 
depression and anxiety measures (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). The importance of 
stress as the best contributor in discriminating neurasthenia from the diagnostic groups 
of depression and anxiety, and as best predictor for the score of NS in the multiple
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regression analysis, would seem to support the view of its being a specific and unique 
construct. However, as noted from the findings of correlation analysis, in addition to 
the measure of neurasthenia (NS), DASS-Stress also correlated highly with depression 
and anxiety indicating that it may be a more encompassing construct than initially 
suggested. Thus, the extent to which DASS-Stress contributes to neurasthenia as a 
specific emotional construct or as a general affective state is clearly an important issue 
worthy of further investigation.
Characteristics o f  N eurasthenia
Another principal aim of this thesis, after establishing neurasthenia as a clinical 
phenomenon distinctive from that of depression and anxiety, was to identify those 
factors that characterise the syndrome. For this purpose, the scores on the 
psychometric scales of the NS, PSWQ, BDI, BAI and the DASS were compared 
between the neurasthenic group and the control groups of anxiety and depression. 
Indeed, the result of the comparison provided further empirical support of a group 
difference. In comparison with the depression and anxiety groups, the neurasthenics 
consistently obtained significantly lower score on all o f the psychometric measures. 
Lower scores on the depression and anxiety measures (BDI, DASS-Depression, BAI & 
DASS-Anxiety) were expected, as the neurasthenic group comprised subjects with a 
“pure neurasthenia” diagnosis, that is, without co-morbid anxiety or depressive 
disorder. Similar findings were obtained for the measure of stress (DASS-Stress) and
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the trait of worry (PSWQ). However, contrary to the prediction, the neurasthenic group 
also obtained a lower score on the NS than the anxiety and depression control. Since 
the NS, which measured the dimension of fatigue and associated distress, was supposed 
to be a major “marker” for the syndrome of neurasthenia, this finding is surprising and 
unexpected. Thus, on the basis of these findings, it would appear that neurasthenia, at 
least in its “pure” form, is characterised not by fatigue symptoms per se, but by a lower 
magnitude of symptom-severity across all measures employed in this study.
An obvious but important question pertaining to the mildness of distress 
symptoms needs to be addressed here. That is, whether the mildness of the distress 
symptoms found in neurasthenia is of a generalised and diffused nature, or whether it is 
confined only to specific dimensions of distress such as affect. Further elucidation on 
the nature of neurasthenia can be derived from the findings of group comparisons on 
the sub-scale scores of the DASS and NS, which provided a finer description of the 
characteristics distinctive of neurasthenia. From the DASS, all o f the sixteen sub- 
scale-scores measuring symptom clusters of depression, anxiety, and stress, were also 
found to be significantly lower in the neurasthenic group which seemed to characterise 
neurasthenia as a condition of generalised mild distress.
As for the NS, four sub-scales were produced, namely Irritability and 
Nervousness, Fatigue and Exhaustion, Musculoskeletal Ache and Pain, and 
Dysfunctional symptoms (e.g., somatic concern and diminished sexual drive). O f these
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four sub-scales, only the sub-scale Irritability and Nervousness presented a score in the 
neurasthenic group lower than that in the Depression and Anxiety control. Content 
analysis of this sub-scale revealed that it comprises mainly affective symptoms 
pertaining to nervous tension and arousal (e.g., becoming agitated easily, over-reactive, 
nervous and difficult to relax, etc.). To the extent that the neurasthenics showed 
significantly a lower magnitude o f symptom-severity on the various mood measures 
including BAI and BDI, as well as on the NS sub-scale of Irritability and Nervousness, 
the characteristic of neurasthenia as a generalised mild condition of distress would 
appear to be further substantiated. However, since these scales are all measures of 
different emotional constructs, it can be argued that neurasthenia as a mild condition of 
distress is primarily marked by a relative absence of the affective components.
Having said this, it is noteworthy that on three of the four NS sub-scales, the 
scores o f the neurasthenic group were comparable to the depression and anxiety 
control. These three sub-scales represented symptoms of (a) Fatigue and Exhaustion, 
(b) Musculoskeletal Aches and Pain, and (c) Dysfunctional problems such as somatic 
preoccupation and diminished sexual drive. On this basis, it would appear that despite 
the mildness of the affective symptoms, neurasthenia remains a distressing condition, at 
least in terms of the symptoms of fatigue and exhaustion, musculoskeletal aches and 
pain, and a few functional problems. It is of interest that these symptoms of fatigue, 
and the relative absence of affective components, would appear to resemble the
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complaints of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, as specified in the diagnostic criteria 
presented in Table 2 (Sharpe, 1995).
It can be argued that findings from the group comparisons may simply indicate 
neurasthenia as a sub-clinical threshold disorder, and thus the generalised low scores on 
most o f the psychometric scales are to be expected. It can also be argued that the 
present result were pre-empted and therefore entirely predictable, as all of the 
neurasthenic patients were “pre-selected” by an operational criterion which included 
only those without a co-morbidity of anxiety or depression. By excluding depression 
and anxiety from the diagnostic group of neurasthenia, the symptom-severity of the 
neurasthenics might have been “artificially” lowered and thereby “inflated” the scale- 
scores difference between the diagnostic groups of neurasthenia and the depression and 
anxiety control. On the other hand, as the diagnosis of neurasthenia was established 
empirically by means of the ICD-10, such an exclusion strategy nevertheless provided 
an opportunity to validate the “existence” of “pure neurasthenic” cases. Moreover, by 
removing the confounding effect of the co-morbidity of anxiety and depression, the 
“exclusion strategy” had thereby provided an opportunity to study the “actual” 
characteristics of the “pure neurasthenia”.
Im plications and Future D irections
The present study set out to distinguish neurasthenia from depression and anxiety 
in light of the widely held assumption that it is a variant of these psychological
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disorders. From the data generated thus far, there is little evidence of such a 
resemblance or an overlap. The only resemblance among these syndromes is on a 
small number o f fatigue symptoms of tiredness and exhaustion, sleep difficulty, muscle 
pain and dysfunctional complaints. In fact, the data consistently showed that as a 
syndrome, neurasthenia can be distinguished easily and clearly from depression and 
anxiety, at least in terms of the self-reported measures of DASS, BDI, BAI and PSWQ. 
At the symptom level, it can also be distinguished in terms of the relatively low 
magnitude of the psychosomatic complaints on mood and somatic distress.
It is apparent that the outcomes of the present study are at odds with the finding 
from the Hunan Study in China (Kleinman, 1982). An inescapable question arises: 
why should there be such a difference in the outcome of the present study? One major 
reason may be in the diagnostic procedure. As discussed, there are a number of 
methodological shortcomings concerning the use of the DSM-III procedure in the 
Hunan study, which did not address the co-existence of other diagnostic categories in 
the face of non-specific somatic complaints such as fatigue. In the Hunan study 
(Kleinman, 1982), the possibility of a comorbidity of anxiety or depressive disorder in 
the neurasthenic patients was neither addressed nor controlled. On that basis, it can be 
argued that the clinical subjects in the Hunan study may be very different from those 
employed in the present study. In addition, as mentioned before, there was also a 
heuristic bias inherent in the interpretation of data. In an attempt to prove that the 
neurasthenic patients in China were misclassified depression and anxiety, non-specific
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somatic symptoms of fatigue and distress were assumed as indications of affective 
disorder a priori.
Thus, how to interpret the small pool of non-specific symptoms of fatigue as 
elicited in the present study becomes an important issue. This inevitably leads to 
another thorny and philosophical question. Why shouldn’t this condition of 
generalised mild distress and the small pool of fatigue symptoms be seen as a mild or 
sub-threshold affective disorder (e.g., Greenberg, 1990), or as an undifferentiated 
somatoform disorder, as recommended by the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1991)? Alternatively, and given the similarity of symptom profile, is the 
condition in fact the Westernised version of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome? From the 
perspective of psychiatric taxonomy, for example, most of these non-specific 
symptoms could well be categorised as manifestations of depression. Proponents could 
justifiably argue that symptoms such as tiredness, muscle aches and pains, sleep 
difficulties, and diminished sexual drive might be regarded as “typical” signs or 
complaints of depressive disorder. Similarly, the arguments for the somatoform 
disorder, or CFS, can be equally justified given the presentation o f predominantly 
somatic and fatigue symptoms, and the relative absence of affective components. 
However, diagnostic categories are no more than summary descriptors of symptoms. 
As Lakoff (1987) highlighted, they are neither empirically derived nor theoretically 
driven, but part of a “philosophical position arrived at on the basis o f a priori 
speculation”. Therefore, whether the non-specific symptoms in question should be
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seen as more representative of neurasthenia, a sub-threshold affective disorder, 
somatoform disorder, or CFS is dependent on the eyes of the beholder.
There are also a number of disadvantages with the taxonomic/syndromal 
approach, which placed much emphasis on diagnostic categorisation in accordance with 
a set of predetermined rules. In the context of nosology, diagnostic categories such as 
neurasthenia, depression, anxiety, somatoform disorder and CFS tend to be 
overinclusive, and may therefore be applied to a diverse group of individuals who share 
only a small number of symptoms of distress. Methodologically, by focusing on a 
predetermined symptom patterns and the assigned diagnosis, subtle difference in 
symptom presentation within and between groups of individuals may be overlooked 
(Persons, 1986). In order to gain a better understanding of clinical phenomena, it has 
been suggested that more emphasis should be placed on studying the conceptual 
relationship between symptoms and the underlying psychological processes, rather than 
on the diagnoses. With reference to neurasthenia, its relationship with other clinical 
constructs such as depression and anxiety could be better understood by means of the 
conceptual-based approach. Conceptually, depression is predominantly characterised 
by low mood states such as sadness, dysphoria, and anhedonia, while anxiety is 
characterised by subjective fear and somatic tension (Zinbarg & Barlow, 1996; Clark & 
Watson, 1991b). Thus, given the relative absence of affective symptoms by the 
neurasthenics as shown by their significantly lower scores on the depression and 
anxiety measures, neurasthenia is unlikely to be a variant of depression or anxiety.
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In summary, two notable components emerge consistently from the findings in the 
present study: namely stress and a symptom pool of non-specific psychosomatic 
complaints including fatigue, sleep difficulty, muscle pain, weakness, and 
dysfunctional distress. This inevitably invites the theoretical question concerning their 
role in and relationship with the concept of neurasthenia, depression and anxiety. 
Under the general conceptual framework of diathesis-stress, a number of theories have 
been proposed in recent years linking the concept of stress to neurasthenia or fatigue 
syndrome (e.g., Wessely, David, Butler, & Chalder, 1989; Surawy, Hackman, Hawton, 
& Sharpe, 1995). In this theoretical formulation, neurasthenia and the emotional 
conditions of depression and anxiety are assumed to have a common activating 
mechanism such as the influence of stress, but have different predisposing factors such 
as pre-morbid personality and style of cognitive attribution. On this basis, how a 
psychosomatic illness manifests itself will depend on the interplay between the 
activating event and the predisposing factors. Theoretically, this opens many 
interesting avenues for future research and investigation. For example, in the present 
finding, neurasthenia is marked by a relative absence of affective components as shown 
by their lower scores on measures of depression and anxiety. Since neuroticism is a 
known trait of emotional disorders (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1964), it may be o f theoretical 
interest whether neurasthenics in general are in fact less “neurotic” than those with 
depression or anxiety. By the same token, it is known that people with emotional 
disorders tend to attribute symptoms to their persons rather than to physical illness
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(Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). Therefore, whether the neurasthenics have 
specific illness beliefs and attributions, different from those of depressed and anxious 
patients may also be of theoretical interest. In the context of the present study, fatigue 
and other somatic symptoms appear to be the predominant complaints of the 
neurasthenic, thus the issue of whether the neurasthenics have a higher propensity to 
somatise, as has been suggested (e.g., Kleinman, 1982) is clearly also worthy of 
investigations.
The role of somatisation in the genesis of psychosomatic illnesses such as 
neurasthenia has been further elaborated in an historical analysis of psychosomatic 
illnesses by Shorter (1992). According to Shorter, psychosomatic illness arises because 
the conversion of stress into physical symptoms represents one of the mechanisms for 
mobilising the body to cope with psychological distress. Within this process, people 
have tried to achieve some kind of plausible interpretation of their bodily sensation, by 
casting them in a kind of “symptom pool” defined by the predominant medical models 
available in their culture. Culture, as Shorter contended, provides the models or 
templates for psychosomatic illnesses such as neurasthenia, shaping as well as 
legitimising the responses to the corresponding illness. Using this analysis, and in light 
of the recent epidemic of CFS in the West, it seems pertinent to ask the familiar 
question again: is CFS a modern and Westernised version of the neurasthenia in 
Chinese societies nowadays? Tracking the literatures of psychosomatic medicine as 
they have developed in the past century, one can detect a trajectory of shifting medical
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folklore and paradigms, which illuminates how patients in the modern era manifested 
their physical symptoms as espoused by society at large. From the early theories of 
“nervousness” and “reflexes”, to the organic or viral disease of modern medical 
models, moving onto disharmony of bodily organs of the Chinese medical folklore, and 
the recent popularisation of nutritionist models of poisons and allergy, the patterns of 
fatigue syndrome have shifted and turned as culture, and the corresponding mythology 
changed their decision on what is and what is not a legitimate disease. From the 
perspective of epistemology, history often illuminates reality.
Lim itations o f  the Study
In this thesis, the distinctive characteristics of neurasthenia are outlined and 
linked to a conceptual model of aetiology. However, as this study represents the first 
attempt in a Chinese society, both the findings and theoretical formulation must be 
regarded as preliminary information. Further replication in another Chinese 
community would be useful. The findings and interpretations made in this study are 
also subjected to a number of important limitations, as follows:
Firstly, the present thesis investigated specifically the characteristics o f “pure” 
neurasthenia by excluding those with a co-morbid anxiety or depression condition. 
While there are clearly theoretical advantages of studying such a group, from a clinical 
perspective, it is also useful to compare and contrast the findings with an “impure” 
group, that is, those with co-morbid anxiety or depression condition.
Secondly, as the present study employed a cross sectional design as opposed to a 
prospective design, it remains to be seen whether there is a temporal stability in the 
present findings on neurasthenia. Of special interest is the aetiological question of 
whether there is a temporal relationship or causal sequence between neurasthenia and 
the other affective disorders. For example, given the relative mildness of the affective 
symptoms, it has been suggested that neurasthenia may be a precursor to more severe 
clinical conditions of anxiety or depression (Zheng et al., 1997). With reference to the 
present study, it may therefore be beneficial to undertake a follow-up study of the same 
subjects over, say, two years or more.
The third limitation pertains to the sampling procedure for the diagnostic groups 
of depression and anxiety in which their diagnoses were determined only by a routine 
semi-structured interview based on the DSM-IV/ICD-10. Given the importance of 
diagnostic implication in the present study, a more stringent diagnostic procedure was 
essential. For this reason, there was clearly a need to cross-validate the initial 
diagnoses using a more robust procedure such as the Structured Clinical Interview for 
DSM-IV (Steinberg, 1993) or Anxiety Disorder Interview Schedule for DSM-IV 
(Brown, DiNardo, & Barlow, 1994).
Fourthly, the present study employed a psychometric approach, relying 
exclusively on self-report scales for examining the construct of neurasthenia and its 
relationship with depression and anxiety. Although in general, the findings were
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satisfactory, particularly in terms of the excellent psychometric information compiled 
on all of the scales, there is ground for alternative methods of investigation. 
Methodologically, the psychometric approach may lend itself to a number of intrinsic 
confounds, including social desirability, response bias and possible misinterpretation of 
items, which are difficult to control.
The present study also contains a number of methodological shortcomings, which 
should be addressed in future-investigations. First, the difference in education level 
between the diagnostic groups might constitute a potential confound which needs to be 
controlled in future study. Secondly, the fact that the depressed and anxious groups 
were recruited from settings different from that of the neurasthenics inevitably raises 
the question of generalisability of the findings. Thirdly, additional confounds might 
also be posed by the fact that subjects of different diagnostic groups included patients 
with different stages of illness and treatment. In this respect, the employment of a 
longitudinal design to examine the temporal course of neurasthenia, and its relationship 
with depression and anxiety disorder, might help to throw light on this issue.
Finally, in view of the inextricable relationship between culture and 
psychosomatic illness, the scope of the present study may be broadened by including a 
cross-cultural perspective to look at, for example, diagnostic relationship between 
Westernised CFS and Chinese neurasthenia, with relevant groups of patients from the 
East and West.
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Conclusions
These limitations notwithstanding, several important conclusions can be distilled 
from the present study. Theoretically, the existence of neurasthenia as a fatigue 
syndrome has been ascertained. Diagnostically, there is psychometric evidence of 
discernible differences between neurasthenia and the affective disorders of depression 
and anxiety. There is hence little support for the proposition of neurasthenia as a 
variant of depression or anxiety disorder. Clinically, its salient features are marked not 
by the fatigue symptoms per se, but by a relative absence of affective complaints.
As an endeavour to disentangle the relationship between neurasthenia and that of 
depression and anxiety, this thesis focussed on only some psychological aspects of the 
condition. Obviously, the importance of neuro-biological correlates and other 
psychological factors should not be discounted. As has been suggested, neurasthenia is 
likely to be a heterogeneous condition with complex somatic and psychological 
aetiology. On that note, one also needs to be mindful of the conventional taxonomic 
approach of clinical science, which has a tendency to categorise and reify clinical 
phenomena for sake of parsimony. Throughout its adventurous history in the clinical 
borderland, and from the Victorian West to the Post-Cultural Revolution East, the 
phenomenon of neurasthenia has certainly gripped the imagination of clinicians and 
general public at large. But from the epistemological perspective, its rise and fall as a 
legitimate clinical entity only serves as a stark reminder of the shifting and wavering 
nature of scientific paradigms, which are often vulnerable to the influence of social and
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cultural forces. Nature, as Bacon, the great British philosopher observed, "is more 
infinite in her manifestations than man in his conceptions”.
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Appendix I
Details of the composition of the Anxiety Disorder subdiagnoses
Subdiagnoses Frequency Percentage Cumulative
Percentage
Anxiety Disorder with 
Social Phobia 1 1.6 1.6
Panic Disorder with 
Agoraphobia
2 3.1 4.7
Panic Disorder 
without Agoraphobia
3 4.7 9.4
Obsessional 
Compulsive Disorder
6 9.4 18.8
General Anxiety 
Disorder
29 45.3 64.1
Anxiety Disorder 
NOS
23 35.9 100
Total 64
Appendix II: The Questionnaires (in English Language)
Neurasthenia Scale 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire 
Beck Depression Inventory 
Beck Anxiety Inventory 
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale
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Neurasthenia Scale
Please read each statement carefully. Enter the number next to each statement that best 
describe the way you have been feeling in the past week. Please do not spend too much 
time on each statement.
0 = Not at all
1 = Applied to me to some degree, or some o f the time
2 = Applied to me to a good degree, or a good part of the time
3 = Applied to me very much, or most of the time_________________________
1. I often felt physically tired.
2. Sometimes when I woke up, if  felt like I had not slept before.
3. I often experienced muscle pain.
4. I found it difficult to concentrate.
5. I felt weak and fatigue on the limbs.
6. I was hasty and agitated in mood.
7. I was mixed up in mind.
8. My body was fragile.
9. I often worried about little things.
10.1 became agitated rather easily.
11. Very trivial things could make me feel nervous.
12.1 often felt tired without any apparent reason.
13.1 had headaches.
14. My mind was clouded with thoughts at all times.
15.1 lost temper easily on “minor” things.
16.1 often overreacted to my surroundings (e.g. noise, pressure or criticism).
17.1 had difficulties in falling asleep at night despite feeling very tired at daytime.
18.1 was disturbed easily by daily hassles.
19.1 was nervous and find it difficult to relax.
2 0 .1 got upset easily and have lots of thoughts.
2 1 .1 was fearful o f suffering from serious illnesses (e.g. heart disease, cancer).
22. My memory was much worse than before.
2 3 .1 was suspicious and oversensitive.
2 4 .1 often had feelings of dizziness.
2 5 .1 felt aches and stiffness around my neck.
26. My sexual drive and interest had diminished.
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The Penn State Worry Questionnaire
Enter the number that best describes how typical or characteristic each item is of you, 
putting the number next to each item.
1 2 3 4 5
Not at all _____________ Somewhat typical___________________ Very typical
1. If I don Ï  have enough time to do everything, I don ï  worry about it.
2. My worries overwhelm me.
3. I don ï  tend to worry about things.
4. Many situations make me worry.
5. I know I shouldn t  worry about things, but I just couldn t  help it.
6. When I am under pressure, I worry a lot.
7. I am always worrying about something.
8. I find it easy to dismiss worrisome thoughts.
9. As soon as I finish one task, I start to worry everything else I have to do.
10 .1 never worry about anything.
11. When there is nothing more I can do about a concern, I don t  worry about it anymore.
12.1 have been a worrier all my life.
13 .1 notice I have been worrying about things.
14. Once I start worrying, I can ï  stop.
15 .1 worry all the time.
16 .1 worry about projects until they are all done.
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Beck Depression Inventory
This questionnaire consists of 21 groups of statements. After reading each group of 
statements carefully, circle the number (0,1,2, or 3) next to one statement in each group 
which best describes the way you have been feeling the past week, including today. If 
several statements within a group seem to apply equally well, circle each one. Be sure to 
read all the statements in each group before making your choice.
1. 7.
0 I do not feel sad 0 I don’t feel disappointed in myself
1 I feel sad 1 I am disappointed in myself
2 I am sad all the time and I can’t snap out of it 2 I am disgusted with myself
3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it. 3 I hate myself
2. 8.
0 I am not particularly discouraged about the 0 I don’t feel I am worse than anybody else
future 1 I am critical of myself for my weakness or
1 I feel discouraged about the future mistakes
2 I feel I have nothing to look forward to 2 I blame myself all the time for my failure
3 I feel that the future is hopeless and that 3 I blame myself for everything bad that
things cannot improve happens
3. 9.
0 I do not feel like a failure 0 I don’t have any thoughts of killing myself
1 I feel I have failed more than the average 1 I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would
person not carry them out
2 As I look back on my life, all I can see is 2 I would like to kill myself
failures 3 I would kill myself if I have the chance
3 I feel I am a complete failure as a person
10.
4. 0 I don’t cry any more than usual
0 I get as much satisfaction out of things as I 1 I cry more than I used to
used to 2 I cry all the time now
1 I don’t enjoy things the way I used to 3 I used to be able to cry but now I can’t cry
2 I don’t get real satisfaction out of anything even though I want to
any more
3 I am dissatisfied or bored with everything 11.
0 I am no more irritated now than I ever am
5. 1 I get annoyed or irritated more easily than I
0 I don’t feel particularly guilty use to
1 I feel guilty a good part of the time 2 I feel irritated all the time now
2 I feel quite guilty most of the time 3 I don’t get irritated at all by the things that
3 I feel guilty all the time used to irritate me
6. 12.
0 I don’t feel I am being punished 0 I have not lost interest in other people
1 I feel I may be punished 1 I am less interested in other people than I
2 I expect to be punished used to be
3 I feel I am being punished 2 I have lost most of my interest in other people
3 I have lost all my interest in other people
Continued next page
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13. 18.
0 I make decisions about as well as I ever could 0 My appetite is no worse than usual
1 I put off making decision more than I used to 1 My appetite is not as good as it used to be
2 I have greater difficulty in making decision 2 My appetite is much worse now
than before 3 I have no appetite at all anymore
3 I can’t make decision at all anymore
19.
14. 0 I haven’t lost much weight, if any, lately
0 I don’t feel I look any worse than I used to 1 I have lost more than 5 pounds
1 I am worried that I am looking old or 2 I have lost more than 10 pounds
unattractive 3 I have lost more than 15 pounds
2 I feel that there are permanent changes in my
appearance that make me look unattractive I am purposely trying to lose weight by eating
3 I believe that I look ugly less. Yes------  No-----
15. 20.
0 I can work about as well as before 0 I am no more worried about my health than
1 It takes an extra effort to get started at doing usual
something 1 I am worried about physical problems such
2 I have to push myself very hard to do as aches and pains; or upset stomach; or
anything constipation
3 I can’t do any work at all 2 I am very worried about physical problems
and it is hard to think of much else
16. 3 I am so worried about my physical problems
0 I can sleep as well as usual that I cannot think about anything else
1 I don’t sleep as well as I used to
2 I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and 21.
find it hard to get back to sleep 0 I have not noticed any recent change in my
3 I wake up several hours earlier than I used to interest in sex
and cannot get back to sleep 1 I am less interested in sex than I used to be
2 I am much less interested in sex now
17. 3 I have lost interest in sex completely
0 I don’t get more tired than usual
1 I get tired more easily than I used to
2 I get tired from doing almost anything
3 I am too tired to do anything
Subtotal Page 2 
Subtotal Page 1
Total Score
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Beck Anxiety Inventory
Please read each item in the list carefully. Next to each item enter the appropriate number 
which indicate how much you have been bothered by each symptom during the past 
week, including today.
0 = Not at all
1 = Mildly; it did not bother me much
2 = Moderately; it was very unpleasant but I could stand it
3 = Severely; I could barely stand it
1. Numbness and tingling.
2. Feeling hot.
3. Wobbliness in legs.
4. Unable to relax.
5. Fear of the worst happening.
6. Dizzy or lightheaded.
7. Heart pounding or racing.
8. Unsteady.
9. Terrified.
10. Nervous.
11. Feeling o f choking.
12. Hands trembling.
13. Shaky.
14. Fear o f losing control.
15. Difficulty breathing.
16. Fear o f dying.
17. Scared.
18. Indigestion or discomfort in abdomen.
19. Faint.
20. Face flushed.
21. Sweating.
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Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS)
Please read each statement and enter a number 0 ,1 ,2 , or 3 which indicates how much the 
statement applied to you over the past week. There are no right or wrong answers. Do 
not spend too much time on any statement.
The rating scale is as follows:
0 Did not applied to me at all
1. Applied to me to some degree, or some o f  the time
2. Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part o f  the time
3. Applied to me very much, or most o f  the time
1. I found myself getting upset by quite trivial things
2. I was aware of dryness of my mouth
3. I couldn’t seem to experience any positive feeling at all
4. I experience breathing difficulty (e.g. excessively rapid breathing, breathlessness in 
the absence of physical exertion)
5. I just couldn’t seem to get going
6. I tended to over-react to situations
7. I had a feeling of shakiness (legs going to give way)
8. I found it difficult to relax
9. I found myself in situations that made me so anxious I was most relieved when they 
ended
10.1 felt that I had nothing to look forward to
11.1 found myself getting upset rather easily
12.1 felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy
13.1 felt sad and depressed
14.1 found myself getting impatient when I was delayed in any way (lifts, traffic lights, 
being kept waiting)
15.1 had a feeling of faintness
16.1 felt that I had lost interest in just about everything
17.1 felt I wasn’t worth much as a person
18.1 felt that I was rather touchy
19.1 perspired noticeably (e.g. hands sweating) in the absence of high temperatures or 
physical exertion
2 0 .1 felt scared without any good reason
21.1 felt life wasn’t worthwhile
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(DASS)
Reminder of rating scales:
0 D id  not apply to me at all
1 Applied to me to some degree, or some o f  the time
2 Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part o f  the time
3 Applied to me very much, or most o f  the time
22 .1 found it hard to wind down
23 .1 had difficulty in swallowing
24 .1 couldn’t seem to get enjoyment out o f the things I did
2 5 .1 was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical exertion (e.g. sense 
of heart rate increases, heart missing a beat)
26 .1 felt downhearted and blue
2 7 .1 found that I was very irritable
28 .1 felt I was close to panic
29 .1 found it hard to calm down after something upset me
30 .1 feared that I would be “thrown” by some trivial but unfamiliar task
31.1 was unable to become enthusiastic about anything
32 .1 found it difficult to tolerate interruptions to what I was doing
33 .1 was in a state of nervous tension
34 .1 felt I was pretty nervous
35.1 was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with what I was doing
36 .1 felt terrified
37 .1 could see nothing in the future to be hopeful about
38 .1 felt life was meaningless
39 .1 found myself getting agitated
4 0 .1 was worried about situations in which I might panic and make a fool of myself
41.1 experienced trembling (e.g. in the hands)
4 2 .1 found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things
Appendix III: The Questionnaires in Chinese Language
1. Demographic information
2. Neurasthenia Scale
3. Penn State Worry Questionnaire
4. Beck Depression Inventory
5. Beck Anxiety Inventory
6. Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale
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Appendix IV:
Introduction and Instruction for the questionnaires
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Introduction and Instruction for the Questionnaires
1. This survey is part o f the research programme currently conducted at the Chinese 
University o f Hong Kong, the aim of which is to investigate the psychological wellbeing 
of people in Hong Kong.
2. The content of the questionnaire will be kept confidential.
3. In order to keep your identity anonymous, please do not write your name, but do fill in 
all the other personal details, which are needed as part of our study.
4. Should you have any query, please don’t hesitate to contact us at the following address 
and telephone during office hours:
Clinical Psychology Unit,
Department o f Psychiatry,
Prince of Wales Hospital,
Shatin, N.T. Tel: 2632-3610
5. Please read the following instruction carefully before filling in the questionnaire:
Read every statement carefully. Each statement describes your behaviour or feeling in 
response to various events. On the left o f the statement are numerical ratings 
representing how well it matches your feeling in ‘the past week’. Circle the rating which 
is the most appropriate to you. Please do not spend too much time on each statement.
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Appendix V: List of the 16 DASS sub-factors and items
Depression
Dysphoria 
I felt downhearted and blue 
I felt sad and depressed 
Hopelessness 
I could see nothing in the future to be hopeful about 
I felt that I had nothing to look forward to 
Devaluation of life 
I felt that life was m eaningless 
I felt that life w asn’t worthwhile 
Self-deprecation 
I felt I was pretty worthless 
I felt I w asn’t worth much as a person 
Lack of interest /involvement 
I felt that I had lost interest in just about everything 
I was unable to becom e enthusiastic about anthing 
Anhedonia
I couldn’t seem  to experience any positive feeling at all 
I couldn’t seem  to get any enjoym ent out o f  the things I did 
Inertia
I just couldn’t seem  to get going  
I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things
Anxiety
Autonomic arousal
I was aware o f  the action o f  my heart in the absence o f  physical exertion (e.g. sense o f  heart rate increase, heart m issing a beat) 
I perspired noticeably (e.g. hands sweating) in the absence o f  high temperatures or physical exertion 
I was aware o f  dryness o f  my mouth
I experienced breathing difficulty (e.g. excessive rapid breathing, breathlessness in the absence o f  physical exertion)
I had difficulty in swallow ing  
Skeletal muscle effects 
I had a feeling o f  shakiness (e.g. legs going to give way)
I experienced trembling (e.g. in the hands)
Situational anxiety
I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make a fool o f  m yself 
I found m yself in situations which made me so anxious I was relieved when they ended 
I feared that I would be “thrown” by some trivial but unfamiliar task 
Subjective experience o f anxious affect 
I felt I was close to panic 
I felt terrified 
I had a feeling o f  faintness
Stress
Difficulty relaxing 
I found it hard to wind down
I found it hard to calm down after som ething upset me 
I found it difficult to relax 
Nervous arousal 
I felt that I was using a lot o f  nervous energy 
I was in a state o f  nervous tension  
Easily upset /  agitated 
I found m yself getting upset rather easily  
I found m yself getting upset by quite trivial things 
I found m yself getting agitated 
Irritable /  over-reactive 
I tended to over-react to situations 
I found that I was very irritable 
I felt that I was rather touchy 
Impatient
I was intolerant o f  anything that kept me from getting on with what I was doing
I found m yself getting impatient when I was delayed in any way (e.g. lifts, traffic lights, being kept waiting)
I found it difficult to tolerate interruptions to what I was doing
241
Section 5
M.Psychol. Thesis (Clinical Psychology) 
University of Liverpool
An Evaluation of Two Statistical Methods 
for Improving Clinical Decision Making
Submitted in Part-Requirement for the Degree of 
M. Psychol. (Clinical Specialisation)
University of Liverpool 
August, 1981
Acknolwedgement
The author would like to acknowledge the help and advice o f Dr. G. Owens, and of 
Dr. G.N. Wright o f Huddersfield Polytechnic; to Dr. R. Hoy o f West Cheshire 
Hospital, Mrs. Ann Fordam of Walton and Fazakerley Hospitals, and Mr. B. 
Geldeard o f Halton Hospital for providing access to patients’ files; Dr. M. Dewey 
for his advice on statistical analysis; and last but not least, to all my colleagues for 
participated in the experiment.
244
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
I ABSTRACT 246
II LITERATURE REVIEW 248
1. Introduction 248
2. Psychological Studies on Human Judgment 248
3. Statistical Methods in Clinical Decision Making 259
4. Clinical Versus Statistical Controversy 268
5. The Present Study 270
III METHOD 272
1. Materials 272
2. Subjects 273
3. Judgmental task 273
(1) P a rti 274
(2) Part 2 276
IV RESULTS 280
L Hit Rate Comparison 280
2. Validity Coefficient Comparison 284
3. Experience versus Inexperience 287
4. Validity and Consistency of Cue Utilisation 288
5. Calibration of Subjective Probability 295
V DISCUSSION
I. Summary of the Results
245
2. Linear Model versus Clinical Judgment 299
3. Bayes* Theorem and the Problems of its Application 301
4. On Compositive Judgment 302
5. Confounding Variables 303
6. Conclusion 304
VII REFERENCE 306
VI LIST OF APPENDICES 313
Appendix A Basic paradigm for Linear Model 
Appendix B Details of patient history 
Appendix C Table of Multiple Correlation between 
the prediction variables 
Appendix D Results of Clinical Predictions SI - SI6
Appendix E Results of Linear Regression Estimates SI - SI 6 
Appendix F Results of Bayesian Prediction SI - SI 6 
Appendix G Copy o f Part I  o f the Experiment 
Appendix H  Copy of Part II of the Experiment
246
I. ABSTRACT
The present study examines the predictive efficacy of two statistical decision- 
theoretic techniques, namely, Linear Additive Model and Bayes’ Theorem. Linear 
additive model was presented as an optimal procedure for 'capturing’ the expertise 
of a judge, and at the same time, reducing his (or her) unreliability. Bayes’ 
Theorem was presented as a normative method for combining a judge’s subjective 
prior opinion with the evidence of clinical data into a single decision. The efficacy 
of these two statistical models were evaluated by comparing their performance to 
that of clinical method, in the context of identifying 'brain damaged’ and non brain 
damaged’ cases.
The results showed that Linear additive model was more accurate that the 
'clinicians’ whom they modelled. Further analysis of clinicians’ judgmental policy 
revealed that accurate clinicians tended to be more consistent with their judgmental 
policy while the inaccurate clinicians tended to use their judgmental policy less 
consistently. The finding seemed to bear out the argument in literature regarding 
the usefulness of Linear Additive Modelling.
In contrast, the performance of Bayes’ Theorem was less impressive. The 
failure of the present finding to demonstrate the theoretical advantage of Bayes’ 
Theorem might be related to the use of conditional non-independent clinical data, as 
the application of Baye’s Theorem assumed the data to be conditional independent. 
The finding also showed that the clinicians were subjected to over-estimate bias in
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subjectively probability assessment thus raised the question o f using subjectively 
elicited probabilities in Bayesian analysis.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
1. In troduction
The subject of the present study is clinical decision-making, a highly valued 
quality which is regarded as the sine qua non of a good clinician. The primary 
concern of the present study is to evaluate the efficacy of two statistical methods, 
which have been used to analyse and aid the efficacy of decision making. The 
models to be evaluated are: Linear model of the judge and Bayes’ Theorem.
Are statistical methods better than clinician in making prediction? Can they 
substitute clinical judgment? Many of these controversial issues have already been 
reviewed by Meehl (1954), and it is not the primary intention of this project to stage 
another 'head’ versus 'form ula’ contest. On the contrary, it is hoped that this study 
will provide the perspective that is so badly needed in the understanding of human 
judgment, and thus reconcile the differences between the mathematicians and 
clinicians. Indeed, even if the statistical methods are found to be superior to 
clinician in judgmental performance, it does not necessarily mean that machine 
(implementing a mathematical formula) will replace the clinician. Rather, the 
clinician will have to learn more about decision theoretic techniques, his task will 
be more complicated. This paper begins on the subject of human judgment.
2. P sychological Studies on H um an Judgm ent
The term judgment is not clearly defined. It is often used as an umbrella 
term to refer to those cognitive processes that precede a decision. Meehl (1954)
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distinguishes two types of processes involved in a judgmental situation : first, there 
is the problem of what information is required before a decision can be made, and , 
secondly, there is the problem of what to do with the available information. For the 
purpose of this thesis, judgment will be referred to as the way in which information 
is integrated into a decision, it will also be used interchangeably with the term 
decision making.
In medical and clinical training, much emphasis has been devoted to the 
problem of amassing evidence and collecting information for making a decision. 
Clinicians are taught how to recognise or discover signs, symptoms or cues of 
various diseases or conditions. The general assumption appears to be, the more 
information a clinician has, the better decision he makes. Whilst these 
considerations are important, relatively little attention has been given to how 
information should be combined or integrated into an appropriate decision. Yet 
there seems little doubt that the skill of integrating information is an important 
process in decision making as most clinicians often do not have unequivocal and 
conclusive evidence. Or even if it does exist, many clinicians simply cannot afford 
the time to wait for the extra information. Judgment is therefore a probabilistic 
inferential process, a skill of optimising information in the face of uncertainty. As 
Sir William Osier, a famous Canadian physician once said, “Medicine is a science 
of uncertainty and an art of probability”.
2.1 The Fallibility of Human Judgment_____
Clinical judgment, it is often argued, is an intuitive process and as such it
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cannot be subjected to the rigors of scientific scrutiny. Consider the 
following quotation:
There is no science. It is an a r t ... It is a personal intuition, sensing the 
pattern o f  behaviour ... it is a kind oflocked-in concentration, an intuition, a feel, 
nothing that can be schooled” (cited from Smith, 1968, p20).
The implicit assumption underlying the statement is that judgment is an 
intrinsic property of a clinician’s professional status or experience. It is assumed to 
be something that is based on a state of mind, on feelings or attitudes, on knowing, 
without the conscious use of well-defined reasoning. However, while it is possible 
that some clinicians are able to ‘smell-ouf a patient’s condition and arrive at an 
accurate decision, in general, the results on the validity of clinical intuition have 
been quite discouraging.
Over the past 30 years, numerous studies have tested the accuracy of clinical 
intuition. Goldberg (1968), for example, references nine studies that not only 
demonstrated a marked lack of validity but also yielded the surprising finding that 
the judge’s length of professional training and his experience often showed little 
relationship to his accuracy. Equally disillusioning are the results o f some studies, 
which have shown that the amount of information available to the judge is not 
necessarily related to the accuracy of his inferences. One example is a study by 
Oskamp (1965) who gave 32 clinicians background information about a patient’s 
case. The information was divided into four sections. After reading each section of 
the case, the judge answered twenty-five questions about the personality of the
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subject. The correct answer was known to the investigators. The clinician also 
rated his confidence in his answers. Oskamp found that, as the amount of 
information about the case increased, accuracy remained at about the same level 
while the clinician’s confidence increased dramatically and became 
disproportionately great.
In his review, Goldberg also documented a lack of reliability and 
consistency between judges and within judges when making several judgments of 
the same case. In the medical field, a surprising degree o f unreliability and 
inaccuracy has also been reported in physicians (Bakwin, 1945) and radiologists 
(Garland, 1960). The inaccuracy and reliability of judgmental performance are not 
confined to clinicians alone, similar findings have been reported among insurance 
underwriters, stockbrokers (Cowles 1944), and business managers in financial 
settings (Treynor and Mazuy, 1966).
2.2 The Limited Capacity Hvvothesis
It has been suggested that the inaccuracy and unreliability of judgmental 
performance is a result of man’s inherent physical difficulty in dealing with 
probabilistic information (Hogarth, 1975). Here, man is seen as a limited 
information processor with a tendency to ignore uncertainty. This view o f man has 
3 major consequences (cited from Hogarth, 1974):
1. Perception of information is not comprehensive but selective. Since man is 
only capable of apprehending a small part of his environment, his anticipation of 
what he will perceive determine to a large extent what he does perceive.
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2. As man does not have the capacity to make what one might call 
‘optimal’ calculations, man makes much use of heuristics and cognitive 
simplification mechanisms.
3. Since man cannot simultaneously integrate a great deal of 
information, man is forced to process information in sequential fashion.
In conclusion, Hogarth writes, “man is a selective, stepwise information 
processing system with limited capacity ... he is ill equipped fo r  assessing 
probabilistic information'' (Hogarth, 1975, my underlining).
2.3 Heuristic Biases in Hum an Judsm ent
While many psychologists will not necessarily share Hogarth’s pessimistic 
view of man, there is a large amount of evidence, which supports the view that 
man’s processing of probabilistic information is often biased. Recent research on 
the mechanisms by which people assess uncertainties and predict future events have 
found that man tends to use a limited set of heuristics (rules o f thumb) for making 
judgments. These heuristic principles, albeit adaptive mechanisms, can sometimes 
lead to systematic biases in judgment.
Much of the work in this area stems from Tversky and Kahneman (1974), 
who describe three major judgmental heuristics: namely, representative-ness, 
availability, and anchoring and adjustment.
R  eyres en tativen ess refers to the tendency of man to base his judgment on 
the extent to which the event to be judged is representative o f (or typical of) a
253
particular condition. To illustrate the phenomenon, Kahneman and Tversky (1973) 
asked the subjects to assess the likelihood of an individual is an engineer or a 
lawyer. All the subjects had available was a brief personality description of several 
individuals, allegedly sampled at random from a group of professionals - engineers 
and lawyers. They were also given the base rates for the engineers and lawyers. 
Kahneman and Tversky found that their subjects evaluated the degree to which the 
given description was representative o f the stereotypes of an engineer or a lawyer, 
on the basis of personality sketches, with little or no regard for the base rates of the 
two categories. In further support of the prevalence of representative-ness as a 
judgmental heuristic, Tversky and Kahneman demonstrated a belief in what they 
called the “law of small numbers” whereby even small samples are viewed as highly 
representative o f the population from which they are drawn. This belief led their 
subjects to underestimate the error and unreliability inherent in small samples of 
data.
Availability Man’s judgment can also be distorted by the ease with which 
the relevant instances of event can be retrieved, imagined or associated. The 
superstitious behaviour in Skinner’s pigeons (Skinner, 1948) is an illustrative 
example of how ‘erratic’ behaviours can be determined by the ease in which 
‘illusory correlates’ can be brought to mind. In another demonstration of this effect, 
Tversky and Kahneman (1973) gave their subjects a list of well known personalities 
of both sexes. The subjects were subsequently asked to judge whether the list 
contained more names of men than of women. Different lists were presented to 
different groups of subjects. It was found that in each of the lists, Tversky and
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Kahneman’s subjects erroneously judge the class (sex) that had the more famous 
personalities was the more numerous. Thus, the heuristic principle of availability, 
although a useful cue for the assessment of probabilistic information, is often 
affected by psychological factors such as primacy and recency effect, familiarity 
and emotional saliency which may lead to systemic biases.
Anchoring and Adjustm ent This refers to situations in which a starting 
point (anchor) is used as a first approximation to the judgment which is then 
adjusted to accommodate the implications of additional information. Tversky and 
Kahneman argued that different starting points tend to yield different adjusted 
estimates, which are biased towards the initial values. Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974) gave an example of quantity estimation in which subjects were asked to state 
the percentage of African countries in the United Nation. Each subject was given a 
different number (between 0 and 100) and was instructed to indicate first whether 
that number was higher or lower than the actual percentage by moving upward or 
downward from the given number. It was shown that these arbitrary numbers had a 
marked effect on estimates and the adjustments are typically insufficient.
2.4 Conservatism
Further evidence that man has difficulty in processing probabilistic 
information comes from studies on ‘conservatism’. The term conservatism refers to 
a phenomenon of judgment in which subjects, when revising probabilistic 
information, fail to extract from data as much information as the data contain
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(Edwards, 1968). Most of the early findings on ‘conservatism’ come from the 
‘poker chips and bookbags experiment’. In a typical experimental situation, 
subjects are presented with two bookbags filled with different composition of 
coloured poker chips, eg., 70% blue and 30% red on one and 30% blue and 70% red 
on the other. Typically, subjects in this experiment are given samples of poker 
chips from one of the two bags, which is chosen at random, the samples are shown 
to the subjects, one at a time with replacement. On the basis of this sampling 
evidence, the subjects are required to state their probability estimate that the bag 
samples contains the predominantly red or blue proportion of chips. Subjects’ 
responses are subsequently compared to the veridical probabilities given by the 
normative statistical procedure of Bayes’ Theorem. The general result has been that 
subjects required far more observations that Bayes’ Theorem to revise their 
estimates to the same degree. In other words, subjects act as if  the data are less 
diagnostic that they truly are. In some studies (Peterson et al 1965; Phillips and 
Edwards, 1966), subjects have been found to require from two to nine observations 
to revise their opinions as much as the optimal model of Bayes’ Theorem would 
prescribe for one observation. The optimality of Bayes’ Theorem in the revision of 
opinion will be returned at a later section.
As a result of such findings, several competing explanations have been 
advanced about which part of the judgmental process is suboptimal. There are three 
major explanations: misperception, misaggregation, and the artefact hypothesis 
(Edwards 1968).
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The misperception hypothesis argues that conservatism is caused by poor 
understanding of the experimental situation, and as a result of which, subjects 
misperceive the diagnostic impact of the sampling information. Indeed, some 
experiments have found that by making the experimental situation more realistic 
(e.g., DuCharme and Peterson, 1968), or by making it more familiar through 
appropriate training (Wheeler and Beach, 1968), the amount of conservatism is 
reduced.
Misperception error is also related to the rarity or an event, which, when 
occur, tends to be seen as uninformative. This was demonstrated by Vlek (1965) 
and Vlek and van der Heijden (1967) who showed subjects were more conservative 
when responding to less likely event.
Misaggregation An alternative explanation of conservatism was proposed 
by Edwards (1968) who argued that man’s main difficult in processing probabilistic 
information is not due to misperceiving the meaning of a single piece of data, but in 
integrating various pieces of information of produce a single response.
Support for the misaggregation hypothesis comes from DuCharme and 
Peterson (1968) who showed that subject performed well on single datum judgment 
or first trial of a four data sequential judgmental task, but was conservative on 
subsequential trials, i.e., when forced to integrate more information.
Finally, it has been suggested that conservatism may be an artefact due to the 
demand characteristics of the experiment (Peterson, see Edwards, 1968). For
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example, in real life, it has been shown that people are more accustomed to give 
judgment in odds rather than as point probability estimates (Phillips and Edwards, 
1960). Thus artefactual results may arise in conservatism experiments when 
subjects are required to give responses as probability estimates. When estimates 
were given in odds, the conservatism phenomenon was either reduced or eliminated 
(DuCharme, 1970).
In summary, there remains little unified agreement on what causes 
conservatism in judgmental tasks. Moreover, there is still considerable debate 
regarding the existence of conservatism. Also, the degree of conservatism observed 
in probability revision experiments has varied considerably and in some cases 
subjects were not conservative (e.g., Shum, 1966).
2.5 Realism of Probability Assessment
As noted earlier, clinical judgment is often probabilistic, therefore an ability 
to give accurate probability assessments is of importance. Winkler and Murphy 
(1968) identify two dimensions of goodness (expertise) in the judgmental process: 
‘substantive’ goodness, which refers to the amount of knowledge a decision maker 
has in the subject matter of concern, and ‘normative’ goodness, which refers to the 
decision maker’s ability to express his (or her) opinions in probabilistic form. 
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Phillips (1977) have added a further dimension of 
judgmental goodness, which they labelled “calibration” of probability estimates. A 
probability assessor is said to be perfectly calibrated, if  for all those events assessed 
as having xx probability of occurrence, xx% actually occur.
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The ability of man to assess realistic probabilities (i.e. calibration) has been 
examined in many different settings. In one example, Christensen-Szalanski and 
Bushyhead (in press) investigated the probability estimate given by 9 physicians to 
1531 patients. After studying the evidence, the physicians’ assessed probabilities 
were, generally, “overconfident”, i.e., the proportion correct was less than the 
assigned probability. Were the physicians acting cautiously because of the risk of a 
false negative i.e., assigning a non-pneumonia diagnosis when the patient did in fact 
have pneumonia? Christensen-Szalanski and Bushyhead tested for a motivation 
bias by asking the physicians to list their utilities (pay-offs) for the possible 
outcomes of the decision and found that the overall utilities for the two possible 
diagnoses balanced. They concluded the overconfidence bias was cognitive rather 
than motivational.
It has been shown that people in general, are poorly calibrated. Lichtenstein 
et al. (1977) documented the generality of this effect with psychologists, civil 
servants, insurance underwriters and university students. It is not clear why people 
are poorly calibrated, though Lichtenstein et al. have noted the effect may be related 
to task difficulty - overconfidence for difficult task and underconfident for easy 
task. Cultural and sub-cultural influences have also been suggested (Phillips and 
Wright, 1977; Wright et al., 1978) although much of these work needs to be 
substantiated.
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In summary, the ability to assign probabilistic assessment realistically is an 
important variable in judgmental process. As Adams and Adams (1961) note: "(zf 
reflects the ability o f  the decision maker) to discriminate realistically what he
knows and what he does not know ...”
3, S ta tistica l M ethods in C linical D ecision M aking
Clearly, the vast amount of literatures reporting on the pitfalls of human
judgmental performance have highlighted the need for the development of coherent 
and systematic methods for aiding human decision making. In the past two 
decades, a number of decision-theoretic techniques have been developed. Much of 
the works can be broadly categorised into two main approaches: the Regression 
approach and the Bayesian approach (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971). The 
mathematical techniques to be evaluated in the present study, are representative of 
the approaches.
3.1 Linear Additive M odel o f  the Judse
The first reported use of linear model proposed by Benjamin Franklin (in 
Bigelow, 1887; cited from Dawes, 1974), in a letter to his friend, Joseph Priestly, 
Franklin writes,
“ ... /  cannot, fo r  want o f  sufficient premises, advise you what to determine, 
but i f  you please, I  will tell you how ...m y  way is to divide ha lf a sheet o fpaper by a 
line into two columns; writing over the one Pro, and over the other Con. Then 
doing 3 or 4 days considerations, I  pu t down under the heads short hints o f  the
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/MOfzv&y, r/zar ar rzme occwr ro /Mg ybr or ogozM^ r r/ze mgojzzrg.
When I  have thus got them all together in one view, I  endeavour to estimate the 
respective weights ... (to) fin d  at length where the balance lies ... And, though the 
weight o f  reason cannot be taken with the precision o f  algebraic quantities, yet, 
when each is thus considered, separately and comparatively, the whole matter lies 
before me, I  think I  can judge better, and am less liable to make a rash step; and in 
fac t I  have found  great advantage fo r  this kind o f  equation, and in what may called 
moral or prudential algebra (p. 522) ”
By estimating the respective weights of pro and con arguments, and finding 
where the balance lies, Franklin was in effect using a Linear Additive Model, 
adding together the positive weights of the pro argument with the negative weights 
of the con argument, and then deciding pro or con, depending on whether the sum 
was positive or negative.
3.2 Capturins the Judue’s Policy
One of the main developments of Linear Additive Model is to focus on the 
decision maker’s judgmental policy, i.e., to describe (simulate) the judge’s 
idiosyncratic method of combining and weighting information by developing a 
linear regression equation representative of his combinatorial processes (Hoffman, 
1960). The basic approach of this method requires the decision-maker to make 
quantitative evaluations of a fairly large number of cases, each of which is defined 
by a number of quantified cue dimensions or characteristics. For example, a 
clinician could be asked to differentiate a group of patients into neurotics or
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psychotics on the basis o f 11 MMPI sub-test scores. His judgment, when quantified 
can then be used as the dependent variable in a standard linear regression analysis. 
The independent variables in this analysis are the values of the MMPI sub-tests. 
The result o f such an analysis can be represented by a linear regression equation:
Y = A + bjXj x b2x2  + bnx n (1)
where Y = predicated diagnostic judgment o f the clinician 
A = scaling constant
x l5 x2 xH are the quantitative values of the MMPI scores 
b1? b2, ... bu are the weights given to the corresponding MMPI sub­
test in order to maximise the multiple correlation between the predicted judgment 
and the actual judgment. These weights are assumed to reflect the relative 
importance of the MMPI sub-tests for the decision-maker. Such equation, with its 
respective set o f relative weights for the corresponding cues is known as the Linear 
Model of the Judge or his policy. Figure 1 outlines the basic paradigm for the 
model.
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FIGURE 1. Basic Paradigm for the Construction of a Linear Additive Model of a 
Judge
PATIENT INFORMATION 
Score (x) on each of the 11 MMPI 
subscales related to neuroticism 
and psychoticism
CRITERION(Y) TO BE PREDICTED 
Whether the patient was diagnosed 
neurotic or psychotic after extensive 
psychological and psychiatric evaluation
JUDGE
Weight (b) derived 
for each of the 11 
MMPI subscales
LINEAR ADDITIVE MODEL OF 
JUDGE
(Y A+b1x1+b2x2 -4b,,x,,)
3.3 The Robustness o f  Linear Additive M odel
Linear model has been found to be remarkably successful in many diverse 
settings such as psychiatric diagnosis (Meehl 1959), prediction of the malignancy of 
ulcers (Hoffman et al, 1968), job performance and the riskiness and attractiveness of 
gambles (Slovic, 1972). One of the purposes of using a linear model to represent 
judgmental process is to make the judge’s weighting policy explicit as it has been 
found useful for describing decision processes of judges (Slovic & Lichtenstein,
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1971). By modelling judgments of complex stimuli, it can be used to reveal 
differences between individuals in weighting policies (Hoffman et al, 1968; Gillis & 
Moran, in press).
It has been reported that by simulating a judge’s policy in a man-machine 
system the Linear Model outperforms man. Such a co-operative man-machine 
system is called ‘Bootstrapping’ by Dawes (Dawes and Corrigan, 1974; Dawes, 
1979). Why does ‘Bootstrapping’ work? Dawes argues that it is because the linear 
model catches the essence of a judge’s expertise and at the same time it eliminates 
man’s unreliability and inconsistency. As Goldberg writes:
“He is subject to al the human frailties which lower the reliability o f  
judgment below unity. And, i f  the ju d g e ’s reliability is less than unity, there must be 
error in his judgment - error which can serve no other purpose than to attenuate his 
accuracy. I f  we co u ld ... (eliminate) the random error in his judgment, we should 
thereby increase the validity o f  the resulting prediction (p.423)”.
3.4 The Problem  o f  Confïsuralitv
Although the linear model has shown to be doing an impressive job of 
predicting judgment, it has been suggested that the simplicity of the model 
contradicts the intuitive feelings of many clinicians about judgmental process. 
(Meehl, 1954). There is a popular and widely held belief that information is 
processed in a global and configurai manner, rather than linearly (Hoffman, 1968). 
However, while some studies have demonstrated a configurality effect in human 
judgment (e.g. Hammond et al., 1964), the values o f configurality are found to be
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disappointingly low (Hoffman et al., 1968; Rorer et al., 1967; Slovic, 1979). 
Moreover, it was shown to be unrelated to judgmental accuracy and amount of 
clinical training (Wiggins & Hoffman, 1968).
In general the linear model has been shown to be a useful device for 
predicting judgment on the basis of specific cues. Furthermore, it also possesses 
descriptive properties, which is capable of highlighting individual differences in the 
use and misuse of information as well as making explicit the causes of underlying 
disagreements among judges in both simple and complex tasks.
3.5 B ayes’ Theorem
While the linear additive model relies on the correlation statistic, the 
Bayesian approach is an elementary fact about probabilities. The theory, which 
stems from a theorem developed by an English clergyman Reverend Thomas Bayes, 
is associated with the view that a person’s belief should be quantified in terms of 
subjective probabilities, and that the optimal revision of such opinion should be 
accomplished via Bayes’ theorem.
In its algebraic form, Bayes’ Theorem can be expressed in the equation:
P (H/D) = P (D/H) x P (H) (2)
P(D )
where P (H/D) is the posterior probability of the hypothesis given data 
P (D/H) is the probability of the datum given the hypothesis 
P (H) is the prior probability of the hypothesis 
P (D) is the conditional probability of the datum D.
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To express itself in a convenient form, Bayes’ Theorem can be simplified 
into the odds-likelihood version:
Q“ = Q ‘ L (3)
Posterior odds = prior odds x likelihood ratio
Thus, Bayes’ Theorem can be seen as a formal mechanism which combines 
optimally a person’s prior degree of belief, reflecting his a priori knowledge, and 
the likelihood function, reflecting the sampling information (diagnosticity of data) 
to form a final opinion about the likelihood of a hypothesis. Using this likelihood 
and the relative likelihood of other hypothesis, decision can be made about the most 
likely hypothesis given the data.
3.6 Bayesian versus Intuitive Revision o f  Opinion
Why should Bayes’ theorem more optimal than the intuitive revision of 
opinion? The argument is that Bayes’ Theorem is based on the axiomatic principles 
derived from the laws of probabilities, (Savage, 1954; Edwards, Lindman & 
Savage, 1963; Phillips, 1973). The laws of probabilities prescribe certain logical 
relationships and consistencies that must exist when assessing an event or 
combination of events. For instance, one axiom is that ‘the probability of any one 
event occurring among N mutually exclusive events is equal to the sum of the 
probabilities of the individual events’. To give an example, the probability of a 
specified side of the six sides of a dice landing facing up is 1/6, therefore the 
probability of any one side of a dice landing facing up is 1, or certainty. If one
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accepts the axiomatic principles (i.e. inductive reasoning) of the probability laws, 
then Bayes’ Theorem is the optimal method for revision of opinion.
Further evidence supporting the optimality of Bayes’ Theorem in opinion 
revision comes from the empirical studies on conservatism. Subjects’ performance 
on revision of subjective opinion was compared with Bayes’ Theorem. As reviewed 
in section 2.4, while subjects were able to revise their posterior probabilities upon 
receipt of new information and in the same direction as Bayes’ Theorem, their 
revision is typically too small. They acted as if the information were less diagnostic 
than they truly are (Peterson, Schneider & Miller, 1965; Phillips & Edwards, 1966).
3.7 Quantifvins Opinion
One issue remains controversial - that of Bayes’ Theorem’s reliance on the 
input of subjectively quantified opinion. Can a decision-maker’s subjective feelings 
or degrees of belief be justifiably translated into probabilistic terms? The argument, 
which involves logical and philosophical ground, is complex, but the Bayesian view 
is affirmative. Bayes’ Theorem embodies the theory of personal probability. In this 
theory, “probability measures the confidence that a particular individual has in the 
truth of a particular proposition, which can be expressed in terms of betting odds or 
translated, if  so desired, from odds to probability” (Winkler, 1967). The probability 
so assessed conforms to the axioms of probability theory, so long as the decision 
maker assessed his degrees of belief quantitatively, and in a coherent manner (the 
postulates of coherence are such that it is impossible to lay a series of bet against 
the assessor in such a way that he will lose whatever the outcome).
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Thus the Bayesian Theory for the revision of subjective probability therefore 
assumes a careful and responsible assessment of a decision-maker’s opinion, 
drawing on his past experience and knowledge. The crucial question is: Do 
decision-makers in general wish to behave consistently and in accordance with the 
postulate of coherence? The Bayesian approach believes people generally do. De 
Finetti (1937/1964) for example, has shown that if  a decision maker can order an 
entire set of events in a coherent, transitive manner, then his opinion can be 
represented by an additive probability function, and is therefore rational and 
coherent in this narrow sense of the term. In a review, Beach (1975) has also shown 
that expert decision-makers can give accurate approximation of probability 
assessment in a variety of real life settings. In some cases, such as in weather 
forecasting (Root, 1962; Sanders, 1953) and in patient’s length of stay (Gustafson, 
1966), subjective probability estimates were more accurate than those derived from 
actuarial data.
3.8 Summary
To summarise, both the Linear Model and Bayes’ Theorem have shown to 
be useful frameworks for research, investigating the decision-maker’s cognitive 
processes. In many ways, both frameworks also serve as standards of ideal 
performance against which the performance of decision-maker can be compared. In 
this sense, they are optimal models, representing the way a perfectly informed, 
infinitely sensitive, and thoroughly rational judge would behave (Lichtenstein et al, 
1975; Barclay, 1971).
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4. C lin ical Versus S ta tistica l Controversy
4.1 A Survey of the Empirical Evidence
Clearly, statistical methods are of value to clinical assessment and practice. 
In the past twenty-five years, there has been a plethora of research investigating the 
relative merit of clinical and statistical method of prediction. The issue of whether 
‘head’ is better than ‘formula’ or vice versa was popularised by Paul Meehl (1954) 
who did a careful analysis of a number of studies involving comparison of the two 
methods. Meehl found that “m all but one o f  the 20 studies the prediction made 
actuarially were either approximately equal or superior to those made by the 
clinician”. Further evidence favouring the statistical method was also reported by 
Gough (1963) and Meehl (1965). In another view, Sawyer (1966) extended the 
scope of the problem by considering clinical and statistical measurement (i.e. 
qualitative and psychometric data) as well as the method of prediction. Sawyer 
surveyed 45 studies and abstracted 75 comparisons. After they were tallied as to 
whether the clinical or statistical method was better, or both were equal, Sawyer 
concluded: “ ...the analysis finds the mechanical mode o f  combination always equal 
or superior to the clinical mode; moreover, this is true whether data were collected 
clinically or mechanically ...” (page 193).
The weight of the evidence seems rather crushing to hopes for clinical 
method.
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4.2 Critique of the Surveys
However, while there is overwhelming evidence favouring the statistical 
method, it has been argued that the clinical approach has not been adequately 
represented (Holt, 1958, 1969, 1970; McReynolds 1968).
Indeed, there is much evidence favouring clinical methods other than those 
used in experiments evaluating clinical and statistical judgment (e.g. Lindzey, 1965; 
Korman, 1968). Other studies have also pointed to methodological flaws and errors 
in the research designs. Some of the shortcomings in research literatures comparing 
the relative efficacy of the two prediction methods have been summarised by Holt 
(1970):
1. Criterion contamination of uncross-validated formulae - In many of 
the studies surveyed, the prediction formulae was applied to the same sample from 
which it was originally derived rather than to a new (cross-validational) sample of 
subjects (e.g. Sawyer, 1966). It is well known that correlation tends to shrink in 
cross-validation.
2. Inadequate criterion measures - In a number of studies, the criteria 
being measured are often inadequately conceived, or defined. For example, in one 
study (Kelly & Fisks, 1951), the predicted criterion was trainee’s future 
performance as clinical psychologist. This was measured while the subjects were 
still in graduate school!
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3. Misleading classification of judges as 'clinicians’ - The participants 
in many studies were other professionals, e.g. military officers, students, sport 
writers rather than 'real’ clinicians.
4. Use of quantitative data only e.g. MMPI scores. A fair test o f clinical 
judgment should allow access to relevant qualitative data as well as quantitative test 
scores utilised by the mathematical techniques.
In conclusion, while the dispute between clinicians and statisticians rages 
on, many criticisms seem to be levelled at either 'naive’ clinical method or 'pure’ 
statistical approaches. With the best of both traditions, clinical judgment may be 
more sophisticated, as Holt concedes,
“It would be a perverse clinician indeed who claimed that a casual, 
informal, uncontrolled approach was necessary better than a disciplined, unbiased 
one
5. The P resen t Study
In the spirit of the recent research, the present study is designed to evaluate 
the efficacy of two statistical techniques in clinical setting. The techniques to be 
evaluated are: Linear Model technique and Bayes’ Theorem. Specifically, the 
efficacy of the techniques will be explored in the area of neuropsychological 
assessment on the presence of organic impairment. This has several advantages:
1. The predicted criterion is better defined and conceived compared to 
studies of personality assessment or psycho-diagnosis.
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2. As neuropsychological assessment is based on a multivariate 
approach, there is an opportunity to study the impact o f multiple diagnostic input on 
human judgment in a clinical setting.
In addition, the comparison o f Linear Model and Bayes’ Theorem may 
provide some theoretical interest: are clinicians conservative information 
processors, as implicated by Bayes’ Theorem, or are they inconsistent in the 
utilisation of information, as implied by the linear model?
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III. METHOD
1. M aterials
Sixteen patient histories were selected from cases referred to hospitals in the 
Mersey Region for neuropsychological consultation. The cases were selected 
according to the following criteria:
1) Age - male or female patients aged between 21 to 64 years. Children 
and the old age group were excluded to avoid the confounding effect o f age on brain 
function.
2) Diagnostic outcome - the outcome for each case was established by 
demonstrable evidence. By demonstrable evidence it was meant that physical 
evidence existed of the impairment. All the 'impaired’ cases were confirmed by at 
least one of the following evidence: angiography, E.E.G., brain scan, C.T. scan, air 
encephalography, skull x-ray and in some cases, direct surgical procedures. For the 
non-impaired cases, their diagnoses were confirmed by negative results in their 
neurological investigations. Their medical histories and records of follow-up were 
also scrutinized carefully to ensure that there was no medical or historical reason to 
suspect organic impairment of brain function, although, to quote from Teuber, 
(1975) “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence”. Details of each case’s 
diagnosis and neurological investigations are presented in Table 1, Appendix B.
3) Psychometric tests - each patient history contained the same 
psychometric tests so that information could be standardised. The psychometric 
tests presented in the case histories were :
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a) Wechsler Adult Intelligence Test (WAIS)
b) Benton Visual Retention Test (BVRT)
- form C, administration A.
c) Williams Delayed Recall Test - Form A (WDRT)
d) Walton Black Modified New Word Learning Test (MNWLT)
The psychometric tests mentioned above were selected on the basis that they
were frequently used for neuropsychological assessment.
2. Subjects
Subjects were clinical psychologists working in the Mersey Region. A total 
of 16 subjects participated in the experiment. The amount of clinical experience in 
our subjects ranged from trainee psychologists to psychologists in the principal 
grade. Out of 16 subjects, 10 were probationers and 6 were qualified psychologists.
3. Judsmental Tasks
The judgmental tasks used in this study were to determine whether each 
patient case presented was of ‘organically impaired’ or ‘not impaired’. The 
experiment was divided into two parts, the purpose of which was to yield 3 sets of 
predictions for each case history:
1 ) prediction by clinical method
2) prediction by Bayesian method
3) prediction by linear regression analysis
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Part /.
Part 1 of the experiment was designed to yield a Bayesian prediction for 
each case history.
Information extracted from each case history was standardised. On the basis 
of the 16 case histories, a booklet was constructed which contained 5 categories of 
information, each of them was presented separately in a different section of the 
booklet. Section A of the booklet contained the results of the Benton Visual 
Retention Test, Section B contained the results of Williams Delayed Recall Test, 
while Sections C and D contained respectively the results o f Modified New Word 
Learning Test and Wechsler Adult Intelligence Test. Section E contained brief 
outlines of the presenting symptoms and complaints for each individual case.
Procedure: Section A to D - subjects’ task was to study each test result 
carefully, they were then required to assign, for each test result, two probability 
estimates:
a) The likelihood of the given result occurring in brain damaged cases.
b) The likelihood of the same result occurring in non-brain damaged cases.
The probability estimates must be given in a range between 0 and 100 with 0 
indicating ‘not a chance’ and 100 meaning ‘absolute certainty’. To assist subjects 
in their probability assessment, norm tables for the psychometric tests were 
provided. Subjects were also allowed to use any other tables or manuals. There
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was no time limit for the task. Subjects were allowed to study the booklet and to 
complete their tasks at leisure.
In Section E of the experiment, subjects were presented 16 brief outlines of a 
patient’s presenting symptoms and complaints. Subjects were also informed of the 
proportion of brain-damaged cases and non-brain damaged cases (the base rate of 
the test sample). The subjects’ task was to determine, on the basis of the 
information given for each of the 16 cases, whether the individual in question was 
‘brain damaged’ or ‘not brain damaged’. In addition, subjects were also required to 
indicate the degree of confidence for each judgment, ranging from 50 (totally 
unsure) to 100 (complete certainty). Subjects were required to give their confidence 
rating between 50 and 100 since the decisions involved binary choices, thus even by 
randomly guessing, they still have 50% chance of being correct. The confidence 
rating so obtained represented subjects’ subjective probability estimate of their 
judgment being ‘true’.
Bayesian Prediction:
The inputs of Bayesian prediction were provided by the subjects’ responses 
in part 1 of the experiment. Responses to a case outline in Section E represented the 
subjects’ prior probability of the case being ‘brain damaged’ or ‘not brain damaged’ 
before any test result was known. Responses to each test result in Sections A to D 
represented the likelihood estimates for the test result.
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Using Bayesian Theorem, the posterior probability of a case being ‘brain
damaged’ or ‘not brain damaged’ can be calculated:
p(BD/T) = p(BD) x p(T/BD) 
p(BD) x p(T/BD) + p(NBD) x p(T/NBD)
where
p(BD) - prior probability of brain damage
p(NBD) - prior probability of not brain damage
p(T/BD) - likelihood estimate of the test result occurring in brain damaged cases
p(T/NBD) -likelihood estimate of the test result occurring in non brain damaged
cases.
Since there were 4 sets of test results (Benton VRT, Williams DRT, 
MNWLT, WAIS), the computation was applied sequentially i.e., after the prior 
probability was combined with the likelihood estimate of the first test result, the 
posterior probability then served as the prior probability for the next stage of 
analysis to combine with the likelihood estimate of the next test result and so on.
Part II
Part II of the experiment was designed to obtain predictions by the clinical 
method and linear modelling.
The experiment was given approximately two weeks after the subjects had 
completed Part 1. In this part of the experiment, subjects were presented with 
another booklet which contained 16 patient profiles, based on the same case 
histories used in part 1. Each case profile contained a brief outline of presenting
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symptoms and complaints, and test results of WAIS, BVRT, WDRT, MNWLT. 
Similar to Part IE, the proportion of brain damaged and non-brain damaged cases 
was also given.
Procedure: The procedure for the experiment was the same as Part IE, i.e., 
after studying each case profile, the subjects’ task was to determine, for each of the 
16 case profiles, whether the individual in question was brain damaged or non-brain 
damaged. Subjects were also required to give the degree of confidence for each 
judgment, ranging from 50 to 100. Again, as in part IE, norm tables for the tests 
were provided to assist subject in his assessment. There was no time limit for the 
task.
Clinical Judgm ent
Responses to the 16 case profiles in part II of the experiment represented 
subjects’ clinical judgment derived from a global and intuitive method.
Linear Resression Mo dell inn
On the basis of subjects’ responses to the 16 case profiles, a linear model of 
each subject can be constructed using the subject’s own judgmental responses as the 
dependent variable (criterion), and the score of the four psychometric tests as the 
independent variables (predictors); the independent variables for the regression 
analysis were: Verbal/Performance discrepancy score (WAIS), 'number correct’ 
score (BVRT), raw score of WDRT, and the total score of MNWLT. Using the 
technique of stepwise regression procedures*, least square regression weights for
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the independent variables were computed. Briefly, the stepwise regression 
technique selects variable for a regression equation one at a time. Selecting first the 
most valid predictor variable, it then selects that variable which when combined 
with the first variable is the most useful - i.e. the one which adds the most to the 
multiple correlation and which thus yields the best 2 predictor equation. The 
technique then selects by the same criterion the variable, which combines with the 
first two variables to produce the best three-predictor-equation. Subsequent 
variables are selected in a similar manner.
The regression weights (equation) obtained from the analysis was then used 
to predict the individual’s probability of brain damage or not brain damage for each 
case profile.
To express the predicted outputs in terms of probability estimates (i.e. so 
that the predicted output will always fall within the range of 0 and 100 whatever the 
values of the predictor variables), the value of the dependent variable in a linear 
equation was transformed into logistic value, so that
Y (dependent variable) = In (Y)
1 - Y
where In is the natural logarithm (base e)
Y is the odds related to the dependent variable,
for example, if the judgment of brain damaged (i.e. Y) is .75, the odds are 
.151.25, or 3:1, or simply 3. As a result of the logit transformation, the resulting 
linear regression equation is:
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In (Y) = bjXj + b2x2 + b3x 3 + b ^
1 - Y
where x, x4 are the values of the predictors 
b ,  b4 are the values of the beta weight
* for further details o f stepwise regression procedure, see Draper & Smith (1966) “ 
Applied Regression Analysis ” or the SPSS manual, version 6. for details o f logit 
transformation, see Cohen J. and Cohen P. (1975) ‘Applied Multiple 
Regression/Correlation Analysis for Behavioural Sciences
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IV . R E S U L T S
For the purpose of the present study, the data are organised around the 
following issues:
1) Comparing the hit rate derived from clinical judgment with those 
estimated by Bayesian method and linear regression analysis.
2) Comparison of validity coefficient in the prediction of ‘brain 
damage’ or ‘not brain damage’.
3) Validity and consistency of utilization of information by clinicians.
4) Clinicians’ calibration of probability assessment.
1. Hit Rate Comvarison
The first analysis deals with the hit rate obtained by the clinicians in 
the prediction of brain damage/non-brain damage, and those yielded by the 
Bayesian method and Linear Modelling. Since the outcome for each case 
was known to the experimenter, the hit rate of a clinician’s judgment was 
calculated simply by tallying the number of ‘hits’ and ‘misses’ in his (or her) 
responses to the 16 case profiles. As for the statistical methods, the choice 
criterion (Brain damage or non-brain damage) was determined by the 
principle of dominance i.e. if  ‘brain damage’ was estimated to be more 
probable than ‘not brain damage’, then the choice criterion should be 'brain 
damage’. On the basis of this principle, the proportion of hits’ and 'misses’ 
was computed.
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Table 1 gives the hit rate obtained by each clinician and those 
obtained by Bayesian method and Linear Modelling. The mean hit rate and 
standard deviation for each judgmental method are presented at the lower 
half o f the table. In addition, the hit rate for a ‘composite’ judge is also 
presented; a composite judge was obtained by averaging the judgment of all 
16 subjects to each case. Similarly, a composite Bayesian model and linear 
model o f this ‘hybrid’ judge were also obtained. The composite linear 
model was obtained by linear regression analysis of the composite judge, 
while the composite Bayesian model was obtained by averaging the prior 
probabilities and likelihood estimates o f all 16 clinicians to each case.
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TABLE 1 - Hit Rate comparison (in percentage correct)
Method of Prediction
Judge Clinical Bayesian Linear
1 50.0% 81.25 62.5
2 62.5% 62.5 68.75
3 68.75% 50.0 81.25
4 75.0% 87.5 93.75
5 50.0% 62.5 68.75
6 50.0% 81.25 68.75
7 75.0% 75.0 81.25
8 81.25% 81.25 93.75
9 87.5% 75.0 87.5
10 87.5% 75.0 87.5
11 81.25% 75.0 93.75
12 75.0% 75.0 75.0
13 87.5% 81.25 81.25
14 75.0% 81.25 87.5
15 50.0% 81.25 50.0
16 62.5% 62.5 62.5
Mean 69.92 74.2 77.7
(Typical)
S.D.* 14.11 9.91 13.1
Composite 75 81.25 87.5
* S.D. - Standard Deviation.
283
Overall, the result shows that linear modelling yieldded the best 
average hit rate (77.7%), the Bayesian method also obtained a better hit rate 
than that obtained by clinical method (69.9%).
A comparison of the performance of individual judges with their 
corresponding linear models also shows a similar pattern. In 15 cases out of 
a total of 16, Linear Modelling was either equal to or better than the judges’ 
own performance. The performance of the Bayesian method shows a more 
varied pattern. When the performance of the Bayesian method was 
compared with that of the clinical method, only 6 cases of Bayesian analysis 
were better than the clinicians, 4 were equal, and in 5 cases, Bayesian 
method were less accurate than the clinicians.
A correlated-T test was also carried out to test the significance of the 
mean difference between the hit rate of clinical method, Bayesian method 
and linear modelling. The performance of the linear models were shown to 
be significantly better than that of clinical method (t =3.87, df = 15,P< .005). 
The mean difference between Bayesian method and clinical method, and 
between linear modelling and Bayesian method, were not significant. The 
results of the correlated - T test are displayed in Table 2.
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Table 2 - Correlated T Test comparing the Mean Hit Rate o f Clinical 
Prediction, Bayesian Model and Linear Model.
t df P
Linear > Clinical 3.87 15 <.005
Bayesian > Clinical 1.09 15 n.s.
Linear > Bayesian 0.95 15 n.s
* n.s. = not significant p > .05
One interesting result was the performance of the ‘composite’ judge, 
which has shown to perform as well as or better than a typical judge 
(average across subjects and cases). Modelling of the composite judge also 
gave a more accurate performance.
2. Validity Coefficient Comvarisons
Accuracy of judgmental performance can also be evaluated in terms 
of validity coefficient, which is the biserial correlation between the predicted 
judgment and the actual (dichotomas) criterion.
Table 3 gives the validity coefficient for the judgment o f all 16 
clinicians and those achieved by the Bayesian method and linear modelling.
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TABLE 3 - Validity Coefficient of Clinical Judges, Bayesian 
Models and Linear Models.
Method of Prediction
Judge Clinical Bayesian Linear
1 .19 .71 .50
2 .45 .53 .66
3 .59 .20 .68
4 .57 .74 .73
5 - .07 .26 .14
6 .06 .67 .35
7 .59 .63 .69
8 .78 .67 .70
9 .70 .58 .63
10 .67 .55 .73
11 .65 .53 .76
12 .46 .59 .57
13 .68 .73 .64
14 .54 .70 .63
15 - .09 .65 .50
16 .52 .57 .47
Average
(Typical)
0.50 .58 .60
Composite 0.61 .68 .70
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The mean coefficient for each of the three judgmental methods was 
also computed. (To compute a mean coefficient, the r values were 
transformed into Fisher-z-r scores, and then back-transformed into r- 
coefficient after their mean was calculated). In addition, as in hit rate 
analysis, the validity coefficient of a ‘composite’ judge and the models of 
this judgmental composite was created. The results are shown at the lower 
half of Table 3.
The overall results show that, once again, linear modelling yielded a 
better validity coefficient than Bayesian method and clinical method. 
Comparison of the mean validity coefficient obtained by linear modelling 
with that obtained by clinical method shows a statistical significance (t = 
3.15, df = 15, p < .01). Comparison of the difference between Bayesian and 
clinical method, and between linear model and Bayesian method, did not 
show any statistical significance. The results of the correlated T test are 
presented in Table 4.
t df P
p (linear model > clinician) 3.15 15 <.01
p (bayesian > clinician) 1.59 15 ns
p (linear > bayesian) 0.15 15 ns
Table 4: Correlated T test comparing the mean validity coefficient between 
Clinical, Bayesian and Linear method of judgment.
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Finally, the composite judge (the average judgment o f all 16 judges 
to each case profile) has again shown to be more valid than the typical judge 
which is the average across the 16 subjects and 16 cases. Modelling of the 
composite judge also yields a higher validity coefficient.
3. Experience versus Inexperience
In order to investigate the effect of clinical experience on the 
performance of the clinicians in the present study, a comparison of the 
performance between the trainee psychologists and qualified psychologists 
was made. The results are presented in Table 5.
Qualified Psychologists 
(n = 6)
Trainee Psychologists 
(n = 10)
Mean hit rate 69.8% 70%
Mean validity 
coefficient
.56 .45
Table 5 - Comparisons of hit rate and validity coefficient - Trainee versus 
qualified psychologist.
In terms of hit rate comparison, the result shows no difference 
between the two groups. However, when the comparison was made on 
validity coefficient, the qualified psychologists yielded a higher validity 
coefficient than did the trainee psychologists. Unfortunately, the sample 
size of the two groups is far too small to permit any definite inference to be 
drawn.
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4. Validity and Consistency of Cue-Utilization
The third analysis concerns the way our clinicians weight information 
(predictor variables) in their judgmental process. A clinician’s weighting 
policy can be represented by the least square regression weights of the 
predictor variables, which were computed in a regression analysis using 
clinician’s judgmental response as the dependent variable and the predictors 
(cues) as the independent variables.
Table 6 presents the estimates o f regression weight for each judge, 
together with the values of R2, which is the squared multiple correlation 
between the predictor variables and the clinician’s judgmental decisions 
(dependent variable). R2 is a measure, which indicates the extent to which 
the variance in a clinician’s decision is explained by the values of the 
predictor variables. It is therefore an index of consistency with which the 
clinician weights information (predictors). It is not however, an unbiased 
estimate of the correlation coefficient. The bias in R2 resulted because the 
process of determining regression weights, which minimise the average 
squared error, takes advantage, as it were, of the idiosyncracies o f the sample 
of observations. The extent of the bias depends on a number of factors such 
as the sample size and the number of predictor variables. In view of the fact 
that our estimate of R2 might be biased, the estimated values were 
‘corrected’ using the following equation:
R’2 = 1 -H  - R2) (N - 1)
(N- n)
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where R’2 = corrected R2
R2 = squared multiple correlation originally estimated 
N = number of observations 
n = number o f predictor variables
Table 6 - Summary o f Clinicians’ Regression Coefficient and R2
Index of
Predictor Variable Consistency
Subiect WAIS BVRT WDRT MNWLT E! RÜ
1 .035 .288 .044 -.001 0.41 0.26
2 .008 .248 .101 -.009 0.60 0.50
3 -.003 .106 .036 .041 0.69 0.61
4 .006 .482 .045 .067 .079 .074
5 -.001 .196 .051 -.066 0.36 0.20
6 .031 .115 .042 -.022 0.67 0.59
7 .009 .225 .034 .008 0.77 0.71
8 .003 .222 .034 .052 0.78 0.72
9 -.026 .059 .054 .140 0.78 0.75
10 .000 .440 .035 .022 0.88 0.85
11 -.008 .133 .017 .022 0.71 0.64
12 .027 .567 .069 -0.21 0.71 0.64
13 .013 .118 .040 .045 0.81 0.76
14 .014 .059 .069 .012 0.90 0.87
15 .007 .205 .002 .004 0.10 0.13
16 .030 .232 .057 -.026 0.69 0.61
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The R’2 reported in Table 6 ranges from 0.13 to 0.87, thus indicating 
a varying degree of consistency among the clinicians in cue-utilization. 
Subjects 1, 5 and 15 obtained the lowest R’2 (mean value = 0.2), while 
subjects 4, 10, 13 and 14 and the highest R’2 (mean value = 0.8). As may be 
expected, the least consistent clinicians were also shown to be least accurate 
in judgmental performance (mean hit rate = 50%; mean validity coefficient = 
.01), while those with highest consistency score (R’2) were more accurate in 
their judgmental performance (mean hit rate = 81.25%; mean validity 
coefficient = .62).
In addition to R’2, the regression weights obtained by individual 
clinicians were also examined. As shown in Table 6, there appears to be 
differences between individual clinicians in their weighting policies, as 
reflected by the values of their regression weights. To measure the degree of 
agreement (concordance) between the clinicians in their weighting policy, 
the regression weights for the predictor variables for each clinician was 
ranked according to their values. Thus, for 16 clinicians, this resulted in 16 
sets of ranks. The degree of agreement among the clinicians in their 
weighting policies was then calculated by means of Kendall’s coefficient of 
concordance procedure. The result shows that there is little agreement 
among the clinicians in their judgmental policy (w = 0.13; for perfect 
agreement w = 1).
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One question of interest is whether the more accurate clinicians used 
judgmental policy significantly different from the inaccurate clinicians. 
Figure 2 provides such a comparison by presenting the graph of regression 
coefficients for an accurate clinician and an inaccurate clinician.
most accurate 
judge R2 =.72 
(Hit rate =81.25)  
(Validity Coeff. = 0.78)
+.300—
O least accurate 
judge R2 =0.13  
(Hit rate = 50)
(Validity Coeff = - .99)+.200
+ . 100—
-.100
WAIS BVRT MNWLTWDRT
Predictor Variable
Figure 2 : Comparison of judgmental policy most accurage just versus least 
accurate judge. ( S8 vs S15 )
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As shown in Figure 2, the 'weighting policy’ of the inaccurate judge 
did not appear to depart significantly from the accurate judge. In this 
instance, it would appear that both judges follow a similar policy, the only 
difference between them, apart from judgmental accuracy, was that the 
accurate judge was more consistent in his weighting policy (R’2 = .72) while 
the less accurate judge was inconsistent (R’2 = .13).
However, it has to be added that some equally accurate and consistent 
judges used judgmental policy significantly different from each other, as 
illustrated in Figure 3.
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S9 (Predictive 
(Validity = 0.7) 
R2 = 0.72
.600 —
S]0 (Predictive
(Validity = .67) 
R" = 0.85
.500 —
.400—
.300—
+  .200—
+  . 100—
. 000 —
WAIS BVRT WDRT MNWLT
Predictor Variable
Figure 3: A comparison of 2 judges (S9 & S10) who differed markedly in 
their judgmental performance.
Finally, the weighting policy of an arbitrarily selected experienced 
clinician (S2) and an arbitrarily selected inexperienced clinician (S I6) was 
compared to investigate whether the amount of clinical experience would 
necessarily result in different policy. The comparison is illustrated in Figure 
4, which needs no further comment.
R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
 
E
st
im
at
e
2 9 4
® ®  Experienced Clinician 
(R'" = 0.50)
Q O Inexperienced Clinician
(R'" = 0.61)
+ .200__
+ .100
.000
-  .100
WAIS BVRT WDRT MNWLT
Predictor Variables
Figure 4: Comparison of judgmental policy Experienced Clinician (S2) 
versus Inexperienced Clinician (S I6)
In summary, while clinicians were shown to be using different 
policies, it does not appear that the differences in judgmental policies are 
necessarily related to accuracy of judgment.
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5. Calibration o f  Subjective Probability Assessment
The final analysis deals with the issue of subjective probability 
assessment, which is used as a method of quantifying a clinician’s opinion in 
Bayesian analysis. One important question concerning the use of 
subjectively encoded probability is whether it represents closely the judge’s 
internal degree of belief. One method currently in the literature for 
attempting to establish the validity of subjectively encoded probability is 
'Calibration’ (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff & Phillips, 1977). To assess
calibration, one determines whether for all events assigned probability P, the 
proportion that occurs, or is true, is in fact P. Thus, of those answers to 
which a perfectly calibrated judge assigns a probability o f .5, 50% will be 
correct, for all proposition to which .6 is assigned, 60% will be correct.
The extent to which a judge (or judges) calibrates with his (her) 
subjective probability assessment can be represented in a calibration curve. 
A calibration curve can be constructed by pooling all the clinicians’ 
probability responses into the ranges: .50 to .59, .60 to .69, .70 to .79, .80 to 
.89, .90 to .99 and 100. The mean response for each range can then be 
plotted against the percentage correct (Further details see Lichtenstein, 
Fischhoff & Phillips, 1977).
Figure 5 gives the calibration curves for the clinicians when judging 
the probability of 'brain damage’ or not brain damage’. Two calibration 
curves are constructed: the first curve (broken lined) represents the response
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of all the clinicians when asked to judge the probability of brain damage/not 
brain damage on the basis of only brief outlines of patients’ presenting 
symptoms and complaints i.e. when they were required to make probabilistic 
judgment with very little clinical information. The second curve represents 
the clinicians’ probability judgments on the basis of full patient profiles (i.e. 
part 2 of the experiment when clinicians receive more information).
100—
q  Probability assessment 
when subjects had little 
clinical information
Probability assessment 
when subjects had mon 
information /
(full case p ro file^ ^
90—
80—
70—
60—
5 0 - -
.6.5 .7 8 9 1.0
Assessed Probability
Figure 5 : Calibration Curves.
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The diagonal line represents a prefect calibration curve. A curve 
lying below the perfect curve indicates over confident estimate e.g., when 
the clinicians said they are 60% (= .6) sure, less than 60% of their answers 
were in fact correct. Conversely, a line lying above the diagonal line 
indicates under-confident effect, e.g., when clinicians say .7, more than 70% 
of the answers were correct.
The first curve (broken-lined) which represents clinicians’ probability 
responses when receiving little information, indicates that in general, the 
clinicians were over confident. However, they became better calibrated as 
they received more knowledge (clinical information) about their judgmental 
tasks, as shown by curve 2 (straight lined).
298
V. DISCUSSION
1. Sum m ary o f  the R esults
The aim of this project was to evaluate the efficacy of two statistical 
decision theoretic techniques, namely, linear additive model and Bayes’ 
Theorem. The principal findings are summarised as follows :
1) In terms of hit rate and validity coefficient, linear modelling 
was shown to be more accurate than the clinicians whom they modelled.
2) Bayes’ Theorem has also shown to improve on the accuracy 
of clinical prediction, but the improvement of accuracy made by Bayesian 
method was not statistically significant.
3) Judgmental composite, which was formed by pooling the 
judgment of all the clinicians to each case, was found to be more accurate 
than the typical clinician. Modelling of the composite judge also produced 
incremental validity.
4) Analysis of clinicians’ judgmental policies shows that more 
accurate clinicians tended to follow their judgmental policy more 
consistently than were the less accurate clinicians. There is no overall 
‘agreed’ pattern of judgmental policy. Clinicians in general tended to weigh 
information in their own idiosyncratic manner.
5) Probability assessment under condition of uncertainty may 
result in over-estimate bias, which can be reduced by increase in knowledge.
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2. L inear M odel versus C linical Judgm ent
The present findings suggest that, at least in an experimental setting, 
unaided clinical judgment can be improved upon by linear regression 
analysis of the clinician’s own judgment without recourse to any criteria 
data. Is the result surprising? Whatever the reaction the result has been 
anticipated. About two decades ago, Yntema & Torgerson (1961) had 
suggested the ‘intriguing possibility’ that decision based on multivariate 
input “might be better done by a regression equation based on a decision 
m aker’s behaviour than those the decision maker can make fo r  him self (or 
herself i f  he dealt each situation as it arose”. Subsequent research has 
demonstrated this effect (Goldbert, 1970; Dawes & Corrigan, 1974, Dawes, 
1976,1979).
The resolution of this paradox was quite simple, as Yntema & 
Torgerson argued, “... there was apparently random error in subjects’ 
responses, it was as i f  they made small unpredictable mistakes in trying to 
set the marker exactly where they want it. The regression analysis involved 
taking the mean o f  all the subjects ’ responses, so the random error tended to 
be averaged o u t ...”
(p34, my underlining).”
In a business context, Bowman (1963) also wrote, “Man seems to 
respond to selective cues in his environment - particular things seem to 
catch his attention at times ... (these random and particularistic components
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can be eliminated) through the use o f  incorporating regression coefficients 
derived from  management’s own recurrent behaviour (p.316)”.
Thus, Linear Additive Model works because it separates a clinician’s 
judgmental inconsistency from his hopefully somewhat valid judgmental 
strategies. The present findings seem to have corroborated this statement.
Although linear additive model has been demonstrated to be a useful 
technique in decision making, it has a number o f short-comings which are 
summarised here:
1) Linear model is difficult to implement when there is an 
inadequate sample size. In multiple regression, b weights are notoriously 
unstable; the ratio of observations to predictors should be as high as 15 to 1 
or 20 to 1 before a stable estimate can be obtained. As mentioned in an 
earlier section, an inadequate sample size may result in a biased estimate of 
multiple correlation coefficient.
2) Another situation in which linear model cannot be used is that 
in which there are no measurable criterion variables. For example, when 
deciding on the success of therapy, one may wish to predict some long-term 
psychological variables such as ‘self-actualization’ or ‘insight’, which may 
be difficult to define and measure. Thus, the application of linear regression 
model may be quite limited.
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3. B ayes' Theorem  and the problem s o f  its application
In contrast with the performance of linear additive model, the present 
finding has failed to demonstrate the theoretical advantage of Bayes’ 
Theorem claimed. There are some difficulties in its application, which 
might be associated with its ‘less convincing’ performance.
One main difficulty in the use of Bayes’ Theorem concerns the 
assumption of conditional independence o f data (clinical evidence). In 
Bayes’ Theorem, the revision of prior probability depends on the impact of 
each piece of diagnostic information. When the assumption of conditional 
independence is not met, i.e. when the diagnostic information are correlated 
with each other, the impact of each piece of information upon the revision of 
prior opinion might be distorted.
It was discovered that the diagnostic information used in the present 
study (the scores of WAIS, BVRT, WDRT, MNWLT) were correlated and 
therefore might have affected the result of Bayesian analysis. The multiple 
correlation table for the predictor variables are presented in Appendix C.
Although the distorting effect of the conditional non-independent data 
can be ‘corrected’ by quasi-statistical procedure (see Slovic & Lichtenstein, 
1971), their implementation becomes extremely difficult and complex when 
more than two data are correlated.
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The second issue concerns the use of subjective probability in 
Bayesian analysis, the assumption of which is that people in general wish to 
behave rationally and consistently. The question regarding this issue is 
whether probability elicited subjectively represents the ‘true’ opinion of the 
person from whom it was elicited. Our finding has shown that when given 
adequate information and knowledge, the clinicians were indeed well 
calibrated with their probability judgment. However, under conditions of 
uncertainty, the clinicians, like many subjects reported in calibration studies, 
were subjected to over-estimate bias.
Although the sample size (16 subjects x 16 observations) is too small to 
validate the present finding as well as to carry out calibration analysis on 
individual clinicians, over-confident bias has been reported cross-culturally 
(Phillips & Wright, 1976, Wright et al 1978) and between different sub­
cultural groups (Phillips & Wright, 1977; Lichtenstein et al, 1977). Clinical 
studies on physicians (Christensen-Szalanski 1980) and radiologists 
(Lustead, 1977) have also demonstrated a similar result. All these findings 
therefore raise the question of how much faith one should give to 
subjectively elicited probabilities and to accept their face values without 
considering them seriously.
4. On com posite ju dgm en t
One interesting finding in the present study was the superiority of 
composite judge, which was shown to be more accurate than a typical judge.
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The superiority of composite judgment over the average of individual 
judgment has already received considerable support. Winkler (1967), for 
example, has carried out an analysis of the judgment o f experts estimating 
the points achieved by football teams over a season of weekly encounters. 
In this study, Winkler found that a composite of the expert’s judgment “in 
all cases, ... performed better than the average o f  the individual subject’s 
scores”.
The finding suggests that the composite judgment may be a useful 
technique in improving accuracy of judgment and costly procedure, since all 
the cases must be judged by each clinician in turn. On the other hand, in 
situations where time and cost is of no concern, or where accuracy 
outweighs cost, then a composite judgment might be useful.
5. Confounding Variables
Although the statistical procedures introduced in the present study 
have shown to be useful, the present study suffers from a number of 
weaknesses, which might have confounded the findings:
1) The sample size (16 subjects x 16 cases) is too small to permit 
confidence in the findings. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, in linear 
regression analysis, an adequate ratio of observations to predictors is 
important to provide a stable and unbiased estimate of multiple correlation 
coefficient. Clearly, in the present study, the ratio of 16 case profiles
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(observations) to 4 predictor variables (i.e. WAIS, BVRT, WDRT, & 
MNWLT) is potentially inadequate. Nevertheless, stability across subjects’ 
regression weights suggests that the sample size is large enough for 
reasonable estimate (e.g. see Figure 4).
2) Meaningfulness of judgmental task - the task of making a 
probability ‘forecast’ was found to be a rather exacting and unusual task for 
our subjects many of whom were unfamiliar with and unsophisticated in 
probability assessment. The subjects’ difficulties in probability assessment 
might have given rise to inconsistent responses.
3) In the experiment, subjects were given information regarding 
the proportion of brain-damaged and non brain-damaged cases in a 
judgmental task in which they were required to make the correct ‘diagnosis’. 
Initially, this information was introduced in the hope that subjects would use 
it as sample base rate. However, in retrospect, this was probably an unwise 
procedure, which might have prejudiced the subjects’ responses. Instead of 
judging each case profile on the basis of its information or evidence, the 
subjects’ judgment might be affected by trying to work out the ‘correct’ 
number of brain-damaged cases and non brain-damaged cases.
6. Conclusion
In the light of all the difficulties and limitations, no firm conclusion 
will be drawn from the present study. However, notwithstanding all the 
aforementioned shortcomings, the findings seem to bear out the arguments
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in literature regarding the usefulness of linear regression procedure. Linear 
additive model is clearly of value to clinical decision-making and its 
research, although further research will be needed to investigate how it can 
be applied realistically in the clinical setting.
However, even in their non mathematical form, Linear model and 
other statistical procedure can still be useful frameworks for clinical decision 
making, for they impose logical reasoning that need to be used in arriving at 
a decision. Moreover, the approach also encourages clinicians to explicate 
their method of procedure, to spell out their rules o f thumb to clinical 
problems that confront them.
Mathematical techniques are therefore potentially useful, as Dawes 
(1971) wrote,
“A mathematical model, by its very nature, is an abstraction o f  the 
process it models; hence, i f  the decision-maker’s behaviour involves 
following valid principles but following them poorly, these valid principles 
will be abstracted by the model - as long as the deviations from  these 
principles are not systematically related to the variables the decision maker 
is considering (p. 182)
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APPENDIX B
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P a tien t
Case Age Sex Diagnosis In v estig a tio n s
14 49 M Functional i l ln e s s E.E.G.
Skull X-Ray ) A ll 
Carotid Angiogram) Negative 
Air Encephalogram)
15 57 F Depression E.E.G. negative  
Follow-up -  O.E.
16 29 M Anxiety Neurosis E.E.G -  negative  
Follow-up -  O.K.
APPENDIX C TABLE OF MULTIPLE CORRELATION 
BETWEEN THE PREDICTOR VARIABLES
WAIS BVRT WDRT MNWLT
WAIS 1
BVRT . 0
WDRT .20 .26
MNWLT .34 .10 .51 1
.WAIS Wechsl'er Adult In te llig e n c e  Scale
BVRT . Benton V isual Rentention Test
WDRT W illiam s Delay R ecall Test
MNWLT M odified New Word Learning Test
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Appendix G: Copy of Part I of the Experiment
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this experiment. This booklet contains 
part 1 of the experiment, it should take you about an hour to work through. Part 2 of 
the experiment will be given at a later date.
The purpose of this experiment is to evaluate the usefulness o f statistical 
decision-theoretic techniques in clinical decision making. I am interested in the 
judgement of clinical psychologists on different test profiles and clinical histories. 
Further instructions will be given with each section of the experiment.
I would like to emphasize that this experiment is not a test o f your clinical 
competence. My main interest is in how well the decision-theoretic techniques 
compare with human judgement.
Kee-on NG
SECTION A
The following are Results from the Benton Visual Retention Test.
Instruction:
For each set of results, you are required to give 2 responses:
1. What is the chance of a BRAIN DAMAGED patient obtaining such a score?
2. What is the chance of a NON-BRAIN DAMAGED patient obtaining the score? 
Give your subjective probability estimate on scale raning from 0 to 100 with
0 indicating Not a chance 
100 indicating Absolute Certainty
BENTON VISUAL RETENTION TEST RESTLTS 
(Form C, Administration A)
Norms for correct score:
1 below “expected score” - normal
2 “ “ “ - raises question of
acquired impairment
3 “ “ “ - suggestive of
acquired impairment
4 or more “ “ - strong indication of
acquired impairment
Norms for error score:
1 or 2 points above “expected score” - normal
3 “ “ “ “ - raises
question of 
acquired impairment
4 “ “ “ suggestive of
acquired impairment
5 or more “ “ strong indication of
acquired impairment
PROBABILITY EST. 
BRAIN DAMAGED 
PATIENT
OBTAINING SCORE
PROBABILITY EST. 
NON BRAIN DAMAGED 
PATIENT
OBTAINING SCORE
1. correct score = 4 (expected = 5) 
error score =13 (expected = 8)
2. correct score = 3 (expected = 5) 
error score =16 (expected = 8)
3. correct score = 8 (expected = 8) 
error score = 2 (expected = 3)
4. correct score = 4 (expected = 6) 
error score =13 (expected = 6)
5. correct score = 3 (expected = 6) 
error score = 14 (expected = 6)
6. correct score = 2 (expected = 6) 
error score =13 (expected = 6)
7. correct score = 2 (expected = 5) 
error score =14 (expected = 8)
SECTION A (continued)
BENTON VISUAL RETENTION TEST RESTLTS 
(Form C, Administration A)
Norms for correct score:
1 below “expected score” - normal
2 “ “ “ - raises question of
acquired impairment
3 “ “ “ - suggestive of
acquired impairment
4 or more “ “ - strong indication of
acquired impairment
Norms for error score:
1 or 2 points above “expected score” - normal
3 “ “ “ raises question of
acquired impairment
4 “ “ “ suggestive of
acquired impairment
5 or more “ “ strong indication of
acquired impairment
PROBABILITY EST. 
BRAIN DAMAGED 
PATIENT
OBTAINING SCORE
PROBABILITY EST. 
NON BRAIN DAMAGED 
PATIENT
OBTAINING SCORE
8. correct score = 6 (expected = 9) 
error score = 4 (expected = 2)
9. correct score = 1 (expected = 5) 
error score = 20 (expected = 7)
10. correct score = 5 (expected = 8) 
error score = 7 (expected = 3)
11. correct score = 7 (expected = 9) 
error score = 3 (expected =1)
12. correct score = 5 (expected = 8) 
error score = 6 (expected = 3)
13. correct score = 4 (expected = 7) 
error score = 7 (expected = 4)
14. correct score = 6 (expected = 7) 
error score = 5 (expected = 4)
15. correct score =10 (expected = 9) 
error score = 0 (expected =1)
16. correct score = 6 (expected = 8) 
error score = 4 (expected = 2)
SECTION B
The following are results from the Williams Delayed Recall Test.
Instruction: as previous section
i.e., for each set of results, give 2 responses:
1. the probability estimate of a BRAIN DAMAGED patient obtaining the result.
2. the probability estimate of a NON BRAIN DAMAGED obtaining the result. 
N.B. Give your probability estimate on scale range 0 to 100
Test results from Williams Delayed 
R.T. -  form A 
Norms for raw score:
Brain Damaged -14 + 
Doubtful -12 - 13 
Not Brain Damaged - 0 - 11
Probability estimate 
of BRAIN DAMAGED 
patient obtaining 
the score
(range: 0 to 100)
Probability estimate 
of NON BRAIN DAMAGED 
patient obtaining 
the score
(range: 0 to 100)
1. Raw score = 36
2. Raw score =13
3. Raw score = 8
4. Raw score = 23
5. Raw score = 12
6. Raw score = 22
7. Raw score = 16
8. Raw score = 8
9. Raw score = 30
10. Raw score = 2
11. Raw score = 6
12. Raw score = 2
13. Raw score = 34
14. Raw score = 2
15. Raw score = 6
16. Raw score = 2
SECTION C
The following are results from the Walton-Black Modified New Word Learning Tests.
Instruction: as previous section, i.e., for each set of results 
give your subjective probability estimate that
1. A BRAIN DAMAGED patient may obtain the result
2. A NON BRAIN DAMAGED patient may obtain the result 
Give your probability estimate on scale ranging from 0 to 100
Test Results from the Modified NWLT - 
Old scoring Method
Norms: 30 + Brain Damaged 
21-30  Borderline 
1-20  Not Brain Damaged
Probability estimate 
of BRAIN DAMAGED 
patient obtaining 
the score
Probability estimate 
of NON BRAIN DAMAGED 
patient obtaining 
the score
1. Total score = 25
2. Total score = 40
3. Total score = 30
4. Total score = 26
5. Total score = 23
6. Total score = 24
7. Total score = 8
8. Total score = 1
9. Total score = 40
10. Total score = 29
11. Total score = 20
12. Total score = 19
13. Total score = 35
14. Total score = 6
15. Total score = 20
16. Total score = 1
SECTION D
The following are some results from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
Instruction: as previous section, i.e., for each set of results 
give your subjective probability estimate that
1. A BRAIN DAMAGED patient (age between 25 and 64)
will obtain the same pattern of scores
2. A NON BRAIN DAMAGED patient (age between 25 and 64)
will obtain the same pattern of scores
WECHSLER ADULT INTELLIGENCE SCALE
Probability estimate 
of BRAIN DAMAGED 
patient obtaining 
same pattern of score
(range: 0 to 100)
Probability estimate 
of NON BRAIN DAMGAED 
patient obtaining 
same pattern of score
(range: 0 to 100)
information - 8
comprehens. - 9
arithmetic - 10
similarity - 6
digit span -10
vocabulary - 8
digit symbol 
pict. comple. 
block design 
pict. arrang. 
object assem.
-5 
-7 
-7 
-  6 
-7
Verb. IQ = 93 Perform. IQ = 88 
F.S. IQ = 90
information - 8
comprehens. - 12 
arithmetic - 12
similarity - 11
digit span - 10
vocabulary - 11
digit symbol 
pict. comple. 
block design 
pict. arrang. 
object assem.
-3 
-9 
-7 
-  6 
-4
Verb. IQ = 108 Perform. IQ = 89 
F.S. IQ = 100
information - 16 
comprehens. - 18 
arithmetic - 13
similarity - 14
digit span -10 
vocabulary - 14
digit symbol 
pict. comple. 
block design 
pict. arrang. 
object assem.
-4
- 8
-5
-5
-5
Verb. IQ = 129 Perform. IQ = 87 
F.S. IQ =111
information - 
comprehens. - 
arithmetic 
similarity 
digit span 
vocabulary -
digit symbol 
pict. comple. 
block design 
pict. arrang. 
object assem.
-7
- 6
-5
Verb. IQ = 88 Perform. IQ = 87
F.S. IQ = 87
SECTION D (continued)
WECHSLER ADULT INTELLIGENCE SCALE
Probability estimate 
of BRAIN DAMAGED 
patient obtaining 
same pattern of score
(range: 0 to 100)
Probability estimate 
of NON BRAIN DAMAGED 
patient obtaining 
same pattern of score
(range: 0 to 100)
information - 
comprehens. - 
arithmetic 
similarity 
digit span 
vocabulary -
digit symbol 
pict. comple. 
block design 
pict. arrang. 
object assem.
-3
-9
-3
-4
-7
Verb. IQ = 78 Perform. IQ = 85 
F.S. IQ = 80
information - 10
comprehens. - 6 
arithmetic - 8
similarity - 8
digit span - 9
vocabulary - 7
digit symbol 
pict. comple. 
block design 
pict. arrang. 
object assem.
- 4
-  10
- 7
-  8 
-10
Verb. IQ = 85 Perform. IQ = 87 
F.S. IQ = 85
information
comprehens.
arithmetic
similarity
digit span
vocabulary
11
10
9
10
9
12
digit symbol 
pict. comple. 
block design 
pict. arrang. 
object assem.
7
11
7
7
7
Verb. IQ = 100 Perform. IQ = 86 
F.S. IQ = 94
information - 14
comprehens. - 13 
arithmetic - 8
similarity - 10
digit span - 7
vocabulary - 15
digit symbol 
pict. comple. 
block design 
pict. arrang. 
object assem.
9 
12
10 
10 
9
Verb. IQ = 109 Perform. IQ = 112 
F.S. IQ =111
information
comprehens.
arithmetic
similarity
digit span
vocabulary
10
6
6
9
4
9
digit symbol 
pict. comple. 
block design 
pict. arrang. 
object assem.
-0
-4
-4
-0
-2
Verb. IQ = 83 Perform. IQ = 48
F.S. IQ = 66
SECTION D (continued)
WECHSLER ADULT INTELLIGENCE SCALE
Probability estimate 
of BRAIN DAMAGED 
patient obtaining 
same pattern of score
(range: 0 to 100)
Probability estimate 
of NON BRAIN DAMAGED 
patient obtaining 
same pattern of score
(range: 0 to 100)
10
information - 9
comprehens. - 10 
arithmetic - 8
similarity - 8
digit span - 11
vocabulary - 10
digit symbol 
pict. comple. 
block design 
pict. arrang. 
object assem.
- 9
- 9
-  8 
-  12
Verb. IQ = 95 Perform. IQ = 97 
F.S. IQ = 96
11
information -13
comprehens. -14 
arithmetic - 11
similarity - 13
digit span - 14
vocabulary - 15
digit symbol 
pict. comple. 
block design 
pict. arrang. 
object assem.
11
9
11
11
9
Verb. IQ = 119 Perform. IQ = 102 
F.S. IQ = 112
12
information - 10
comprehens. - 10 
arithmetic - 10
similarity - 7
digit span - 11
vocabulary - 10
digit symbol 
pict. comple. 
block design 
pict. arrang. 
object assem.
-  11 
- 12  
-16 
-  12 
- 16
Verb. IQ = 98 Perform. IQ = 127 
F.S. IQ =111
13
information -15
comprehens. - 17 
arithmetic - 11
similarity - 11
digit span - 11
vocabulary -15
digit symbol 
pict. comple. 
block design 
pict. arrang. 
object assem.
11
6
8
11
7
Verb. IQ = 124 Perform. IQ = 108 
F.S. IQ =118
14
information - 9
comprehens. - 10 
arithmetic - 7
similarity - 13
digit span - 7
vocabulary - 12
digit symbol 
pict. comple. 
block design 
pict. arrang. 
object assem.
- 7 
-10 
-11
- 9 
-11
Verb. IQ = 97 Perform. IQ = 98
F.S. IQ = 97
SECTION D (continued)
WECHSLER ADULT INTELLIGENCE SCALE
Probability estimate 
of BRAIN DAMAGED 
patient obtaining 
same pattern of score
(range: 0 to 100)
Probability estimate 
of NON BRAIN DAMAGED 
patient obtaining 
same pattern of score
(range: 0 to 100)
15
information - 17
comprehens. - 15 
arithmetic - 17
similarity - 14
digit span - 14
vocabulary - 17
digit symbol 
pict. comple. 
block design 
pict. arrang. 
object assem.
-  8
- 3
-  10 
-  12 
-  6
Verb. IQ = 137 Perform. IQ = 110 
F.S. IQ = 127
16
information - 9 digit symbol - 0
comprehens. - 6 pict. comple. - 3 
arithmetic - 6 block design - 3
similarity - 9 pict. arrang. - 2
digit span - 4 object assem. - 4
vocabulary - 9
Verb. IQ = 87 Perform. IQ = 62 
F.S. IQ = 75
SECTION E
The next few pages are 16 case histories o f patients with neuropsychological 
complaints. 9 of these cases were found to be BRAIN DAMAGED’, 7 were 'NOT 
BRAIN DAMAGED’.
These case histories are only brief outlines of each patient’s presenting 
complaints and clinical symptoms. No interview data or psychometric test result is 
presented in any o f these case histories.
INSTRUCTION:
Assuming this is the only information you have for each case, your tasks are, after 
reading each case history -
1. Indicate your opinion whether the patient is BRAIN DAMAGED’ or NOT 
BRAIN DAMAGED’.
2. Express how confident you are in your opinion on a scale ranging from 50 to 100, 
with 50 meaning you are totally unsure, to 100 meaning you are completely 
confident.
You should write your degree of confidence between 50 and 100 since there are only 
two answers (Brain damaged or not Brain damaged). Thus, even if  you are totally 
unsure and make a random guess, you still have 50% chance o f being correct.
SECTION E (continued)
CASE 1. Mr. D. was 61 yrs. old when he was seen.
He complained of having increasing difficulty in remembering things, e.g., 
addresses and telephone numbers. The problem had got worse in the past 
6 months. He was noted to be mildly euphoric in his behaviour, but he 
insisted he had been like this since he was young. He had had no previous 
psychiatric history of history of alcohol or drug abuse.
Which is the correct diagnosis? I BRAIN DAMAGE
(Please tick the appropriate box) '--- '
| | NOT BRAIN DAMAGE
How sure are you? (range: 50 to 100) _____
CASE 2. Mr. G. was 52 yrs. old retired fireman. He retired early after a major 
stomach operation.
He was referred for his increasingly apathetic and indifferent behaviour, 
where he would spend all day just sitting and gazing into space, and had to 
be reminded to attend to his personal hygiene. He was also noted to have 
changed his eating habits, and became very indiscriminate about food, 
which was at odds with his previous behaviour. The patient also claimed a 
deterioration in his memory and concentration. He denied being 
depressed.
Which is the correct diagnosis? I BRAIN DAMAGE
(Please tick the appropriate box) '— I
| | NOT BRAIN DAMAGE
How sure are you? (range: 50 to 100) _____
CASE 3. Mrs. M. (49 yrs. old housewife) was admitted to hospital after she was 
found in a confused and forgetful state at home. She was said to be 
disorientated of time, date and place. Whilst in hospital, her orientation 
had recovered.
She was reported to be under considerable emotional stress after the death 
of her second husband 9 months ago. Her first husband also died suddenly 
5 years ago.
Which is the correct diagnosis? I BRAIN DAMAGE
(Please tick the appropriate box) '---1
| | NOT BRAIN DAMAGE
How sure are you? (range: 50 to 100) _____
SECTION E (continued)
CASE 4. Mr. X. (64 yrs. old building worker) complained of a longstanding history 
of headaches, poor concentration and disturbed sleep through bad dreams. 
He claimed that it was caused by an accident which occurred 15 years ago 
when he was hit by a tipper bucket while he was working on a building 
site.
Although he sustained only superficial cuts to his face and was awarded 
pounds 64 for the injury, he was convinced that the accident had given rise 
to his headaches and disturbed sleep, and had requested further 
compensation.
Which is the correct diagnosis? I BRAIN DAMAGE 
(Please tick the appropriate box) '— '
| | NOT BRAIN DAMAGE
How sure are you? (range: 50 to 100) _____
CASE 5. Mr. E. (age: 48 yrs. -  unskilled worker at a stationery shop).
The patient reported that 2 weeks ago while on his way home, he suddenly 
had an 'odd and drunk’ feeling. Soon after that he developed severe 
occipital headaches.
He described the pain as radiating which spread over to his left eye. The 
pain continued for over a week. He also complained of having felt dizzy 
and nauseas after each headache attack.
Which is the correct diagnosis? I BRAIN DAMAGE 
(Please tick the appropriate box) <— '
| | NOT BRAIN DAMAGE
How sure are you? (range: 50 to 100) _____
CASE 6. Mr. J. (age 56 yrs.)
Mr. J. was referred for the complaint of a perpetual occipital headache, he 
was also observed to have choreiform-like movement.
He was initially admitted to hospital for his depression.
His depression was lifted soon after his admission, and he became 
extremely lively and talkative. He was also noted for his somewhat 
eccentric behaviour, and example of which was he carried pounds 1000 
in his pocket whilst in hospital.
Which is the correct diagnosis? I BRAIN DAMAGE
(Please tick the appropriate box) I---1
| | NOT BRAIN DAMAGE
How sure are you? (range: 50 to 100) _____
SECTION E (continued)
CASE 7. Mrs. P. (age 48 yrs. assistant staff officer)
Her main complaint was her poor memory and her forgetfulness, e.g., she 
had difficulty in remembering whether she had cleaned her teeth or how 
many eggs she had used when she was baking a cake.
She also complained of a staffing headache which was often followed by 
an impairment of sensation on the right side of her body.
Which is the correct diagnosis? I BRAIN DAMAGE 
(Please tick the appropriate box) I— '
| | NOT BRAIN DAMAGE
How sure are you? (range: 50 to 100) _____
CASE 8. Mr. B. (age 34 yrs.)
He had a 'black-out’ in town 2 years ago. Since then, he had been feeling 
weak and lethargic. He also suffered from a recurrent frontal headache, 
which was getting progressively worse.
He admitted being a compulsive gambler, but denied this had anything to 
do with his complaints.
Which is the correct diagnosis? I BRAIN DAMAGE
(Please tick the appropriate box) '--- '
| | NOT BRAIN DAMAGE
How sure are you? (range: 50 to 100) _____
CASE 9. Mr. H. (age 31 yrs. hotel worker)
He complained of having lost his memory for an event which took place a 
week ago. Apparently, the problem was associated with an accident -  he 
was out drinking with a friend and on returning home, he was reported to 
have 'passed out’ and fallen to the ground.
Although he sustained no apparent injury, he claimed to have lost 
recollection of the event which took place that night.
Which is the correct diagnosis? I BRAIN DAMAGE 
(Please tick the appropriate box) ‘ ‘
| | NOT BRAIN DAMAGE
How sure are you? (range: 50 to 100) _____
SECTION E (continued)
CASE 10. Mr. S. (age 37 yrs. -  unemployed lorry driver)
This patient complained of poor concentration at work and claimed to have 
'patchy’ memory for recent events. He also complained of insomnia.
He reported that he had been drinking heavily during the past few months, 
and he had been feeling depressed over a worsening relationship with his 
wife.
Which is the correct diagnosis? I BRAIN DAMAGE
(Please tick the appropriate box) ■--'
| | NOT BRAIN DAMAGE
How sure are you? (range: 50 to 100) _____
CASE 11. Mr. N. (age 59 years)
He complained of a severe headache which developed suddenly a month 
ago. He also reported having suffered from a severe back pain (between 
shoulder blades) 7 years ago. After that, he had several 'black-outs’; but 
the investigations for his black-outs were found to be negative. His last 
black-out occurred a year ago while he was at work.
Which is the correct diagnosis? I BRAIN DAMAGE
(Please tick the appropriate box) '-- '
| | NOT BRAIN DAMAGE
How sure are you? (range: 50 to 100) _____
CASE 12. Miss C. (age 25 years)
She claimed to have difficulty in concentration and was unable to 
remember facts, e.g., things she had read. She also complained of feeling 
tense and restless.
She had had a long history of alcohol and drug abuse. Over the past 7 
years, she had taken a variety of drugs which included Amphetamines, 
LSD, Barbiturates, Heroin and Cocaine.
Which is the correct diagnosis? I BRAIN DAMAGE
(Please tick the appropriate box) '-'
| | NOT BRAIN DAMAGE
How sure are you? (range: 50 to 100) _____
SECTION E (continued)
CASE 13. Mrs. R. (age 34 years -  housewife)
This woman has had a longstanding history of agitated depression and 
panic reactions.
She complained of headaches and occasional brief loss of consciousness 
which started 6 months ago. She described her headaches as generalized 
which could come on at any time of the day. She also complained of being 
unable to tolerate noise, which she claimed would make her unsteady on 
her feet.
Which is the correct diagnosis? I BRAIN DAMAGE 
(Please tick the appropriate box) '— »
| | NOT BRAIN DAMAGE
How sure are you? (range: 50 to 100) ______
CASE 14. Mr. K. (age 49 years -  linguistic lecturer)
He complained that he suddenly felt 'peculiar’ 3 weeks ago while walking 
home.
It was an indescribable feeling he had never had before.
Immediately after the peculiar experience, he developed pins and needles 
in his right arm and leg. This was followed by a gradual spasm in his right 
knee and hip which lasted only a few seconds.
Which is the correct diagnosis? I BRAIN DAMAGE 
(Please tick the appropriate box) '— I
| | NOT BRAIN DAMAGE
How sure are you? (range: 50 to 100) ______
SECTIO N E (continued)
CASE 15. Mrs. Y. -  57 years old, former school teacher.
She was reported to be 'slowing down’ since her returned from Rhodesia 
several months ago. With the exception of a period of insomnia (about 10 
years ago) treated by her general practitioner in Rhodesia where she 
resided for 30 years, she was said to have been an active, healthy woman. 
For her symptoms, she was diagnosed as suffering from 'agitated 
depression’, but various medications and ECT had not resulted in any 
improvement in her condition.
She remained indifferent and apathetic, and was complaining of lack of 
concentration and poor memory.
Which is the correct diagnosis? I BRAIN DAMAGE 
(Please tick the appropriate box) ■— '
| | NOT BRAIN DAMAGE
How sure are you? (range: 50 to 100) ______
CASE 16. Mr. A -  29 years old, car worker at Ford.
He claimed that his memory had deteriorated, that he had difficulty in
remembering events in the past.
He has had a longstanding history of anxiety problems, coupled with a 
feeling of being a social misfit. This resulted in his drinking a lot and his 
experimenting with drugs to relieve his anxiety. He was admitted to
Psychiatric Hospital as a day patient 2 years ago after he claimed that he
was unable to cope with his emotional difficulty.
Which is the correct diagnosis? I BRAIN DAMAGE 
(Please tick the appropriate box) I— •
| | NOT BRAIN DAMAGE
How sure are you? (range: 50 to 100) ______
Appendix H: Copy of Part II of the Experiment
Name
CLINICAL DECISION EXPERIMENT -  PART II
Once again, thank you for taking part in this experiment. You will be shown 
16 case histories o f patients with neuropsychological complaints, together with 
PSYCHOMETRIC Test results.
Nine o f these cases were found to be BRAIN DAMAGED, the other seven 
cases NOT BRAIN DAMAGED.
INSTRUCTION:
YOUR TASKS ARE, AFTER READING EACH CASE HISTORY:
1. INDICATE, IN YOUR OPINION, WHETHER THE PATIENT IS BRAIN 
DAMAGED OR NOT BRAIN DAMAGED
2. INDICATE HOW SURE YOU ARE ON A SCALE RANING FROM 50 
to 100
with 50 meaning totally uncertain 
100 “ completely certain
YOU SHOULD EXPRESS YOUR DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE 
BETWEEN THE RANGE OF 50 -100, BECAUSE, EVEN BY A 
RANDOM GUESS, YOU STILL HAVE 50% CHANCE OF BEING 
CORRECT.
* Norms for different brain damage test are given on the next pate. You may 
use any other norm tables and manuals.
1. Norms for Benton Visual Retention test
(a) for correct score:
1 below “expected score” - normal
2 “ “ “ - raises question of
acquired impairment.
3 “ “ “ - suggestive of acquired
impairment.
4 or more “ “ - strong indication of
acquired impairment.
(b) for error score:
1 or 2 points above “expected score” - normal
3 points “ “ “ - raises question of
acquired impairment.
4 points “ “ “ - suggestive of
acquired impairment.
5 or more “ “ - strong indication of
acquired impairment.
2. Norms for Williams Delayed Recall Test
Raw Score 14+ - Brain damaged
“ “ 1 2 - 1 3  - Doubtful 
“ “ 0 - 1 1  - Not Brain Damaged
3. Norms for Modified New Word Learning Test 
(Old scoring method)
Total Score 30+ - Brain Damaged
“ “ 2 1 - 3 0  - Borderline
“ “ 1 -  20 - Not Brain Damaged
CASE 1. Mr. D. was 61 yrs. old when he was seen.
He complained of having increasing difficulty in remembering things, e.g., 
addresses and telephone numbers. The problem had got worse in the last 6 
months. He was noted to be mildly euphoric in his behaviour, but he 
insisted he had been like this since he was young. He had no previous 
psychiatric history o f history of alcohol or drug abuse.
Psychological Investigations:
1. Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
information -1 0  digit symbol
comprehens. - 6
arithmetic - 8
similarity - 8
digit span - 9
vocabulary - 7
- 4
pict. comp - 10 
block design - 7 
pict. arrang. - 8 
object assem. - 1 0
Verbal IQ =85  
Perform. IQ = 87 
F.S. IQ = 85
2. Benton Visual Retention Test (Form C, Administration A) 
number correct score = 4 (expected score = 5) 
number error score =13 (expected score = 8)
3. Williams Delayed Recall Test (Form A)
Raw Score = 36
4. Walton-Black Modified New Word Learning Test 
Total score = 25 (old scoring method)
Which is the correct diagnosis? BRAIN DAMAGE
(Please tick appropriate box) NOT BRAIN DAMAGE
H ow  sure are you?(range: 50 to 100)
CASE 2. Mr. G. was 52 years old retired fireman. He retired early after a major 
stomach operation.
He was referred for his increasingly apathetic and indifferent behaviour, 
where he would spend all day just sitting and gazing into space, and had to 
be reminded to attend to his personal hygiene. He was also noted to have 
changed his eating habits, and became very indiscriminate about food, 
which was at odds with his previous behaviour. The patient also claimed a 
deterioration in his memory and concentration. He denied being 
depressed.
Psychological Investigations:
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
information - 9 digit symbol - 0 Verbal IQ = 87
comprehens. - 6 pict. comp - 3 Perform. IQ = 62
arithmetic - 6 block design - 3 F.S. IQ = 75
similarity - 9 pict. arrang. - 2
digit span - 4 object assem. - 4
vocabulary - 9
2. Benton Visual Retention Test (Form C, Administration A) 
number correct score = 3 (expected score = 5) 
number error score =16  (expected score = 8)
3. Williams Delayed Recall Test (Form A)
Raw Score =13
4. Walton-Black Modified New Word Learning Test 
Total score = 40 (old scoring method)
Which is the correct diagnosis? BRAIN DAMAGE
(Please tick appropriate box) NOT BRAIN DAMAGE
H ow  sure are you?(range: 50 to 100)
CASE 3. Mrs. M. (49 years old housewife) was admitted to hospital after she was 
found in a confused and forgetful state at home. She was said to be 
disorientated of time, date and place. Whilst in hospital, her orientation 
had recovered.
She was reported to be under considerable emotional stress after the death 
of her second husband 9 months ago. Her first husband also died suddenly 
5 years ago.
Psychological Investigations:
1. Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
information - 8 digit symbol - 5 Verbal IQ =93
comprehens. - 9 pict. comp 7 Perform. IQ = 88
arithmetic - 10 block design - 7 F.S. IQ = 90
similarity - 6 pict. arrang. - 6
digit span - 10 object assem. - 7
vocabulary - 8
2. Benton Visual Retention Test (Form C, Administration A) 
number correct score = 4 (expected score = 6) 
number error score =13 (expected score = 6)
3. Williams Delayed Recall Test (Form A)
Raw Score = 23
4. Walton-Black Modified New Word Learning Test 
Total score = 26 (old scoring method)
Which is the correct diagnosis? BRAIN DAMAGE
(Please tick appropriate box) NOT BRAIN DAMAGE
H ow  sure are you?(range: 50 to 100)
CASE 4. Mr. X. (64 years old building worker) complained of a longstanding 
history of headaches, poor concentration and disturbed sleep through bad 
dreams.
He claimed that it was caused by an accident which occurred 15 years ago 
when he was hit by a tipper bucket while he was working on a building 
site.
Although he sustained only superficial cuts to his face and was awarded 
pounds 64 for the injury, he was convinced that the accident had given rise 
to his headaches and disturbed sleep, and had requested further 
compensation.
Psychological Investigations:
1. Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
information - 8 digit symbol - 3 Verbal IQ = 108
comprehens. - 12 pict. comp - 9 Perform. IQ = 89
arithmetic - 12 block design - 7 F.S. IQ = 100
similarity - 11 pict. arrang. - 6
digit span -10 object assem. - 4
vocabulary - 11
2. Benton Visual Retention Test (Form C, Administration A) 
number correct score = 3 (expected score = 6) 
number error score =14  (expected score = 6)
3. Williams Delayed Recall Test (Form A) 
Raw Score = 12
4. Walton-Black Modified New Word Learning Test 
Total score = 23 (old scoring method)
Which is the correct diagnosis? BRAIN DAMAGE
(Please tick appropriate box) NOT BRAIN DAMAGE
How sure are you?(range: 50 to 100)
CASE 5. Mr. E. (age: 48 yrs. -  unskilled worker at a stationery shop).
The patient reported that 2 weeks ago while on his way home, he suddenly 
had an 'odd and drunk’ feeling. Soon after that he developed severe 
occipital headaches.
He described the pain as radiating which spread over to his left eye. The 
pain continued for over a week. He also complained of having felt dizzy 
and nauseas after each headache attack.
Psychological Investigations:
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
information - 6 digit symbol - 5 Verbal IQ = 88
comprehens. - 9 pict. comp - 8 Perform. IQ = 87
arithmetic - 7 block design - 7 F.S. IQ = 87
similarity - 9 pict. arrang. - 6
digit span - 6 object assem. - 5
vocabulary - 9
2. Benton Visual Retention Test (Form C, Administration A) 
number correct score = 2 (expected score = 6) 
number error score =13 (expected score = 6)
3. Williams Delayed Recall Test (Form A)
Raw Score = 22
4. Walton-Black Modified New Word Learning Test 
Total score = 24 (old scoring method)
Which is the correct diagnosis? BRAIN DAMAGE
(Please tick appropriate box) NOT BRAIN DAMAGE
H ow  sure are you?(range: 50 to 100)
CASE 6. Mr. J. (age 56 years.)
Mr. J. was referred for the complaint of a perpetual occipital headache, he 
was also observed to have choreiform-like movement. He was initially 
admitted to hospital for his depression. His depression was lifted soon 
after his admission, and he became extremely lively and talkative. He was 
also noted for his somewhat eccentric behaviour, and example of which 
was he carried pounds 1000 in his pocket whilst in hospital.
Psychological Investigations:
1. Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
information - 7 digit symbol - 3 Verbal IQ =78
comprehens. - 4 pict. comp - 9 Perform. IQ = 85
arithmetic 4 block design - 3 F.S. IQ = 80
similarity 3 pict. arrang. - 4
digit span 7 object assem. - 7
vocabulary - 8
2. Benton Visual Retention Test (Form C, Administration A) 
number correct score = 2 (expected score = 5) 
number error score = 14  (expected score = 8)
3. Williams Delayed Recall Test (Form A)
Raw Score = 16
4. Walton-Black Modified New Word Learning Test 
Total score = 8 (old scoring method)
Which is the correct diagnosis? BRAIN DAMAGE
(Please tick appropriate box) NOT BRAIN DAMAGE
How sure are you?(range: 50 to 100)
CASE 7. Mrs. P. (age 48 years, assistant staff officer)
Her main complaint was her poor memory and her forgetfulness, e.g., she 
had difficulty in remembering whether she had cleaned her teeth or how 
many eggs she had used when she was baking a cake. She also 
complained of a staffing headache which was often followed by an 
impairment of sensation on the right side of her body.
Psychological Investigations:
1. Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
information - 14 digit symbol - 9 Verbal IQ =109
comprehens. - 13 pict. comp - 12 Perform. IQ = 112
arithmetic - 8 block design - 10 F.S. IQ = 111
similarity - 10 pict. arrang. - 10
digit span - 7 object assem. - 9
vocabulary - 15
2. Benton Visual Retention Test (Form C, Administration A) 
number correct score = 6 (expected score = 9)
number error score = 4 (expected score = 2)
3. Williams Delayed Recall Test (Form A)
Raw Score = 8
4. Walton-Black Modified New Word Learning Test 
Total score = 1 (old scoring method)
Which is the correct diagnosis? BRAIN DAMAGE
(Please tick appropriate box) NOT BRAIN DAMAGE
H ow  sure are you?(range: 50 to 100)
CASE 8. Mr. B. (age 34 years)
He had a 'black-out’ in town 2 years ago. Since then, he had been feeling 
weak and lethargic. He also suffered from a recurrent frontal headache, 
which was getting progressively worse.
He admitted being a compulsive gambler, but denied this had anything to 
do with his complaints.
Psychological Investigations:
1. Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
information -1 0 digit symbol - 0 Verbal IQ = 83
comprehens. - 6 pict. comp - 4 Perform. IQ = 48
arithmetic - 6 block design - 4 F.S. IQ = 66
similarity - 9 pict. arrang. - 0
digit span - 4 object assem. - 2
vocabulary - 9
2. Benton Visual Retention Test (Form C, Administration A) 
number correct score = 1 (expected score = 5)
number error score = 20 (expected score = 7)
3. Williams Delayed Recall Test (Form A)
Raw Score = 3 0
4. Walton-Black Modified New Word Learning Test 
Total score = 40 (old scoring method)
Which is the correct diagnosis? BRAIN DAMAGE
(Please tick appropriate box) NOT BRAIN DAMAGE
H ow  sure are you?(range: 50 to 100)
CASE 9. Mr. H. (age 31 years, hotel worker)
He complained of having lost his memory for an event which took place a 
week ago. Apparently, the problem was associated with an accident -  he 
was out drinking with a friend and on returning home, he was reported to 
have 'passed out’ and fallen to the ground. Although he sustained no 
apparent injury, he claimed to have lost recollection of the event which 
took place that night.
Psychological Investigations:
1. Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
information - 9 digit symbol - 9 Verbal IQ = 95
comprehens. - 10 pict. comp - 9 Perform. IQ = 97
arithmetic - 8 block design - 9 F.S. IQ = 96
similarity - 8 pict. arrang. - 8
digit span - 11 object assem. - 12
vocabulary - 10
2. Benton Visual Retention Test (Form C, Administration A) 
number correct score = 5 (expected score = 8)
number error score = 7 (expected score = 3)
3. Williams Delayed Recall Test (Form A)
Raw Score = 2
4. Walton-Black Modified New Word Learning Test 
Total score = 29 (old scoring method)
Which is the correct diagnosis? BRAIN DAMAGE
(Please tick appropriate box) NOT BRAIN DAMAGE
H ow  sure are you?(range: 50 to 100)
CA SE 10. Mr. S. (age 37 years -  unem ployed lorry driver)
This patient complained of poor concentration at work and claimed to have 
'patchy’ memory for recent events. He also complained of insomnia.
He reported that he had been drinking heavily during the past few months, 
and he had been feeling depressed over a worsening relationship with his 
wife.
vocabulary - 10
2. Benton Visual Retention Test (Form C, Administration A) 
number correct score = 7 (expected score = 9)
number error score = 3 (expected score = 1 )
3. Williams Delayed Recall Test (Form A)
Raw Score = 6
4. Walton-Black Modified New Word Learning Test 
Total score = 20 (old scoring method)
Psychological Investigations:
1. Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
information - 10 digit symbol - 11
comprehens. - 10 pict. comp - 12
arithmetic - 10 block design - 16
similarity - 7 pict. arrang. - 12
digit span - 11 object assem. - 16
Verbal IQ = 98 
Perform. IQ = 127 
F.S. IQ = 111
Which is the correct diagnosis? 
(Please tick appropriate box)
B R A IN  D A M A G E
N O T  B R A IN  D A M A G E
H ow  sure are you?(range: 50 to 100)
CASE 11. Mr. N. (age 59 years)
He complained of a severe headache which developed suddenly a month 
ago. He also reported having suffered from a severe back pain (between 
shoulder blades) 7 years ago. After that, he had several 'black-outs’; but 
the investigations for his black-outs were found to be negative. His last 
black-out occurred a year ago while he was at work.
Psychological Investigations:
1. Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
information - 16 digit symbol - 4 Verbal IQ = 129
comprehens. - 18 pict. comp - 8 Perform. IQ = 87
arithmetic - 13 block design - 5 F.S. IQ = 111
similarity - 14 pict. arrang. - 5
digit span -10 object assem. - 5
vocabulary - 14
2. Benton Visual Retention Test (Form C, Administration A) 
number correct score = 4 (expected score = 7)
number error score = 7 (expected score = 4)
3. Williams Delayed Recall Test (Form A)
Raw Score = 34
4. Walton-Black Modified New Word Learning Test 
Total score = 35 (old scoring method)
Which is the correct diagnosis? BRAIN DAMAGE
(Please tick appropriate box) NOT BRAIN DAMAGE
H ow  sure are you?(range: 50 to 100)
CASE 12. Miss C. (age 25 years)
She claimed to have difficulty in concentration and was unable to 
remember facts, e.g., things she had read. She also complained of feeling 
tense and restless.
She had had a long history of alcohol and drug abuse. Over the past 7 
years, she had taken a variety of drugs which included Amphetamines, 
LSD, Barbiturates, Heroin and Cocaine.
Psychological Investigations:
1. Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
information - 13 digit symbol - 11 Verbal IQ =119
comprehens. - 14 pict. comp - 9 Perform. IQ = 102
arithmetic - 11 block design - 11 F.S. IQ =112
similarity - 13 pict. arrang. - 11
digit span -14 object assem. - 9
vocabulary - 15
2. Benton Visual Retention Test (Form C, Administration A) 
number correct score =10  (expected score = 9) 
number error score = 0 (expected score = 1)
3. Williams Delayed Recall Test (Form A)
Raw Score = 6
4. Walton-Black Modified New Word Learning Test 
Total score = 20 (old scoring method)
Which is the correct diagnosis? BRAIN DAMAGE
(Please tick appropriate box) NOT BRAIN DAMAGE
H ow  sure are you?(range: 50 to 100)
CASE 13. Mrs. R. (age 34 years -  housew ife)
This woman has had a longstanding history of agitated depression and 
panic reactions.
She complained of headaches and occasional brief loss of consciousness 
which started 6 months ago. She described her headaches as generalized 
which could come on at any time of the day. She also complained of being 
unable to tolerate noise, which she claimed would make her unsteady on 
her feet.
vocabulary - 12
2. Benton Visual Retention Test (Form C, Administration A) 
number correct score = 6 (expected score = 7) 
number error score = 5 (expected score = 4)
3. Williams Delayed Recall Test (Form A)
Raw Score = 2
4. Walton-Black Modified New Word Learning Test 
Total score = 6 (old scoring method)
Psychological Investigations:
1. Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
information - 11 digit symbol - 7
comprehens. - 10 pict. comp - 11
arithmetic - 9 block design - 7
similarity - 10 pict. arrang. - 7
digit span - 9 object assem. - 7
Verbal IQ = 100 
Perform. IQ = 86 
F.S. IQ = 94
Which is the correct diagnosis? 
(Please tick appropriate box)
BR A IN  D A M A G E
N O T  B R A IN  D A M A G E
H ow  sure are you?(range: 50 to 100)
CASE 14. Mr. K. (age 49 years -  linguistic lecturer)
He complained that he suddenly felt 'peculiar’ 3 weeks ago while walking 
home.
It was an indescribable feeling he had never had before.
Immediately after the peculiar experience, he developed pins and needles 
in his right arm and leg. This was followed by a gradual spasm in his right 
knee and hip which lasted only a few seconds.
Psychological Investigations:
1. Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
information
arithmetic 
similarity 
digit span 
vocabulary - 19
17 digit symbol - 8 Verbal IQ = 137
15 pict. comp - 3 Perform. IQ = 110
17 block design - 10 F.S. IQ = 127
14 pict. arrang. - 12
14 object assem. - 6
2. Benton Visual Retention Test (Form C, Administration A) 
number correct score = 6 (expected score = 8) 
number error score = 4 (expected score = 2)
3. Williams Delayed Recall Test (Form A)
Raw Score = 2
4. Walton-Black Modified New Word Learning Test 
Total score = 1 (old scoring method)
Which is the correct diagnosis? 
(Please tick appropriate box)
B R A IN  D A M A G E
N O T  B R A IN  D A M A G E
H ow  sure are you?(range: 50 to 100)
CASE 15. Mrs. Y. 57 years old, former school teacher.
She was reported to be 'slowing down’ since her returned from Rhodesia 
several months ago. With the exception of a period of insomnia (about 10 
years ago) treated by her general practitioner in Rhodesia where she 
resided for 30 years, she was said to have been an active, healthy woman. 
For her symptoms, she was diagnosed as suffering from 'agitated 
depression’, but various medications and ECT had not resulted in any 
improvement in her condition.
She remained indifferent and apathetic, and was complaining of lack of 
concentration and poor memory.
Psychological Investigations:
1. Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
information - 15 digit symbol - 11 Verbal IQ =124
comprehens. - 17 pict. comp - 6 Perform. IQ = 108
arithmetic - 11 block design - 8 F.S. IQ =118
similarity - 11 pict. arrang. - 11
digit span - 11 object assem. - 7
vocabulary - 15
2. Benton Visual Retention Test (Form C, Administration A) 
number correct score = 8 (expected score = 8) 
number error score = 2 (expected score = 3)
3. Williams Delayed Recall Test (Form A) 
Raw Score = 8
4. Walton-Black Modified New Word Learning Test 
Total score = 30 (old scoring method)
Which is the correct diagnosis? BRAIN DAMAGE
(Please tick appropriate box) NOT BRAIN DAMAGE
How sure are you?(range: 50 to 100)
CASE 16. Mr. A -  29 years old, car worker at Ford.
He claimed that his memory had deteriorated, that he had difficulty in 
remembering events in the past.
He has had a longstanding history of anxiety problems, coupled with a 
feeling of being a social misfit. This resulted in his drinking a lot and his 
experimenting with drugs to relieve his anxiety. He was admitted to a 
Psychiatric Hospital as a day patient 2 years ago after he claimed that he 
was unable to cope with his emotional difficulty.
Psychological Investigations:
1. Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
information - 9 digit symbol - 7
comprehens. - 10
arithmetic - 7
similarity - 13
digit span - 7
vocabulary - 12
pict. comp - 10 
block design - 11 
pict. arrang. - 9 
object assem. - 11
Verbal IQ = 9 7  
Perform. IQ = 98 
F.S. IQ = 97
2. Benton Visual Retention Test (Form C, Administration A) 
number correct score = 5 (expected score = 8) 
number error score = 6 (expected score = 3)
3. Williams Delayed Recall Test (Form A)
Raw Score = 2
4. Walton-Black Modified New Word Learning Test 
Total score = 19 (old scoring method)
Which is the correct diagnosis? 
(Please tick appropriate box)
B R A IN  D A M A G E
N O T  B R A IN  D A M A G E
H ow  sure are you?(range: 50 to 100)
